THE REVIEW OF RELIGION

Volume X NOVEMBER, 1945 Number 1

EDITOR
Horace L. Friess

MANAGING EDITOR
Marguerite Block

EDITORIAL BOARD

Roland H. Bainton
Stephen F. Bayne, Jr.
Ruth F. Benedict
W. Norman Brown
Eugene H. Byrne
Louis H. Gray
Evarts B. Greene
William E. Hocking
Arthur Jeffery
Raymond C. Knox
John T. McNeill
Clarence A. Manning
Ralph Marcus
Isaac Mendelsohn
Cyril C. Richardson
David E. Roberts
Herbert W. Schneider
Ryusaku Tsunoda

The Review of Religion is published bi-monthly during the eight months of the academic year (November, January, March and May). Subscriptions: $2.00 a year (foreign, $2.30); single copies 60 cents (foreign, 70 cents). All subscriptions and business matters should be addressed to the publisher, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York City. Manuscripts, editorial communications and books for review should be addressed to the Editorial Office, 401 Low Memorial Library, Columbia University, New York City.

The articles in *The Review of Religion* are indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*, New York City.

COPYRIGHT 1945 BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

ARTICLES

Greek Prayers . . . . . KURT VON FRITZ 5

World Vision for World Order . . . . . IRWIN EDMAN 40

Rainbow Round My Shoulder: A Review Article . . . . . H. HEATH BAWDEN 47

BOOK REVIEWS

Charles A. Moore, ed.: *Philosophy—East and West* . . . . . (KURT F. LEIDECKER) 57

Siu-chi Huang: *Lu Hsiang-shan: A Twelfth Century Chinese Idealist Philosopher* . . . . . (HOMER H. DUBS) 60

Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Vol. XIV . . . . . (LUITPOLD WALLACH) 63

Solomon Liptzin: *Germany's Stepchildren* . . . . . (HENRY WALTER BRANN) 66

41476

William H. Russell: *Jesus, the Divine Teacher* . . . . . (Randolph Crump Miller) 70

Francis E. Mineka: *The Dissidence of Dissent: The Monthly Repository, 1806-1838* . . . . . (Merle M. Bevington) 73

Louise Saxe Eby: *The Quest for Moral Law* . . . . . (David Baumgardt) 76

Kurt F. Reinhardt: *A Realistic Philosophy* . . (Cecil De Boer) 78

Approaches to World Peace: A Symposium . (Henry D. Aiken) 90

Joseph D. Bennett: *Baudelaire: A Criticism* . . . . . .
Denis de Rougemont: *The Devil's Share* . . (Andrew Chiappe) 95

Book Notes 102

Swami Nikhilananda, tr.: *The Bhagavard Gita.* Madeleine S. and J. Lane Miller: *Encyclopedia of Bible Life.* Harris F. Rall: *According to Paul.* Jacques Maritain: *The Dream of Descartes.* Guy F. Hershberger: *War, Peace, and Nonresistance.*

Among the Periodicals 108

GREEK PRAYERS*

KURT VON FRITZ

Professor of Greek and Latin, Columbia University

IN THE MANY COMPREHENSIVE WORKS on Greek religion and its various phases published during the last few decades, prayer has been singularly neglected. Most of these works contain at best a few casual references to individual prayers, and even F. Heiler's monumental work on the history of prayer from the earliest times to the present devotes only a little more than three pages to the ancient Greeks.[1] There does exist a considerable number of small books and articles dealing with the typical forms of the invocation of the gods and their variations, with the relations between prayer and sacrifice, the opinions of Greek philosophers concerning prayer, and similar special topics.[2] None of these works, however, concerns itself expressly with what would seem the most important aspect of prayer as an expression of ancient Greek religion, namely, the characteristic relation between the praying individual and the deity or deities invoked, which reveals

* This article cannot claim to be anything like a complete analysis of the relevant material which has come down to us from antiquity, but since no integrated study of the subject has yet appeared, it seemed justifiable to publish it as it stands, in the hope of stimulating interest and provoking a more comprehensive study by a specialist in the field.

1. Friedrich Heiler, *Das Gebet*, 3d ed. (Munich, 1921), pp. 195-98.

2. The most important treatises and articles dealing with special sections or aspects of Greek prayers that I have been able to find are the following: (1) C. Ausfeld, "De Graecorum precationibus quaestiones," in *Jahrbücher für Philol.*, Suppl. Bd. 28 (1903), 525 ff.; (2) Konrat Ziegler, *De precationum apud Graecos formis* (diss. Breslau, 1905); (3) Harry Schmidt, *Veteres philosophi quomodo iudicaverint de precibus* (Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten, vol. 4, nr. 1, Giessen, 1906); (4) S. Sudhaus, "Lautes und leises Beten," in *Archiv für Rel.-Wissenschaft*, 8 (1906), 185 ff.; cf. also J. Balogh, *ibid.*, 27 (1929), 365 ff.; (5) F. Schwenn, *Gebet und Opfer* (Heidelberg, 1927); (6) Otto Weinreich, *Gebet und Wunder* (Stuttgart 1929); (7) K. Keyssner, *Gottesvorstellung und Lebensauffassung im griechischen Hymnus* (Stuttgart, 1932); (8) H. Kleinknecht, *Die Gebetsparodie in der Antike* (Stuttgart, 1937); (9) J. S. Creaghan, *Content and form of the prayers in Sophocles* (diss., Fordham, 1939); (10) P. J. Ramsey, *Prayers in Aeschylus* (diss., Fordham, 1943); Some interesting observations have also been made by Eduard Norden in his famous book *Agnostos Theos* (Berlin, 1913), pp. 151 f.; I have not been able to find a copy of E. P. Pfeiffner, *Die Götteranrufungen in den Werken der Tragiker* (diss., Freiburg, Switzerland, 1931).

itself in this most intimate expression of human belief in divine powers.

This may seem strange in view of the fact that, in the early and the classical period, and, to a very large extent, also in later times, all public ceremonies in the Greek states began and ended with prayers, and that Greek poetry of all types is full of both official and private invocations of the gods. Yet one has not to look very far for a reason. While the Greeks populated the world with innumerable gods and other divine and semi-divine beings, while they had an enormous variety of cults, sacrifices, religious festivals, initiation rites, etc., and possessed perhaps the richest, certainly the most beautiful, mythology of any religion that ever existed, we do not find in Greek prayers those qualities which we are accustomed to consider characteristic of the highest forms of prayer in other religions. At least, in those periods in which Greek civilization was most purely Greek and not yet contaminated by Oriental cultures, the Greeks seem to have lacked completely, or almost completely, the passionate self-scrutiny, the yearning for intimate personal communication with the god, and the striving for mystic extinction of the personal ego in the deity which are generally acknowledged to be the most profound expression of the religious spirit in the Christian, Jewish, and Muhammedan faiths.

But even so, it is still worth while to ask why it was so. Was it merely because the Greeks were not able to rise to such heights, or was there something, not in the most primitive but in the highest forms of Greek religion, which prevented the development of this type of prayer? To ask the same question in a somewhat different form: were the Greeks acquainted only with the most simple and primitive form of prayer, in which a man asks the deity for help in his troubles and for the material goods of this life, or had they also another and, in a sense, "higher" form of prayer, even though different in character from those of other religions?

One may, perhaps, object that questions of this kind are beside the point for several reasons: because Greek religion did not have the unity of Christian, Jewish, Muhammedan, or even Hindu religion, and hence no general statements concerning Greek religion as a whole should be made; because, even in its "higher" forms, ancient Greek religion is still a rather primitive polytheism which had to be completely overcome before the highest forms of prayer could possibly develop;

finally, because Greek religion seems, to a large extent, indifferent to morality. All such objections, however, are superficial, for, if one takes a concept of Greek religion wide enough to include early Stoic philosophy, the statement about the absence of the outstanding forms of Christian, Jewish, and Hindu prayer still holds good. Yet Stoic philosophy implies the belief in an all-pervading divine intelligence and power, a belief which, a priori, would seem most favorable to the mystic's prayer for union with god. At the same time, in so far as early Stoic philosophy can be called a religion, it is certainly a moralistic religion par excellence. Or to give an example from the fifth century B.C.: In the famous story of how Socrates stood for a whole night on one spot in deep meditation,[3] we are told that when he finally left, it was 'προσευξάμενος τῷ ἡλίῳ,' with a prayer to Helios. With any devout Christian engaged in deep meditation over a moral problem or a moral decision, as was the case with Socrates, prayer would be a part of his meditation but, in the story as told by Plato, there is no indication whatever that the meditation itself was in the nature of a prayer. On the contrary, the prayer is clearly set off as an entirely separate act which naturally follows upon the conclusion of any important action or activity, but is in no way part of it.

These, however, are merely symptoms of a much more comprehensive and deep-seated characteristic of ancient Greek religion. For, paradoxically, though the words "mystic" and "mysticism" are derived from the Greek word μύειν ("to initiate"), and though the "mystery cults" are very genuine and characteristic expressions of Greek religion, as a whole and, again paradoxically, including the mystery cults at least of the classical age, Greek religion is singularly free from mysticism in the modern sense of the word, and in the sense in which it is applied to certain tendencies in East Indian religions, in Muhammedanism, or Christianity. Some scholars, it is true, have suggested that the initiation rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries implied a mystic identification of the initiate with Kore, the goddess who is obliged to go to the netherworld for four months each year, and that through this identification or union with the goddess immortality was guaranteed to them. But if this were so, it would certainly follow that the initiate is reborn after death just as Kore returns from Hades after four months, and, furthermore, that his immortality consists in an ever-

3. See Plato, *Symp.*, p. 220 c/d.

lasting cycle of death and rebirth. Yet the earliest and most reliable ancient sources[4] do not speak of rebirth at all, and clearly presuppose that those who have been initiated, like all others, remain forever in Hades, adding merely that their fate in the other world is better than the fate of the uninitiated. We have too little reliable knowledge concerning the nature of the Eleusinian Mysteries to say definitely in what this greater happiness consisted. It seems that the initiates, in contrast to the other dead,[5] were believed to retain their consciousness in Hades. This retention of consciousness may, in its turn, have been conceived of as a consequence of the revelation which they had received at their initiation, which may have concerned the eternity of life in and through the everlasting cycle of the seasons, as well as the never-ceasing succession of generations springing from one another.[6] But assuming that all this is true, it would mean, at most, some participation of the initiates in this eternity of life through their knowledge of it, and certainly not any kind of mystic union of a human individual with a god.[7]

Two decades ago it was customary to interpret the most savage rites said to have been connected with the cult of Dionysos in some regions of Greece as a crude kind of mysticism. If we are told that, in Argos or Crete, the followers of the god tore a live bull apart and swallowed the bloody pieces,[8] the assumption was made that they tried to achieve

4. Cf. the Homeric hymn to Demeter, 480 ff. and Sophocles, frgt. 753 Nauck: "Three times happy are those who go down to Hades after having seen these mysteries. For to them only is it given *to live there*. For the others everything will be dreary *there*."

5. See the famous *nekyia* in the eleventh book of the Odyssey, where the shadows of the dead assemble at the gate of the netherworld but do not recognize either Odysseus or one another, even though those who, like Achilles and Patroclus, have been inseparable in life are still together, and where they only regain consciousness for a short time when they drink from the blood which Odysseus offers to them.

6. Cf. W. F. Otto, *Die Götter Griechenlands* (Bonn, 1929), pp. 186 ff. and M. P. Nilsson, *Greek Popular Religion* (New York, 1940), pp. 59 ff.

7. What is denied here is, of course, not the existence of a belief in metempsychosis or in a rebirth of the soul in different bodies, but the connection of this belief with the Eleusinian mysteries, and the inference drawn from this supposed connection that this special kind of survival of the soul was considered the consequence of a mystical union with a god. Where we do find the belief in metempsychosis in ancient Greece, the rebirth of the soul in different bodies is considered a consequence of its fall, and certainly not as a consequence of its union with a great deity brought about by special rites.

8. Firmicus Matern., *De err. prof. rel.*, 6, 5; cf. also W. F. Otto, *Dionysos* (Frankfurt, 1933), p. 155, and M. P. Nilsson, *Griechische Feste* (Leipzig, 1906), p. 292.

a mystic union with the god through this savage deed, the bull being considered an incarnation of the god himself. But even if this interpretation be correct, which is anything but certain,[9] it would still be significant that these crude beginnings did not develop into a higher kind of mysticism, but that the higher forms of Greek religion, including the mystery and initiation cults, remained free from mysticism in the sense of the belief in a union of a human being with a god.

The reason for this fact has been pointed out correctly by M. P. Nilsson,[10] who rejects some fanciful modern interpretations of the meaning of the Eleusinian Mysteries on the ground that "early Greek religion considered the gulf separating man from gods as self-evident and impassable." Nilsson speaks of "early" Greek religion in order to contrast this attitude with the syncretism of late antiquity, in which mysticism had become a very important element. But if one looks at Greek religion as a whole, it would perhaps be more correct to say that this awareness of an impassable gulf between men and gods is characteristic of all the higher forms of Greek religion from Homer to early Stoic philosophy. That the notion is very old, is proved by the fact that the three great "sinners" in the Homeric poems, who—in contrast to the shadowlike and melancholy, but painless, existence of the other dead—are tortured in the other world, Tantalos, Sisyphos, and Tityos,[11] are, in fact, not sinners in the modern sense of the word,[12] but are all of them punished because they have overstepped the boundary between men and gods. The same idea has found expression in the many stories of cruel punishment which befell mortals who, like Niobe and Marsyas, tried to compete with, or boasted of being superior to, a god, or who, like Hippolytos or the Danaïdes,[13] denied or tried to escape the power of a god, or even those who merely, like

9. W. F. Otto, *op. cit.*, p. 122, note 10, and U. von Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, II, 68, have rejected this interpretation on the basis of very weighty arguments.

10. *Greek Popular Religion*, p. 44.

11. See *Odyssey*, xi, 575 ff.

12. Certainly nothing is farther from the original meaning of this story than the modern explanation that these three "sinners" are representatives of the three deadly sins. How could the sins be punished but no sinner? But what is more important, essentially all of them have committed the same sin.

13. For the Danaides, see my article "Die Danaidentrilogie des Aeschylus," in *Philologus*, 91 (1936), 121 ff. and 249 ff.

Teiresias,[14] intruded upon the intimacy of a god. Moreover, it is also expressed by the famous inscription of the temple at Delphi, γνῶθι σεαυτόν, which certainly does not mean that a person should try to gain a metaphysical insight into his real self which is identical with the god of the universe, but, quite the contrary, has to be supplemented to γνῶθι σεαυτὸν ἄνθρωπος ὤν ("know that you are a human being and not a god," or more simply, "know your place"). Though I do not know of any express statement to that effect (probably nobody made such a statement because nobody thought that anyone could feel otherwise), the general attitude of the Greeks of the classical period seems to indicate that, to them, a prayer seeking a mystic union with a god would have seemed impious, rather than an expression of the highest piety.

With this consciousness of the difference and distance between gods and mortals, the deification of human beings which, by the way, is certainly not due to "Oriental influence," but is a genuine product of Greek religion, is by no means at variance. On the contrary—and this is very essential for a full understanding of the relations between gods and humans which is characteristic of the ancient Greeks and found expression in their prayers—it is its natural corollary. Inasmuch as this deification of human beings contains a genuinely religious element and is not merely a matter of political expediency, it is nothing but a more definite form of what we find so often in Homer when one person asks another: "Are you a god or a human being?" Since Greek religion (unlike, for instance, the early religion of the Romans) is not primarily a product of fear, but a product of wonder, an unknown person of "wondrous beauty," a man who performs "wonders" of bravery, or who comes to the rescue in a "wondrous fashion"[15] when everything seemed lost, naturally arouses the suspicion that he or she is a divinity. The deification, therefore, of human beings of seemingly superhuman accomplishments in a way emphasizes the difference between gods and human beings rather than disregarding it. At the same time, however, it shows also that it would be wrong merely to stress

14. See Callimachus, Hymn v.

15. "Wonder," in the sense in which the word is used here, is by no means identical with miracle. The wondrous events in which the Greeks feel the presence of a god are, in the overwhelming majority of cases, not miracles in the sense that they are contrary to the laws of nature. Miracles in the latter sense remain rather in the outskirts of Greek religion.

the "unbridgeable gulf" between gods and mortals. In some way the Greek gods are obviously more similar to human beings than those of most other religions. It is this difference between Greek religion and other religions in regard to the special quality and nature of the nearness and the remoteness of the gods, as shall be shown later, which determines the special character and development of Greek prayer.

Another consequence of the same peculiarity is the elimination of magic elements from official rites and from "respectable" Greek religion as a whole. Here one has to distinguish between two aspects of the question. It can hardly be denied that many rites in the official cults originally had magic implications. When, for instance, in the procession connected with one of the Demeter festivals, four white horses draw a carriage with a basket containing the sacred objects, followed by barefooted maidens with unbound hair who chant: "Just as four shining white horses carry the basket, so may the goddess come and bring us white (bright)[16] spring, bright summer, bright fall, and bright winter, and as we walk through the city without sandals and with hair unbound, so may we have foot and head always unharmed,"[17] the element of magic or *Analogiezauber* is quite apparent. Similar elements of magic can be found in the fertility rites of the Attic Thesmophoria and in many other cults, especially those of gods connected with fertility. But it is only the more significant that, in these cults as we find them in the classical and Hellenistic periods, the idea of *magic compulsion* seems completely absent, though in all likelihood it was originally a decisive element in the rite. For it is a fundamental fallacy to believe that the original meaning of a religious rite must be the "true" meaning of the rite as practised in a later period.[18]

16. The Greek word λευκός has the meaning both of *white* and of *bright, shining;* hence the same word can serve to designate the shining white color of the horses and the brightness of the seasons.

17. Callimachus, Hymn VI, 120 ff.

18. It is, perhaps, not beside the point to mention a striking example of this fallacy from my personal experience. In one of the first graduate lectures which I attended as a young student, the late Professor H. Kantorovic asked the question: "What is the real meaning of a handshake?" and answered, "To show you that I have no weapon in my hand." Since it is obvious that, whatever a handshake may have meant in prehistoric times, at present it may mean many things, but certainly not a demonstration that a person carries no weapon, I considered the claim that this was the true meaning of a handshake as a rhetorical device to make the statement about the supposed origin of the custom more impressive. It was only later that I

Quite contrary, what is characteristic of a religion is not the original meaning of its rites and ceremonies, but the way in which it reinterprets them and gives them new meanings.

Magic in the full sense, the magic of witches who were supposed to drag the moon down from the sky or bring the sun to a standstill, who conjured demons and practiced real magic compulsion, played a great part in the belief of the lower strata of the population at all times,[19] especially in some backward regions of Greece, though it came to the surface only in the period of the decay of ancient civilization. Nor was magic in the classical period officially anathematized as irreligious or anti-religious; it was merely reserved a very small corner. There was a special goddess supposed to be connected with magic and sorcery, Hecate. This is quite in keeping with the general character of Greek religion. If there was such a thing as magic, a wondrous thing though of a low type, there must be some deity for it. But this deity, Hecate, while her existence is acknowledged, has hardly any part in respectable religion; and where she does appear in a prominent place, as for instance in Hesiod's theogony (410-452), magic and sorcery do not appear as her main functions.

Again, this is all the more significant because beliefs which, though they do not belong to magic in the narrowest sense yet have a close affinity to it, must have been widespread in the pre-classical period, and by no means confined to the lower strata of society. Of this kind, for instance, is the belief in a *miasma* or pollution which sticks to the hands of a man who has slain a friend or relative, regardless of whether he has killed him intentionally or against his will or even by accident, or the belief in terrible and half-impersonal demons like Alastor or the Erinyes, who pursue the perpetrator of certain deeds regardless of his motives. What these beliefs have in common with magic is the concept of a blind mechanism in the moral and spiritual world: in magic the compelling force of certain formulae; in regard to the miasma and the semi-impersonal demons, the inevitability of the consequences of certain deeds unless prevented by equally mechanical rites of purification.

discovered how often similar "explanations" of the "true" meaning of a custom or religious rite are offered in all seriousness, even though there is the most perfect evidence to show that, in the period considered, the rite or custom did not have or had no longer the supposed meaning.

19. See Nilsson, *Greek Popular Religion*, pp. 78 ff., 90 ff., 111 ff.

Greek tragedy, especially that of Aeschylus, bears witness both to the great influence and power which such beliefs must once have had, and to the rise of a different religion in which these blind powers of the past are overcome by gods who decide and judge in the light of reason. The heroes of several of Aeschylus' plays are afraid of, and often actually subject to, those dark powers and demons, but in their prayers they appeal to the gods as to reasonable beings who consider not merely the material facts but also the motives, and who will often help to free a person from the consequences of his action, if the action seems justified or excusable from the point of view of a higher justice.[20] There is one instance in the *Suppliants*[21] where, in their utmost despair and in a moment of the most immediate danger, the daughters of Danaos, who up to this moment had always invoked the gods by appealing to their justice and reason, suddenly revert to a more primitive or, rather, primeval form of prayer: μᾶ γᾶ, μᾶ γᾶ, βοὰν φοβερὸν ἀπότρεπε, ὦ πᾶ, γᾶς παῖ, Ζεῦ ("Mother Earth, Mother Earth, turn away the terrible cry; O Father, Earth's child, Zeus"). But the English translation does not convey a correct idea of the Greek prayer, in which the short monosyllables suggest a magic formula with compulsive power, referring not to the insight and justice of the gods, but merely to the terrible cry of the distressed which the divine powers are implored to "avert." This deviation from the rule is, of course, in perfect harmony with the general trend of Aeschylus' religious thought, and at the same time a beautiful illustration of the psychological truth that, in moments of the highest emotional tension, human beings tend to return to more primitive attitudes and notions than those which determine their ordinary life.

The monotheistic religions, like Christianity and Islam, it is true, have condemned magic and sorcery outright, and so may seem to have gone much farther in its elimination than Greek religion in the classical age. In both cases the condemnation of magic has two main reasons: (1) Because "black magic" seems to suppose intercourse with evil demons; (2) Because "white magic," though it claims to avoid such intercourse, is irreconcilable with the notion of a good and all-powerful god, since it implies that divine power can be brought under the control of a human being. The condemnation of magic, therefore, seems a natural

20. The clearest and best known examples of this are, of course, the *Eumenides*. For the *Danaides* see the article quoted in note 15, *supra*.

21. 890 ff., 899 ff.

consequence of a monotheistic faith. On the other hand, the same monotheistic religions have produced powerful mystical movements. What seems characteristic of Greek religion in the classical age is, rather, that in its higher forms[22] it gradually eliminated both magic and mystic elements, and that it succeeded in doing this without having to resort to violent suppression, merely by virtue of the new concept of the aloofness of the gods which determines all their relations with human beings.

Even more important, perhaps, is the fact that to this essential aloofness of the gods there corresponds a similar unencroachability of the innermost core and kernel of the human individual by the gods. This feature of Greek religion has found very different expressions in its various phases but, in one way or another, it can be found everywhere from Homer to Stoic philosophy. The gods can, of course, strike a person with illness, they can kill him, and they may even punish him in the other world, though this belief is not common in early times. Yet there is something in him which is not touched and cannot be touched even by the gods. This has been most beautifully expressed by Greek tragedy. In Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes,* for instance, Eteocles, in consequence of the curse which his father has pronounced over him, and in spite of his innocence (only his brother having deserved the curse), goes to his doom with the full knowledge that there is no hope for him, that the gods will not help him, nay, that they have willed it so—θεοῖς μὲν ἤδη πως παρημελήμεθα[23] are his own bitter words—but never wavering in his courage or his duty to the city over which he rules, and so, in his very doom, rising to a greatness over which no god has power. In Sophocles' *Ajax,* the hero has been stricken with madness by the angry goddess Athena, and in this madness has disgraced himself by deeds the memory of which makes it impossible for him to continue his life among

22. In this connection it is, perhaps, pertinent to observe that in any period and any culture there always exists a lowest stratum, one can hardly say of religious beliefs, but of superstitions which show a remarkable similarity everywhere, and therefore cannot be considered distinctive traits of one religion as against others. Likewise, it may be said that, in the realm of the highest religious and philosophical speculations, the various religions and cultures come again at least somewhat nearer to one another. It is in the intermediate sphere—and to this sphere official and public religion belongs everywhere—that the difference is greatest and that the specific spirit of a culture or a religion expresses itself most clearly. It is with this sphere above all that the present article is concerned.

23. *Seven against Thebes,* 702; cf. also 719: θεῶν διδόντων οὐκ ἂν ἐκφύγοις κακά ("if the gods will it you cannot escape your doom").

men. Yet the last scene before his suicide shows clearly that whatever he has done or suffered has not touched the innermost core of his personality, and that he will live, both in the memory of men and in the shadowy world of Hades, as the image of a glorious hero and model of chivalry which he had been before he was stricken by the wrath of the goddess.[24] Sophocles' last play, the *Oedipus Coloneus,* finally, seems to have this as its very theme, that the superhuman greatness of the man who has suffered more from the gods than anyone else, but has not humiliated himself nor become humble, must finally be recognized even by the gods, so that he does not die the death of ordinary mortals.

In the Homeric poems this aspect of the relation between gods and mortals is not so clearly visible, yet implicitly the relation is the same. It is quite true that, as B. Snell and his disciples have shown,[25] the Homeric man often feels that a god has prompted him to an action, and that especially when a man excells himself, when he performs "wonders" of bravery, or feels courage and strength beyond what he is wont to feel, he has no doubt that a god has given him this power. Yet, even here, the innermost personality of a man remains untouched and unencroachable by the god. The influence of the god is temporary, and in keeping with the character of the man. A man who is naturally brave and strong may be given superhuman strength and courage, but this does not happen to the weak or the meek. Even less is there a permanent transformation of the character of a man, a conception which can be found elsewhere in primitive as well as in some of the highest religions. It is an expression of the same philosophy that the dead are believed to live on in Hades without punishment or reward, but as images of what they have been in this life.[26]

The correlate in Greek philosophy to this fundamental concept of Greek religious thought is the conviction that essentially a person has to work out his own salvation. Socrates, in Plato's *Phaedrus,* may pray to

24. See also my article, "Zur Interpretation des Aias," in *Rhein. Museum,* 83 (1934), 113 ff.

25. See B. Snell, "Aischylos und das Handeln im Drama," *Philologus,* Suppl.-Bd. XX, Heft 1 (Leipzig, 1928); Snell, "Das Bewusstsein von eigenen Entscheidungen im frühen Griechentum," in *Philologus* 85 (1930), 141-58; Ch. Voigt, *Überlegung und Entscheidung, Studien zur Selbstauffassung des Menschen bei Homer,* (Berlin-Charlottenburg, 1934).

26. See W. F. Otto, *Die Götter Griechenlands,* pp. 184 ff.

the gods,[27] "grant that I may become beautiful within," and the Stoic Cleanthes may ask Zeus[28] to make him follow his will voluntarily. But, in both cases, the context shows very clearly that while it is right and pious to ask the divinity for help when striving for the good, it is, in actual fact, the individual human being himself who must make himself "beautiful within," or bring himself in harmony with the order of the universe. This is also the ultimate reason for the dissociation of meditation and self-scrutiny from prayer. The god may help—and therefore may be asked for his help—in strengthening the individual for his task, but the meditation itself is never (as so often in Christianity) a dialogue with the divinity, and the gods have no direct part in it. For the same reason, whatever change there may be in an individual is a slow and gradual one. There is no room for sudden conversions, or for a rebirth in which the old Adam is cast off and a new person is born.

The absence, then, of what are often considered the highest forms of prayers in other religions, especially in Christianity, is due not merely to the imperfection or the primitive character of Greek religion, but to the special concept of the relation between gods and human beings which Greek religion has developed in its higher forms. This concept implies a gulf between gods and mortals which cannot be bridged from either side. Hence it implies a certain remoteness of the gods. Yet, at the same time, the Greek gods, at least outside of philosophy, are also nearer to men than in monotheistic and strictly moralistic religions, because they are more similar to them. It is this specific kind of nearness and remoteness of the gods which has determined the development of the higher forms of prayer in Greek religion.

Of all the various aspects of Greek prayers, their external form, especially the typical formulas used in addressing the different gods, have been most frequently and thoroughly discussed. I shall, therefore, not dwell upon this point, except in so far as it is important for the character of Greek prayers in general. It is, perhaps, partly an inheritance from more primitive forms of religion when many Greek prayers begin with a very elaborate invocation of the name or names of a god, including the names of his parents, of his birthplace, of the main places of his worship, etc., and the various epithets indicating his qualities and func-

27. Plato, *Phaedrus*, p. 279 b/c.

28. See *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, coll.Joh.ab Arnim (Leipzig, 1921), vol. 1, frgt. 527; cf. also *infra*, p. 37.

tions. It is also quite possible that this concern with the name and attributes of the god originally had magic implications. In those corners of Greek religion in which magic was practiced this is, of course, actually the case, and some of the magic papyri bear clear testimony to the belief that the possession of the correct name and its pronouncement gave magic power over the god.[29] But this is merely another case which shows that the presumed or actual origin of a religious form or custom does not necessarily have anything to do with its meaning at a given time. In the overwhelming majority of prayers in Greek literature, and especially in those which are most characteristic of the spirit of Greek religion, the content of the prayer following the initial invocation shows clearly that there can be no thought of magic compulsion. Where many names and attributes of the god are mentioned, the purpose is obviously to honor him. Where one attribute is mentioned specifically and to the exclusion of others, appeal is usually made to the function or duty of the god in the order of the universe, or to his personal predilections: to Zeus, for instance, as the protector of the oppressed, specially of suppliants; to Aphrodite as the goddess of love; to Apollo as the protector of prophets and poets, etc. In other words, appeal is made to the god as to a person prompted by rational or emotional motives,[30] the very opposite of the mechanical compulsion of magic.

Still another misinterpretation of a frequent form of Greek prayers must be eliminated. These are the prayers in which a special image of a god or goddess is addressed. Already in early antiquity, some philosophers expressed their scorn for this type of prayer, which they considered an expression of what we would call fetishism, that is, an invocation of images made of wood or stone.[31] It is, of course, possible that there actually existed persons who more or less identified the image with the god, but there is no indication whatever that this attitude was at all prevalent in Greece in the period from the Homeric age to the beginning of Hellenism. Undoubtedly there was a difference between the common notion of a god and that of the philosophers. According to the common notion the gods are not ever-present; hence they must be made to listen

29. See Albrecht Dieterich, *Abraxas* (Leipzig, 1891), *passim*.

30. The instances in Greek literature, especially in Homer and Greek tragedy, are too numerous to be quoted.

31. See, for instance, Xenophanes, B 15 Diels; Heraclitus, B 128 Diels; Diogenes Cynicus in *Diog. Laert.* VI, 2, 37.

from afar; they look down from Mount Olympus or come in person to grant the prayer;[32] while Xenophanes, Heraclitus, and Diogenes believed in a god who is spirit and who is always everywhere. Yet the very fact that, even while the prayer is spoken before an image of the god, the god has to listen from afar and may come to grant the prayer,[33] indicates clearly that the image is not identified with the god. From all we know, therefore, an ancient Greek who prayed before an image no more prayed *to* the image than a Christian who goes into a church to pray believes that God is in the church but not outside, or than the pilgrim to a miracle-working image of St. Mary believes that it is the image itself that works the miracle rather than the saint in heaven, or God on her entreaties. It is not in this direction that the significant characteristics of Greek religion can be found.

Much more important is the connection between prayer and sacrifices and offerings. But, here again, it is quite misleading to consider merely the most primitive expressions of this connection. It is true that all through the classical age animal sacrifices remained an important part of the cult. It is equally true that, in early times, the belief must have been rather common that the gods in one way or another actually consume the sacrifices and even live on them.[34] Finally, it is true that there are instances, and not only in the lowest strata of Greek society, in which the offerings made to the god appear more or less as part of a bargain: "We give you these offerings and you give us your help and protection in return." This is clearly the case, for instance, in Callinus' famous prayer to Zeus during the siege of Ephesus by the Cimmerians: μνῆσαι

32. For examples see K. Keyssner, *op. cit.*, pp. 99 ff.

33. How, in a way, a god is identified with his image and yet at the same time clearly distinguished from it is beautifully illustrated by Sappho's famous prayer to Aphrodite. Here the goddess is first addressed as the one who sits on a richly decorated throne, which, as most commentators rightly have explained, obviously refers to the image of the goddess which Sappho addresses in her prayer. Yet, at the same time, the goddess is not really present, for she is asked to *come* on her chariot drawn by thrushes as she has done on a previous occasion.

34. There is no room in this paper to discuss the various ways in which this consumption of the sacrifice by the gods was thought to take place. It may suffice to point out that the famous story of how Prometheus cheated the gods by making them choose the bones of the animal rather than the meat (Hesiod's complicated version of this story [*Theog.* 536 ff.] is certainly not the original one) is obviously a—perhaps not quite naïve—reflection on the belief that the gods "ate" their part of the sacrifice, and the somewhat incongruous fact that the men who made the sacrifice reserved the better part of it for themselves.

δ' εἴ κοτε μηρία καλὰ βοῶν <Σμυρναῖοι κατέκηαν>[35] ("Remember it now if the Smyrnaeans [Ephesians][36] in the past used to burn beautiful joints of oxen on your altar"). But the passages in Greek literature in which this cruder notion of the meaning of sacrifices has found expression are not very numerous.[37] It is certainly wrong when Keyssner[38] contends that the lines of Theognis (775 ff.): αὐτὸς δὲ στρατὸν ὑβριστὴν Μήδων ἀπέρυκε τῆσδε πόλεος, ἵνα σοι λαοὶ ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ ἦρος ἐπερχομένου κλειτὰς πέμπωσ' ἑκατόμβας, κτλ. ("You yourself, O Apollo, keep away the insolent army of the Medes from this city so that next year in the spring the citizens with joy and merriment will give you splendid hecatombs") imply the notion of a superiority *(Überordnung)* of man over the god, because man can withhold his sacrifice and so bring pressure to bear on the god to compel him to do his will. There is nothing in the poem of Theognis to warrant such an interpretation. But there is an interesting parallel in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes,* which may, at the same time, serve as a comment on the passage in Theognis. Eteocles, who has very good reasons not to believe in the justice and benevolence of the gods, nevertheless, because he feels responsible for the welfare of the city which he rules, considers it his duty to appeal to Zeus and other gods to save the city from destruction. He ends his prayer with the words:[39] ξυνὰ δ' ἐλπίζω λέγειν· πόλις γὰρ εὖ πράσσουσα δαίμονας τίει ("With this I hope to say what is for the common good [of both the gods and the city]. For a prosperous city honors the gods"). This, as pointed out before, is the prayer of a man who does not believe in the justice or benevolence of the gods, who, in fact, has no longer any hope for himself. He therefore tries to appeal to the self-interest of the gods in an effort to save at least the city. Yet the self-interest of the gods does not consist in the preservation of any material tributes which they receive from the city, but in the continuation of the "honor" which is given to

35. Callinus, frgt. 4.

36. Strabo XIV, 4, who quotes the fragment, says that Smyrna was an old name of Ephesus.

37. Examples in Homer are the prayer of Chryses, *Iliad* I, 37 ff. and the prayer of Penelope in *Odyss.,* IV, 762 ff.; cf. also Nestor's prayer in *Iliad* XV, 372 ff., where, however, the idea is not quite the same, since the assumption is made that Zeus has already granted the wish. But, on the whole, the examples indicating a more refined relation between gods and human beings are more frequent even in Homer.

38. *Op. cit.,* p. 135.

39. *Seven against Thebes* 76 f.; cf. also 245 ff.

them. There is no hint, either, that the city could wilfully withhold such honors if the gods do not help. It would be ridiculous to make such a suggestion, for the city is threatened with complete destruction and therefore will not be in a position either to give or to withhold anything if the gods refuse to help.

It is quite true, as Keyssner[40] has pointed out, that the "honor" which a god receives is, in a sense, the measure of his power and influence, and that the gods do take a personal interest in this external expression and confirmation of their power. But this certainly does not mean that a mortal can assert his "superiority" over a god by threatening to withhold the honor due to him if the god does not do his will. Wherever in Greek legend we hear of a man who refuses to honor a god, we find that the god punishes him without the slightest fear of the consequences to himself. On the other hand, the gods *do* hesitate to give up a city which has honored them, even though the city is doomed by the decree of fate. Finally, it was the Greeks who used the term δεισιδαιμονία, ("fear of gods") as a synonym for abject superstition. All these three facts must be taken together if one wishes to understand the Greek notion of the gods' interest in the offerings made by human beings.

In the classical period—and this is, on the whole, also true of Homer—the belief was no longer prevalent that the gods were dependent on sacrifices, so to speak, for their subsistence. There is no indication, either, that the Greek gods in general appreciate slavish adoration or wish to be approached in fear and trembling. But they do like "honors" which are given as a free expression of gratitude and rejoicing. It is in the light of this fact that the εὐφροσύνη in the passage from Theognis cited above must be understood. For unless the city prospers its citizens are not able, even if willing, to honor the gods in the way most pleasing to them. This is the philosophy behind this and similar invocations.

It seems clear that this concept of the "honor" given to a god and the god's interest in this honor presupposes that there already exists a friendly relation, a mutual liking, so to speak, between the god and the person who honors him and asks for his help and protection. It is from this general concept that some of what may be called the "higher" or more subtle forms of prayer characteristic of the ancient Greeks have undoubtedly developed. In many cases a man appealing to a god does not refer to previous or expected sacrifices at all, but mentions, instead,

40. *Op. cit.*, pp. 61 ff.

the help which the god has given him on an earlier occasion.[41] No doubt this man has always given the god the honor due to him, but he does not refer to it, and so avoids even that degree of intrusion on the complete freedom of the god which the suggestion that the god might owe him an obligation would imply. Instead, he flatters the god with the suggestion that he is already under an obligation to him. And how could it be otherwise since the god is so much more powerful than he, a mortal? He makes use, in a way, of the psychological truth—applicable also to the gods, who in ancient Greece are very human in their reactions—that we always feel friendly and benevolent towards a person to whom we have done a favor, unless, of course, he has shown gross ingratitude. Finally, he implies that, since the god has helped him before, he must be a person after the god's heart, so that the god will surely help him again, a confidence which is also flattering. All this seems more or less implied in this form of prayer without being expressed with clumsy directness.

The most beautiful example of this is Sappho's famous prayer to Aphrodite:[42]

> Aphrodite, wondrous-throned, deathless woman,
> God-born, subtle weaver, I beg you this good—
> Lace me not with fierceness of love, not languor—
> Goddess my mistress:
> Yet to me come if, in time past, you ever
> Hearkened to my voice when afar you heard it;
> Hearkened, and, your father's dominion leaving
> Came in your golden—
> Harnessed car: O lovely the flock that drew you—
> Thrushes, swift ones, darkling on earth's face, all the
> Densely whirring wings out of heaven down through
> Air's middle distance.

41. Cf., for instance, *Iliad* I, 453 ff.; XVI, 233. *Iliad* V, 115 ff. Diomedes asks Athena to be friendly to him, and to help him because she was fond of his father and used to help him in battle, a prayer which is repeated in *Iliad* X, 284 ff.; a few lines earlier (X, 278 ff.) Odysseus asks Athena to help him because she has always helped him. Similar examples can also be found in the Odyssey, in tragedy and comedy. See also F. Schwenn, *op. cit.*, pp. 47 ff.

42. For the first three strophes I have used a translation which one of my students, Robert Read, who is now serving in the U. S. Navy, once made for me, since it seems to me both more literal and more poetic than any printed translation I have seen. For the rest, I used the translation of H. R. Fairclough, which is also reproduced in *Sappho and her Influence*, by David M. Robinson (Boston, 1934).

Quickly drew they nigh me, and thou, blest presence,
Sweetest smile divine on thy face immortal,
Thou didst seek what sorrow was mine to suffer,
Wherefore I called thee.
What my soul, too, craved with intensest yearning
Frenzy's fire enkindling, "Now whom," thou criest
"Wouldst thou fain see led to thy love, or who, my
Sappho, would wrong thee"
"Though she flees thee now yet she soon shall woo thee
Though thy gifts she scorneth she soon shall bring gifts;
Though she loves thee not yet she soon shall love thee,
Yea, though unwilling."
Come, ah! come again, and from bitter anguish
Free thy servant. All that my heart is craving,
That fulfill, O Goddess. Thyself, my champion,
Aid in this conflict.

No translation of this poem can even approach the beauty of the original, and an analysis must necessarily destroy the poetry. Yet it is necessary to point out those aspects which characterize it as a most subtle example of a typically Greek form of prayer. It has often been noted that, instead of using the customary invocation, "Hear me" (κλύθι μοι), by which the god is called upon to listen, Sappho says, "I beseech thee" (λίσσομαί σε). Instead of asking the god to listen, she turns to her in prayer, which is both a less intrusive and yet more intense way of calling for her attention. Also, no on can fail to notice that the real prayer, the prayer which asks for something, is confined to the first and last strophes, and that, even there, Sappho's request is couched in the most general terms. The real content of her prayer is given indirectly, through the story of how Aphrodite had helped her the last time, and even then she does not mention the name of the girl whose love she wishes to win. Of course Sappho does not wish to reveal the name of the girl in a poem, but there is also a subtle flattery in the fact that she does not consider it necessary to tell the name to the goddess. For, the last time also, though the goddess did ask for the name, she did not wait for an answer but granted the request at once, which seems to presuppose that she did not need an answer. Greek gods are not generally supposed to be omniscient. There is, therefore, some flattery in the assumption that the goddess need not be told. But there is, perhaps, also a subtle hint that Aphrodite need not be told because she has always an eye on Sappho. She may even have had a hand in the

present trouble. But since she has always been friendly to her, Sappho has supreme confidence that she will extricate her. In the last line, she asks the goddess to be her "ally"—for this, rather than Fairclough's *champion,* is the meaning of the Greek work σύμμαχος, though one is almost tempted to translate the word by "accomplice."

These last prayers are very well suited to illustrate the difference between some of the "higher" or more subtle forms of prayer in ancient Greek religion and those in any monotheistic religion. However great the mutual liking and friendship, even complicity, between a god and a human being may be, the distance between god and mortal is always carefully observed. In fact, the more subtle the prayers become, the greater care is taken not to encroach in any way upon the individual freedom of decision of a god. There is no old or new "testament" in ancient Greek religion, no pact or treaty between a god and his chosen people, or humankind.[43] A Greek god cannot be bound. In this respect, the Greek gods are more remote than in most monotheistic religions. On the other hand, the subtle psychology of the appeals of Odysseus, Diomedes, Sappho, etc., to Athena, Apollo, or Aphrodite, would be considered impious or even blasphemous in any monotheistic religion, because an offense against God's majesty. In this respect the Greek gods are nearer because more human.

The characteristic fundamental relation between gods and human beings which expresses itself in the Greek prayers just discussed has resulted in still another "higher" type of prayer which is very significant. In all religions, hymns in praise of god and prayers are closely related, but nowhere is this relation closer than in Greek religion. In order to understand the significance of this fact one must view it as part of a much larger phenomenon.

In contrast to the view expressed above that Greek religion, the more it becomes characteristically Greek, increasingly eliminates all elements of magic and mysticism, modern research, especially in recent times, has, to a very large extent, consisted in attempts to point out the magic and

43. A Greek god may, of course, be or become the representative and guardian of certain ethical principles or a moral or legal order, and in this case may, in a way, be bound by this order which he represents. But this is very different from the idea of a pact or treaty between the god and a nation or with mankind. A god may also make a promise, but it is worth noticing that where a god binds himself by an oath to fulfil a promise made to a mortal, the fulfillment of the promise, as in the famous story of Phaëton, is often the undoing of the latter.

mystic elements in Greek cults, rites, festivals, and ceremonies. Again, one may readily concede that many of these rites may originally have had magic connotations, though, even in this respect, modern theory certainly often has gone much too far.[44] But even if all these explanations were correct, it would still be necessary to point out again that the original meaning of a rite or other religious performance does not prove anything about its meaning at a later time.

A good example of this is the development of the cult of Dionysos in Attica. The re-enaction of the wanderings, deeds, and sufferings of the god which seems to have formed part of this cult in an early time, according to a widely held theory had magic connotations and was meant to ensure the fertility of the land for the coming year. We find that, from the early part of the fifth century at the latest, at some of the Dionysiac festivals dramas were enacted whose plot had no easily discernible connection with the legend of Dionysos. The assumption is then made that, nevertheless, these plays were a continuation of the enactment of the legend of the god in a different guise and that, at least for a time, the magic connotation was still preserved.[45]

It would certainly be wrong to deny that something of the spirit of the god Dionysos is inherent in Greek tragedy, but a god Dionysos of whose spirit one may say this, is certainly not a "fertility god" or a "spring daimon" like any other fertility god or spring daimon; and the idea that a Greek tragedy, even of the earliest fifth century, was really a fertility rite in disguise is quite preposterous. What is more, that there was a change from the reenactment of the legend of the god to the performance of other dramatic stories and that, at first, this change was felt by many to be incongruous, is attested by the fact that in the early times the audience sometimes expressed its surprise and dissatisfaction by the cry οὐδὲν προς Διόνυσον ("this has nothing to do with Dionysos").

44. Cf. the discussion of such interpretations by W. F. Otto, *Dionysos,* pp. 34 ff.

45. The authors who have gone farthest in this interpretation of the nature of Greek tragedy, though differing greatly from one another in their views concerning the essential meaning of the rites from which tragedy is supposed to have originated, are A. Dieterich, "Die Entstehung der Tragoedie," in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* II, (1907), 163 ff.; W. Ridgeway, *The Origin of Tragedy with special reference to the Greek Tragedians* (Cambridge, 1910); and Egill Rostrup, *Attic Tragedy in the Light of Theatrical History* (London, 1923). A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, though continuing to some extent in the same tradition, has already somewhat rescinded the worst exaggerations of his predecessors in his book *Dithyramb, Tragedy, and Comedy* (Oxford, 1927).

What, then, was the meaning of the performance of tragedies, satyr plays, and comedies as part of the Dionysos festival, when they had no direct relation to the god? Obviously, they were meant to be an offering, the offering of a work of poetry, a product of art—a work of poetry to be sure, in which something of the spirit of the god was alive, but primarily, a work of poetry as a work of art.

A very good illustration of this is the fact that the choric songs addressed to different gods become more and more similar in form and content, and, in the fifth century, to some extent actually interchangeable. The name of the choric song addressed to Dionysos was dithyramb, and that this type of song originally was full of the spirit of dionysiac revelry is attested by the fragment of the early lyric poet Archilochos:[46] ὡς Διωνύσοι' ἄνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος οἶδα διθύραμβον οἴνῳ συγκεραυνωθεὶς φρένας ("I know how to take the lead[47] in singing a beautiful song in honor of the lord Dionysos, a dithyramb, when my mind is thunderstruck from wine"). The paeon, on the other hand, was a sober and solemn song addressed to Apollo and appropriate to the character of this god, so totally different from the character of Dionysos. But among the dithyrambs of the early fifth century poet, Bacchylides, there is a choric poem which is not only hardly distinguishable from a paeon in form and content, but in which Apollon is actually addressed.[48] The explanation is given by a passage in Plutarch,[49] who tells us that during the winter months Apollo was considered to be absent from Delphi, because during that time he dwelt with the Hyperboreans. In his absence, Dionysos, who shared his cult at Delphi, was considered his representative, and for this reason it was customary to sing dithyrambs during the winter in Delphi instead of paeons. But, since Apollo was still the real lord of Delphi, it was possible to address the absent god in these dithyrambs, even though in the beginning of the Bacchylidean dithyramb, which is imperfectly preserved, Dionysos may also have been

46. Frgt. 77 (*Anthologia Lyrica Graeca*, vol. 1, ed. E. Diehl).

47. The Greek word, which later became a *terminus technicus* (cf. Aristotle, *Poetica*, 1449 b, 11), at the time of Archilochos probably meant that one man would begin to sing a strophe with which the chorus would then fall in, or which was repeated by the chorus.

48. *Carmen* 16., ed. B. Snell (Leipzig, 1934).

49. Plutarch. *De E apud Delphos*, 9 (p. 389 C); cf. also B. Snell, p. 44* of the *praefatio* of his edition.

invoked.[50] This was obviously possible only because the character of the choric song was no longer determined by the specific character of the god to whom it was addressed, but was offered to the god as a work of art. It would have been quite impossible to address Apollo in the kind of dithyramb which one sang when one's mind was "thunderstruck" with wine.

Works of art, then, can be offerings to the gods regardless of the special character of their content, merely because they are beautiful and expressions of man's highest creative ability. And the same is true of gymnastic contests, foot races, horse races, etc., which were often instituted on the recommendation of the Delphic oracle in honor of a god, in order either to win his protection or to allay his wrath, or of anything else in which man rejoices, in which he excels, or in which life reaches its greatest intensity. Perhaps there are analogies to this in other religions. There is N. Lesskov's Christian legend of the juggler, Pamphalon, who performed his tricks without a human audience for God, because this was the best that he could do to honor Him. There is a Chassidic story of a young boy who was considered good for nothing, but who had attained great perfection in producing a shrill whistle. The story tells of how once this boy, in the synagogue, in an ecstasy of devotion whistled shrilly, causing consternation among the faithful, but how it was revealed that this whistling was more pleasing to God than all the devotions of the others, because the boy had put his whole soul into the whistle. It has also been said that the pious Christian painters in the monasteries, if it was not their talent to paint saints or holy scenes, would paint anything else in the same spirit of holiness and devotion as their fellow monks painted their saints. But it is significant that all these are exceptions, for it was the rule to paint saints and holy scenes, and it was certainly not the rule to honor God by juggling or whistling. This is not fortuitous. For, in the Christian and Jewish religions, the fundamental idea of sacrifice involves that a man gives up something to God, that he renounces something which he has cherished, while in Greek religion the notion becomes more and more prevalent that the most intense and most joyful activity of man, itself and directly, is the most appropriate offering to the gods. The Christian and Jewish stories mentioned above show that this latter notion is not en-

50. See Kuiper's attempt to restore the first line of the papyrus in the *apparatus crit.* of Snell's edition.

tirely absent in those religions either, just as Greek religion, especially in its earliest beginnings and again in its latest phase, was by no means unacquainted with the idea that a sacrifice may mean giving up something to the god. But the fundamental tendency is in opposite directions. On this basis one may also arrive at an interpretation of the meaning of the ordinary animal sacrifice in the classical period, through which the incongruity that has given rise to the Prometheus story quoted above[51] disappears. For it seems, then, perfectly natural that a festive meal and the preparations for it should be in the nature of an offering to a god, even though the god no longer is supposed to "feed" on the victim.

It is in the light of this special character of Greek religion that the close connection between Greek hymns and Greek prayers must be considered. All higher religions know the prayer of thanksgiving, in which prayer in the narrower sense of petition comes in only secondarily, if at all. Thanksgiving prayers and hymns in praise of a god are naturally closely related. Finally, it is true that in the Christian, Jewish, Muhammedan, and other religions, just as with the ancient Greeks, prayer itself can assume the character of an offering to God. But apart from the significant fact that this higher form of prayer, in contrast to those others the absence of which in classical Greece was discussed above, is most congenial to Greek religion, there are two ways in which the special character of ancient Greek religion reveals itself in it.

One point has already been touched upon—the place of art in religious devotion. There can certainly be no doubt that many Christian, Muhammedan, or Jewish prayers and hymns can be said to be, incidentally, also works of art of the highest order. Not all Greek prayers or hymns, on the other hand, were works of art of high rank. It is not, therefore, a question of artistic superiority or inferiority; it is a difference of religious emphasis. For, Christian, Jew, and Muhammedan alike will feel that there is a certain lack of devotion if a man while making a hymn (and even more while saying or writing a prayer), thinks of producing a work of art. This is where an ancient Greek feels differently, both because to him a work of art as such is a most appropriate offering to a god and, perhaps, also because Greek religion does not favor that intimate communion with god in which everything else disappears and is forgotten.

The second point can best be illustrated by an example. Ajax, in Sophocles' tragedy, before he commits suicide prays for the last time to

51. See *supra*, note 34.

the gods.[52] Part of his prayer consists of requests—to Hermes that he may die without a long drawn out agony, to the Erinyes that they may avenge him on his enemies, to Helios that he may give news of his death to his old parents. But the last and most beautiful strophe of his prayer does not contain any petition; it is a last greeting and, so to speak, offering to the earth on which, and the land in which, he has lived, also to the Sun who shines over the earth and the gods who dwell in his country. He does not expect any help from them, either in this or the other world; he knows that he has to go, and that he has to go because of the cruelty of one god against which no other god has helped him. He also knows that the gods to whom he prays have no power over the dark world of Hades to which he is now going. Yet, in turning for the last time to the world in which he has lived and which he is now about to leave, he also turns to the gods of this world with a last greeting, almost with a blessing. I do not know whether the like of this can be found anywhere else.

There remains one aspect of Greek prayers to be considered, though it is hardly possible to discuss it adequately within the limited space available. This is their relation to moral principles. One of the most enthusiastic admirers of ancient Greek religion, W. F. Otto, has expressed the opinion[53] that it is a sign of the incipient decay and degeneration of Greek religion when it begins to admit moralistic elements. In fact, it cannot be denied that, in this respect, one finds the greatest discrepancy within Greek religion between different groups of men and also between the different phases of the general development. But the question of whether this means a "degeneration," even if one takes this word to mean merely that the intrusion of moralistic elements runs counter to what was most specifically and distinctively Greek in Greek religion, may be left open for the present.

Unquestionably, it is a distinctive trait of the gods in Homer, in Greek tragedy (with the exception, to some extent, of Aeschylus), and also of the gods of popular religion, that, while not all of them are indifferent to all moral qualities, different gods have predilections for different moral qualities, and some of them are rather indifferent to moral principles altogether. In popular religion this has found expression in the establishment of a cult to "Whisper"-Hermes (Ἑρμῆς ψιθυριστής) and

52. Sophocles, *Ajax*, 823-65.
53. *Die Götter Griechenlands*, pp. 330 f.

"Whisper"-Aphrodite (Ἀφροδίτη ψιθυρός).[54] In both cases the god does not whisper but, in contrast to the general habit of praying aloud since the god must hear from afar, is whispered to. Aphrodite, of course, is called upon as a helper in love affairs, while Hermes is, among other things, the protector of thieves, who may give them good luck in their undertakings. It is obvious why the prayers in these cases have to be whispered, and also that the faithful are not ashamed of telling these gods things which they would be ashamed or afraid to tell publicly.[55] This is quite in keeping with what has been said about Greek religion as originally a product of wonder, for many wondrous things may happen in human life which do not comply with the principle of strictest morality.

But the gods as the most powerful beings in this world are also its rulers, and it is a natural postulate that rulers should be just, though the actual rulers in the human world rarely live up to this postulate. It is also natural that the postulate should be applied eminently to the most powerful of the gods, the ruler of them all, Zeus. The function of the ruler in which his justice expresses itself most visibly and conspicuously is the meting out of punishment to wrong-doers. Naturally, therefore, passages are not lacking in Homer in which someone expresses his confidence that Zeus, or the gods, will punish the evil deeds of the

54. Cf. S. Sudhaus, *op. cit.*, p. 189 ff. with other Greek examples and H. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 55. *Schol. ad Hor. ep.* 1, 16, 59 mentions a Roman goddess Laverna, who was a protector of thieves, and who was not even whispered to since, in her case, it was sufficient to think a prayer in order to be understood by her.

55. A rather amusing example of a not strictly moral prayer, addressed, not to one of the less moral gods like Hermes or Aphrodite, but to Zeus, is found on a Greek vase which was published and discussed by C. Robert, *Bild und Lied* (Berlin, 1881), pp. 181 ff. On one side of the vase one sees two men sitting on opposite sides of a table, one speaking and pointing to a big vessel filled with some liquid, probably wine, the other listening to him while his dog sits quietly at his side and looks up at him. Obviously they discuss a business transaction, for around the head of the man who speaks and points to the vessel one finds the inscription Ὦ Ζεῦ πάτερ, πλούσιος γενοίμαν: "O Father Zeus, let me get rich," which obviously means: "Let me make a big profit." But he seems to have been somewhat too eager to put one over on his customer, for on the other side of the vase we find the same scene; but now the man with the dog has risen, speaking with indignant gestures, and his dog is barking furiously. From the situation it seems to follow that, in this case also, the prayer of the first scene, though addressed to Zeus, must have been silent. But "prayers" of this kind are not quite unknown in modern times, and are hardly significant for any religion, or rather for religion altogether.

wicked.[56] But there is no general provision in Homeric religion for rewards or punishment in life after death, and it is all too obvious, at least if one considers the external evidence only, that the wicked are not always punished in this life and the good not always rewarded. This conflict between the postulate of divine justice and the evidence provided by actual life could hardly remain unnoticed, and, while the Homeric poems give no solution of this old problem, they do contain some fragments of a more or less philosophical speculation about it which are not without significance for the history of prayer in ancient Greece.

In the famous speech of Achilles' mentor, Phoenix, in the ninth book of the *Iliad*,[57] we find the observation that the minds of the gods are made pliable by prayer, sacrifice, incense, and libations, so that they may avert punishment from a man who has deserved it by his deeds. Perhaps this does imply to some extent that the gods can be bribed and, like some human rulers, do not always act according to strict justice, but according to personal favor,[58] though this is not expressed with crude bluntness. Much more important, however, is what follows, for Phoenix goes on to say that prayers are lame and squinting daughters of Zeus, while Ate is young and quick of foot and always outruns them, bringing harm to mortals in all lands. Ate is difficult to define. As an abstract concept ἄτη means sometimes the blindness or *Verblendung* in which men commit rash and criminal actions, sometimes guilt, and sometimes the ruinous consequences of criminal actions. As a goddess she belongs in the category of half-impersonal demons who are distinguished from the Olympic gods, and is supposed to make men commit foolish deeds and also to bring about the consequences of these deeds. In his speech Phoenix obviously refers to this latter function, for he concludes by saying that prayers, though always outdistanced by Ate, may later arrive on the scene and "heal" (to some extent) the harm that Ate has done.

Though Ate appears as a demon in other authors also, there can be no doubt—in view of the fact that the prayers are also personified—that in this passage she is a scarcely veiled allegory. The meaning, therefore, seems to be that evil deeds have their own inevitable consequences regardless of whether the gods intend to punish them or not, and that all the gods can possibly do is to "heal" these consequences as far as possible,

56. See, for instance, *Iliad*, IV, 160 ff.; XIII, 622 ff.; XVI, 384 ff.

57. *Iliad*, IX, 497 ff.

58. So H. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 2, who erroneously attributes the speech to Nestor.

though even they can never prevent them altogether. Essentially, this same idea is expressed more directly in the passage in the *Odyssey*[59] where Zeus complains that mortals attribute to the gods the evil which they have brought upon themselves by their own recklessness, sometimes even beyond the decree of destiny.[60]

It would certainly be rash to attempt to elaborate this into a comprehensive and consistent philosophy. Important for the history of Greek prayer is merely the clear implication that there exists an inherent law of causation which brings to pass punishment for rash and criminal action, and which, to some extent, may perhaps be modified by the gods, but over which the gods have no absolute power. For speculations of this kind will naturally lead not merely to the conclusion expressed in the speech of Phoenix, that the effect of prayer is necessarily limited, but also to the question whether foolish prayers may not have the same kind of consequences as foolish and criminal actions. This question is both raised and answered in those numerous stories (for instance, of Phaëton and King Midas) in which a person is punished by having his prayers granted.

The attitude of the gods themselves may be different in different stories of this kind. In the Phaëton story, Helios does not wish to grant the prayer of his son, because he does not wish him to go to the destruction which, as he knows, will be the consequences of the granting of his wish. The same is the case in the story of Zeus and Semele. In both cases the god has to grant the wish because he is bound by an oath. But, then, one should not bind a god by an oath, so there was double folly. In the case of King Midas, the gods deliberately grant his wish in order to punish him for his foolish greed. But whatever the fundamental attitude of the gods in this respect may have been believed to be, once this type of speculation has begun, the result will always be that a man should be cautious in regard to the content of his prayers.

In fact, and this is perhaps still more interesting, this result does not even depend on the fundamental philosophy underlying the examples given so far. It will be the same if the assumption is made that the gods are absolutely just and the guardians of the moral law. For, if there is a

59. *Odyssey*, 1, 32.

60. A very lucid discussion of the notion that someone can bring upon himself misfortune "beyond destiny" is found in W. F. Otto, *Die Götter Griechenlands*, pp. 350 ff.

law of causation over which the gods have no absolute power, a foolish prayer may set in motion a chain of cause and effect which will lead finally to the doom of the man who has prayed foolishly, while, if the gods are just and rule the world, a foolish or criminal prayer will offend them and hence also lead to punishment.

One of the most beautiful early examples of prayers in which this attitude has found its expression is Solon's elegy addressed to the Muses.[61] In this prayer, Solon asks first for ὄλβος, a word which implies a high station in life, splendor, wealth, influence, and freedom from petty cares and troubles, then more specifically that he may always enjoy honor and a good renown among men, furthermore, that he may be "sweet to his friends and bitter to his enemies." Finally, he says that he wishes to have wealth but does not wish to acquire it through injustice. For, he says, the wealth which the gods give stays with the man to whom it is given, but the wealth which men acquire through evil deeds "follows them unwillingly," and soon Ate associates with it, she who grows from a small beginning like a fire, negligible at first and terrible in the end. He concludes with the statement that such is the punishment that comes from Zeus. This is a good illustration of the general statement made above that, once the speculation on the consequences of foolish or evil wishes has started, its influence on prayer is largely independent of its purely theological results. For in Solon's poem the idea that evil deeds or wishes start a mechanism of causation which inevitably leads to ruin is found side by side with the idea that punishment comes from Zeus. At the same time, it is characteristic of Solon and of the period in which he lived that he has not the slightest hesitation in praying for wealth, as long as it is not acquired through immoral actions, and for fame and honor, or to ask the gods that he may be "sweet to his friends and bitter to his enemies." He has no doubt that the most generally coveted goods of this life are real goods, and he certainly does not feel that the wish to be bitter to one's enemies could be impious or unjust.

Solon's prayer belongs in a vigorous, active, and prosperous period of Athenian history, a period of still greater hopes for the future, and is the expression of the philosophy of a man who had striven for the good,

61. Solon, poem 1 in *Anthologia Lyrica Graeca*, ed. Diehl.

but who, though the struggle at times had been hard, so far[62] had been successful in both his political aims and his personal ambitions. Its whole tenor, therefore, is optimistic. It seems to imply not only that evil deeds will ultimately be punished, but also that good deeds will ultimately find their reward, and in this life, not in a hereafter. But different experiences could not fail to lead to different conclusions. The goods of this life do not always "stay with a man," as Solon says, even if acquired without injustice, and they do not always make a man happy. Such experiences would naturally give a new turn to the speculation as to what is a true good for human beings and what, therefore, we should pray for, and would, to some extent, dissociate this speculation from purely moralistic considerations. To follow these speculations and their influence on prayer into all their ramifications would require a book.[63] It must, therefore, suffice to discuss some of the most significant examples.

The famous Croesus-Solon story in the first book of Herodotus[64] does not, in all its parts, present a completely consistent philosophy. Herodotus has contrived to make all its parts fit more or less into the same pattern, yet they are undoubtedly of different provenience and differ in their original character. The gist of the story is, of course, that one must look at the life of a man as a whole—and that means from the beginning to the end—in order to know whether it is a happy one. This is the reason why nobody can be deemed happy before his death. This view is certainly not very optimistic, since it is based on the conviction, which Solon expresses several times, that human life is exposed to many vicissitudes and that nobody can ever be sure of the next day. But, as the story of Tellos of Athens shows, it is not quite pessimistic either, since this story indicates that the life of a man can be reasonably happy from beginning to end, though it also implies that the simple life of an honest Athenian citizen is more likely to be less exposed to sudden misfortune than the almost superhuman splendor of an Oriental king.

The story of Cleobis and Biton is much more pessimistic. For when

62. Though the exact dating of the elegy is contested, there can be little doubt that it does not belong in the latest period of Solon's life, when much, though by no means all, of what he had tried to create had broken down.

63. A very comprehensive and detailed collection and discussion of the ancient Greeks' speculation about good and evil has been given in W. C. Greene's recent book *Moira: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought* (Harvard University Press, 1944).

64. Herodotus 1, 30-33.

their mother, in gratitude for what they have done for her, prays to Hera to give them what is best for a man, they do not wake up again from their sleep. This is essentially the wisdom of Silenus, who, when asked by King Midas what was the best thing for man, answered, "You miserable human beings, the best thing for you is never to be born, and the second best to die immediately after your birth." But it is also significant that the mother of Cleobis and Biton does not pray for any specific good for her children, but merely for "what is best for them," and that this turns out to be something very different from what people ordinarily believe. The implication seems to be that one should not only be cautious with his prayers and not pray for anything that is unjust, but that it is altogether impossible to know what is best for us and what we should pray for, and that, therefore, the best thing is to leave it to the gods and to ask them merely to give us what is good for us.

In the story of Cleobis and Biton as told by Herodotus, these latter reflections are in a way inherent, but they are overshadowed both by the pessimistic philosophy which finds expression in it, and by the use made of the story for Solon's discussion with King Croesus. They are much more explicit in Socrates' philosophical attitude, but here the result, though similar in some respects, is not quite the same. For though Xenophon says[65] that Socrates used to pray to the gods to give him τὰ ἀγαθά (which may be translated "the things good for him") since the gods, he believed, knew best what was good for him, this, even according to the evidence provided by Xenophon himself, can be only one aspect of his attitude in these matters. Xenophon goes on to say that Socrates considered a man who prayed for gold, silver, political power, or anything of this kind, just as foolish as a man who would pray for a battle, that is, for something the outcome of which is quite uncertain. This is undoubtedly quite Socratic. For, however much Socrates' disciples may differ from one another in the interpretation of his philosophy, they all agree that he does not adhere to the Stoic doctrine according to which all external or material *goods* or *evils* are in fact neither goods nor evils, but completely indifferent. Even in Plato's *Gorgias*, which, of all the works of Socrates' immediate disciples that have come down to us, comes nearest to this Stoic doctrine, Socrates does not say that it is a nice thing or completely indifferent for a good and wise man if he suffers injustice, but merely that to *do* wrong is much worse for him.

65. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I, 3, 2.

But all of them agree that, in Socrates' opinion, these external goods were good only for him who knew how to make good use of them, while otherwise they might become actually harmful. And even if a man knew in general how to make good use of such goods, the outcome still depended to some extent on circumstances beyond his control. So Xenophon is certainly right when he attributes to Socrates the opinion that it is foolish to pray for external goods without any further qualification.

But there is also complete agreement among the disciples of Socrates that there were some things, namely, justice, righteousness, fortitude, wisdom, etc., concerning which Socrates had no doubt whatever as to whether they were goods or evils, or of such a kind that one had to wait for the outcome in order to find out whether they were the one or the other. So, then, for these goods, it would seem, one can pray directly and without any qualification. In actual fact this is what Socrates does in the famous prayer in Plato's *Phaedrus* quoted above, for what else could it be to be "beautiful within" but to have all those virtues in their purest form? Yet Plato's *Phaedrus,* though extremely beautiful, is not the most simply Socratic of his dialogues. Also, why is the prayer in Plato's *Phaedrus* almost the only example of its kind? Why do we nowhere hear of hours spent by Socrates in prayer for wisdom, for divine enlightenment, for help in his struggles against sin and his striving for righteousness? For, in the famous story of his nightlong meditation, as pointed out above, the prayer is clearly set off against the meditation and in no way part of it. The only reasonable answer seems the one given above, that essentially a man has to work out his own salvation, though it may be proper for him to ask the gods to be propitious to his undertaking.

The relation between the gods and man as presupposed in this attitude seems paradoxical to us, and it is worth while to consider it a little further. Socrates was certainly not an atheist or what we would call an impious person, but, on the other hand, the Athenians were, perhaps, not entirely wrong when they contended that Socrates did not believe in the gods "in which the city believes" and introduced new divinities. For the tradition leaves no doubt that Socrates was convinced that the gods (if they were gods) could not act immorally, which some of the gods revered by "the city," according to common belief at least, occasionally did. Yet, at the same time, Socrates was not a religious reformer. Everything indicates that he was of the opinion that, in all those things

in which it was impossible to have certain knowledge, one should follow custom and tradition. He was certain that the supreme good was the moral good, and that hence the gods (if they were gods) must be absolutely moral. But in regard to all special religious rites and practices there was no certainty that followed from the nature of things, hence, it was right and proper to follow the established practice. And again, the early tradition is unanimous that Socrates was very conscientious in the observance of his religious duties—though he did not acknowledge that anything could be a religious duty which conflicted with general moral principles.[66] Yet with all his belief in the morality of the gods, it is not natural for him to think of his own striving for moral perfection as of a communion with the gods or with divinity. In fact, it will hardly be wrong to say that it was possible for Socrates not to become a religious reformer only because, in his mind, the gods were not very closely associated with what was most important for him. In this Socrates is most genuinely Greek, a heathen, and not a Christian. The gulf between gods and mortals which makes it impossible for either one of them to encroach upon the other's innermost personality, remains unbridged.

The consequences of this attitude of Socrates for prayer are quite interesting. Certainly one may pray to the gods for τὰ ἀγαθά, inasmuch as these are external goods, though only in general terms, for only the gods know how much of these things is really good for us. But then, Socrates is not passionately concerned with this kind of goods. As to the really essential goods, the moral goods, it is very doubtful whether Socrates prayed for them at all, although he seems to have been quite convinced that it was a man's religious duty towards the gods to pray. But the only prayer that remains under these circumstances for the fulfillment of this duty is the prayer which is really an offering, a very genuinely Greek kind of prayer, as has been shown above. Here again, Socrates is very genuinely Greek.

Socrates' opinion of the uncertainty of all external goods and his attitude towards prayer for such goods have aroused the admiration of the *philosophus christianissimus,* Kierkegaard. All his writings are full of Socrates, and he has tried to introduce Socratic philosophy and the Socratic method into Christian moral theology. In fact, it is remarkable how closely the highest expressions of Greek thought and Christian thought approach each other in the field of moral philosophy, but this

66. This, of course, is the main theme of Plato's dialogue *Euthyphron.*

should not make us blind to the fact that there remains a fundamental difference in their opinion concerning the relation between human beings and divinity.

Since space does not permit a discussion of the attitude of Plato, Aristotle, the Socratics, etc., toward prayer,[67] it must suffice, in conclusion, to cast a glance at the views of the early Stoics and of Epicurus and his followers. In early Stoic philosophy the speculation concerning the proper content of prayer has been carried to its most extreme negative conclusion. The external goods for which, according to Socrates, one may ask the gods, even though only in an indefinite way, are now considered completely indifferent (ἀδιάφορα) that is, no goods at all. Hence, there is certainly no point in praying for them. Apart from this, the world as a whole is regulated by divine providence which determines everything. Hence, to pray for anything to happen makes no sense, since it will either happen anyway (in which case there is no need to pray for it) or, if it is not going to happen anyway because not already provided for by providence, to pray for it would mean to ask providence to deviate from its path, which would be both foolish and impious. It follows that, according to strict logic, there is no room for prayer in Stoic philosophy, except for prayer as a pure act of devotion with no possible implication of prayer as petition.

Yet the desire to pray is so strong in a naturally religious person that Cleanthes, the second head of the Stoic sect, prays nevertheless. He not only wrote a beautiful hymn to Zeus, which concludes with a short prayer, asking for all men essentially the same as Socrates asks for himself in Plato's *Phaedrus,* but he also wrote a special prayer to Zeus and Providence, which to him are one and the same. He asks that he may follow God unhesitatingly, for, he adds, if he does not follow him willingly, he will have to follow unwillingly. This, then, seems the only thing a man can still pray for if he adheres to old-Stoic philosophy, and even this prayer, according to the strictest logic, is perhaps not quite reconcilable with the principles of Stoic theology and ethics. But then, it is doubtful whether these principles, if carried through to their ultimate consequences, are reconcilable with human life or even with one another.

We do not hear anything about Epicurean prayers, and Epicurus'

67. Most of the material has been collected by H. Schmidt, *op. cit.,* but he does not make very much use of it.

theology has often been considered an alien element in his materialistic and hedonistic system, explicable only as a concession to traditional beliefs. But the way in which Epicurus, and even more his late disciple Lucretius, speak of the gods[68] makes this explanation impossible. Moreover, Epicurus' theology, though he criticizes traditional religion sharply, is still in harmony with, and, in a way, a natural product of that characteristic Greek attitude towards the gods which prevented the development of mystic and meditative prayer, and gave the prayer of praise and adoration so prominent a place in Greek religion.

The gods in Epicurus' philosophy, like the gods of most other Greek philosophers, have lost those human qualities which made a personal relation between deity and mortal possible. At the same time, they have not only retained the essential aloofness of the Homeric gods, but this aloofness has become absolute. For, since the gods of Epicurus live in a state of eternal tranquility and bliss, it follows that they can take no interest in the actions and troubles of human beings. Hence they will neither reward nor punish them,[69] nor, of course, listen to their prayers. Yet, though nobody can offend the gods, since nothing can harm or disturb them, there is a difference between piety and impiousness, and piety is good while impiousness is evil. For the pious man will see those blessed beings as they really are and will become like them as far as possible for a human being, while the impious man has a wrong conception of the gods and will live a life full of unhappiness and troubles.[70]

We have no definite knowledge concerning Epicurean prayers, unless the poetic invocations in Lucretius' poem be considered genuine prayers. But prayers of adoration are certainly not irreconcilable with Epicurean philosophy; not that the gods could be affected by them, but because of the beneficial influence upon the soul of him who prays to look up to those blessed and perfect beings. Thus Epicurus' theology reveals itself as a genuine expression of Greek religious feeling, but, at the same time, it emphasises the fundamental difference between all ancient Greek religion and Christianity. For the development of Greek religious thought

68. See *Epicurus: The Extant Remains.* By Cyril Bailey (Oxford, 1926), pp. 94; 82 f.; 129; Lucretius, I, 44 ff.; II, 646 ff.; V, 1194 ff.

69. Epicurus, pp. 52 f.; 84 f.; Lucretius, I, 107 ff.; VI, 68 ff.

70. Epicurus, pp. 82 ff.; Lucretius, V, 1198 ff., where it is said that true piety does not express itself in bloody sacrifices and slavish prostrations before the images of the gods, but in the ability to contemplate the world with a quiet and peaceful mind.

finds its natural conclusion in the belief in a god or gods who are and should be loved but do not love,[71] while God's love for man, or, as Kierkegaard said, "that God has loved us first," is the very centre of Christian religion.

71. This is, of course, essentially also a description of Aristotle's first mover who is unmoved but moves the world ὡς τὸ ἐρώμενον τὸ ἐρῶν, even though ἐρᾶν is here used only as an analogy; for Plato cf. *Sympos.*, 201 d ff.

WORLD VISION FOR WORLD ORDER*

IRWIN EDMAN

Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University

MANY MEN AND WOMEN, even the most secular-minded, have felt a deep lack and a depressing abstractness about most discussions of plans for peace in the postwar world. They have felt, despite themselves, a kind of futility and, often, even a suspicion of irrelevance in the schemes for organizing the peoples of the world into one global brotherhood, and the individuals of our civilization into a world-wide society of mutual aid and friendship and trust. The discussions, whether in the newspapers or on the radio, on the lecture platform or even in the pulpit, have too often been in almost completely political and economic terms, as if man were solely a voting, money-making animal. Something has been left out, and that something has been the spirit of man. Something has been left unspoken and perhaps unthought of. That unuttered, unregarded, indispensable thing is vision. For it is only a vision, touching to the heart and persuasive to the mind, which can initiate and sustain the courage, call out and nourish the generosities, on which the possible birth and the continuing life of any world organization will depend. Without such an inspiriting and unwavering hope of an earth a little more heavenly in its life, the best of blueprints will remain mere paper, the best intentioned of world courts or councils will remain mere global gadgets. Unless the blueprints of peace, written in the blood of the fallen, are the documents of the passionate and unfaltering faith of mankind, peace plans will be merely ironic mockeries and world officials, however well-intentioned, will be merely mannikins. Plans and men will only be effective in world organization if they are the instruments of a world-wide goodwill, a planetary intelligence, and the common and courageous purposes of free men with free man's faith.

There will, in other words, never be a world order unless there is a belief in its possibility, and this order will never come to life or stay alive unless the belief itself is living in the hearts and minds of men alive all over the world. What is missing from the discussions of one world filled with one peace for all men everywhere, is an intimation of the faith

* Address in Centenary Series at Congregation Emanu-el, New York City, November 26, 1944.

which will generate a search for its achievement and a faith, which when such instruments are found, will keep such a world order alive. It is of that faith I wish to speak today. What are the elements of the credo involved in any possible organization of a society for peace on earth in which there will be good will among men? I am using the term faith in a very modest sense, to some minds, perhaps, a quizzical one. I am referring not to a belief in any theology, but to faith in the possibilities of nature and life, as one might speak of faith in an enterprise, or faith in one's self, or in one's friends. Hopes are dependent on what we think is possible. Our energies are dependent on our hopes. What must we minimally believe in as possible for human beings, and as possible here on earth, to insure that liberated and courageous action which will create and sustain a world order? It may, indeed, turn out that what I call a faith in nature and man may be not altogether different in substance or temper from what has traditionally gone by the name of faith in God. It will be clear, at least, that what I regard as elements of the credo necessary to the effective reconstruction of mankind, have been accented from the days of the Hebrew prophets down and have been the moral core of the Hebrew and Christian traditions in the Western world, not to speak of the religions of the East. They have been the insights of all high religion.

We shall never get very far or stick very long with the remaking of world chaos into world order until, in the first place, there has taken widespread hold on the imaginations of men faith in the goods and values implicit in nature itself. There will never be a wholehearted support and widespread search for the pattern of world order, or support for it when it is found or proposed, until there captures the imagination and wins the heart of mankind, a genuine belief in the efficacy of human intelligence. There will never be anything more than a grudging and reserved commitment to a world order, without a prior belief in the possibilities of marshalling the generous aspects of human nature, its wonderful capacities for kindness and courage and love, which our conventions and our institutions, our rigid regimentations have done so much to kill. This faith reduces itself to a belief in *nature,* in *human intelligence* and in *human nature,* and in the untouched reservoirs of generosity in human nature, though history is filled with instances of these, and not history only but our own generation under the stress of war. But we have been too timid to trust human beings.

We have been afraid of more, too. We have been afraid for generations now of the natural world in which we live, the intelligence which has bred us monstrosities of mechanical destruction, of the human nature out of whose greeds and bestialities and hypocrisies we have felt, not without justice, that wars have come. For half a century novelists, moral critics, philosophers have blackened for us the picture of the world of nature into which willy-nilly we are born, of the intelligence which we have misused and only half used, of the human nature which gives us the motives and dynamics of all our actions. It is not surprising that many have experienced a failure of nerve, and have retreated to cynicism or sentimentalism or despair. Nature has been depicted for us as an alien world, as a blind march of omnipotent and ruthless power. So far, we have been told, as science has described the world, it is a vast sentence without a meaning, there is, so far as science can show, nothing in nature to generate poetry, constitute a basis for morals or a source or guarantee of wisdom.

Human nature (how familiar the picture is from current novels and current essayists and satirists) is a compound of lust, falsity, and greed. As for human intelligence? We have been asked to look at the marvelous ingenuities we have lavished with hideous effectiveness on the most fiendish of ends. The very genius of creation has been marshalled for destruction. The gift for invention has been used, and of late almost exclusively used, to destroy.

Certainly it would not be very hard to add up reasons for the blackest despair about the world, the bleakest contempt for ourselves. It would seem plausible, too, to argue that, in a world in which all leads to chaos, confusion, or futility, the only sensible course would be to give up the world, or renounce it, and cultivate our own garden, our private spiritual sensitiveness, our mysticism, our music or our art. Or, if our mood be dark enough, to say that there is no consolation even in these, that there is nothing but nothingness anywhere.

But surely the picture of nature as a bleak enemy of all human good and all human ideals is a melodramatic piece of fancywork. When we wish to restore things nearer to the heart's desire, that wish itself is one of the natural fruits of human nature. Where do human ideals come from but out of the bosom of nature herself? Who is it that dreams of justice and peace on earth but the human animal, born of the flesh and destined to mortality. The great achievements of mankind are made

with materials nature provides and by methods nature suggests to this dreaming and imaginative child who is man. Nature is alive with promises which it is for man to fulfill. It is nature who gives us the earth to cultivate, sounds to make into music and into language, our impulses of justice and generosity as the basis of order among nations, and harmony in our lives. Cures as well as diseases lie in nature, and the poetry of Homer is part of it, along with hurricanes and droughts. Our failures to make the most of those commingled perils and opportunities which define life, those are failures in human intelligence. They are mistakes and blindnesses in human conduct, part of the price we pay for being creatures who can make choices and mistakes. We ought to be chary of indicting all of nature and calling it nothingness or ruin or desolation because not every acorn grows into an oak, because not every human scheme, however well-intentioned, comes to fulfillment.

By the same token, we ought to think twice before falling into the curiously modern, and yet in some ways age-old tendency to berate human nature and call it a vessel of corruption. Of old, distrust of human nature used to be called a sense of sin. We used to beat our breasts and call ourselves unworthy. Now we explore our psyches and find all sorts of new-fangled jargon to tell ourselves what sinks of iniquity we are. We come trailing, not clouds of glory, but impulses of the beast or the parasite. We find that inwardly we are raging, jealous, lustful animals, that we are greedy, spoilt, petulant children. The psychiatrists, or rather, the popularizers of psychiatry and the armchair strategists of psychoanalysis, have asked us to penetrate below the bland genteel surfaces of our lives and see the menagerie of conflicting wild animals, or the cave of savages, which manage somehow to keep uneasy house inside each of us, in what for all its decorous exterior, is a ramshackle tenement of clay.

The novelists, bred on a short course in distorted psychiatry, have rushed in to fill out the sardonic picture. How are we ever to believe a world order may arise when there is such anarchy and disorder in our own souls? How are we ever to believe there can be a harmony among nations, which implies a mutual trust, when we cannot trust our neighbors, or what is worse, ourselves? If patriotism often turns out to be disguised exhibitionism, a subtle form of self-display, if good will turns out to be an oblique eye to the main chance, if friendship is merely what a Frenchman long ago defined it to be, a lively expectation of favors to

come, how will we ever be able to generate enough trust in the world to maintain a world federation, or make any kind of fellowship among the scattered peoples, the conflicting interests of mankind? Will not power politics, the sordid realities of jockeying for markets, the behind-the-scenes predatory movements of vast interests controlling vast cartels, will not these corrupt at the start every attempt to turn the present shambles of the world into a garden where men of all races and all climates may live in peace and amity? If we cannot rid ourselves of prejudice against our neighbor because of his race or color or creed, here at home, how shall we ever hope to be friends in spirit with people halfway round the globe? Who are we, who are eaten by our private cancers of the spirit, who are we to seek the spiritual regeneration of mankind?

It is easy enough to construct a picture of human stupidity, wickedness, and folly and call that picture essential human nature. But it is a piece of libellous invention belied by the facts before our eyes, in the ordinary lives of ordinary people in times of peace, more than ever in times of war. Even the most cynical do not deny that human nature does on occasion display instances of courage—courage is written in every dispatch from the war fronts and might be illustrated as well in patient and anxious hearts at home. But one does not need global war to find instances of generosity, of simple justice and probity, of devotion, of tenderness, (and not only toward one's own) in daily life. It is not too much to say that people ache to be kind, and part of the bleakness of much modern life is that the anonymous and regimental conditions of urban civilization have destroyed the simple human occasions for friendliness and mutual association. A. E. Housman, the English poet, remarks somewhere, of some human beings, "too unhappy to be kind." Hate and greed come very often from insecurity, suspicion from unfamiliarity. The frightened savage lurks in us still. Remove the occasions for the old animal protective devices of anger and suspicion and fear, and the more genial and generous impulses of human nature will come into play. The blitz removed, at least for the time being, distinctions of class in England, and men of all creeds and races co-operate on the fronts and behind the fronts now. Perhaps we have hardly given human nature a chance. Unless we have faith in making the world on the basis of what human nature, time and again, has demonstrated itself to be in the way of courage, kindliness and justice, we have only the alternatives of eternal war and eternal chaos. Unless we have faith in the power of

human love and sympathy, given a chance to fulfill themselves, all the blueprints of peace will be useless, and we shall be in again for the agony of disillusion and its fearful costs in another war.

I come finally to the third article of the humanist's faith, belief in the efficacy of human intelligence. It has become the fashion of late to abdicate any hope that human intelligence can improve the lot of mankind. A distinguished novelist only yesterday referred to the nursery faith in human intelligence and the childish belief in progress, a faith held, by the way, by such "nursery"thinkers as John Stuart Hill, William James, and John Dewey. The crowning argument for the bankruptcy of human intelligence is supposed, as a matter of fact, to be illustrated by this war. Look, we are told, at the ingenuity of mankind which can invent the most complicated engines and instrument only to destroy civilization with the clever devices it has thought up. It is argued that the most scientific method can do is to invent gadgets. It cannot do anything to improve the lot of mankind. The history of mankind itself these last three centuries shows how absurd the argument is. Medicine is only the most striking case of how human intelligence, studiously and scrupulously studying the causes and conditions of human ills, has been able at least to alleviate nearly all of them and to rid mankind of some of them altogether. Human intelligence as well has improved the conditions of living which produced disease. It is only very recently, indeed, that we have begun to exercise human intelligence on improving the social environment of men and women, and on their mental as well as their physical ills. We used to hang people for the slightest infringements of trivial laws. We used to clap neurotics into asylums as we used to kill heretics and exclude strangers. We used to accept poverty as a natural scourge, as we once accepted tuberculosis or venereal disease. Instead of dismissing science as bankrupt, we should realize that it is very young still, and in social matters still very amateur. It is no use giving up the use of our brains when, in the gravest matters of human concern and human happiness, we have scarcely begun to explore what intelligence can accomplish.

It is true that, in the nineteenth century, there was smug belief in progress. In the smooth plateau of comparative order of the eighteen-hundreds, people began to believe progress would come automatically, that freedom would move from precedent to precedent. The shattering cataclysms of the last two wars, hopefully the last of all wars, has taught

us not only that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty, but that eternal resourcefulness is the only hope for a decent and fruitful life in the complexities of modern industrial life. It is true that intelligence itself can become a Frankenstein and destroy us, as the intelligence of German scientists and military experts came near destroying the whole world. I am pointing out the efficacy of intelligence in *achieving* our ends. Our ends come from our desires and our hopes. It requires faith in man himself and the cultivation of human charity and love to direct intelligence into good and not evil works. There are unlimited resources at the disposal of mankind for its own welfare and happiness, if it would but have faith in its own best impulses. There is no dreaming even what intelligence wedded to goodwill might accomplish in the world.

Faith in what men make of man and the world, faith in human love and understanding, has a long tradition in the West. Since the prophet Micah, men have conceived of a world where men would do justly, love mercy, and in so doing walk humbly with their God. The ideal of social justice is the great prophetic contribution to the human tradition. And the faith in what man may make of the nature into which, out of which, he is born, in which he grows, this, to me has a tradition as old as the written records of mankind.

What better parable is there than the story of the Garden of Eden itself, which was for man to cultivate and to live in and to enjoy. The earthly Paradise is an ancient Hebrew idea; a City of God an ancient Christian one. To believe in the possibilities, so moving and generous, that lie before a disciplined intelligence is to carry on into the modern world the prophetic insights of religions thousands of years old. Economic and political arrangements are necessary for a world order. But it will require the contagion of prophetic vision to sustain the world order by the energies of men united in a shared dream of a good life for all mankind.

RAINBOW ROUND MY SHOULDER: A REVIEW ARTICLE

H. Heath Bawden

Gustave Theodor Fechner, the German scientist and philosopher, in his *Little Book on Life after Death* (published once again with relevant additions from his other writings—Pantheon Books, New York, 1943), used the analogy of birth to interpret the fact of death, as the emergence of the individual into a new realm or level of existence. For him, intra-uterine life is one in which the individual sleeps; life after birth is an alternation of sleeping and waking, with a limited consciousness of himself, of other selves and the world about him; while death means an eternal waking—a liberation from those limitations on his awareness imposed by a material body upon a spiritual self. His theory of pan-psychism applies to all three stages. Death is the liberation of the psycho-physical individual into a realm of pure spirit, whatever that may mean. He says:

> In order to again possess a living body, we must consider not only the emanations of the body in death, and ensuingly of the corpse, but also those of the living body during our entire lifetime, not only from the standpoint of matter but also of the effects produced. In other words, we must consider in its entirety the complete inter-relationship of all these emanations. For it is the living body that creates during and by means of our entire present life the physical pre-conditions of our entire future life. In the end, this confining body of ours will decay and nothing further need emanate from it after death. Already, while alive, it has done its part towards that which is to come later, and the ultimate function it fulfils is that of passing away, this being, in itself, a condition of the awakening of man to the new body and the new life. The fact that, in the old body and the old life, consciousness no longer has reason to exist is, itself, the explanation of the fact that man awakens to the consciousness of a new body and a new life in which all former matter, movement and force are regained. It is for this reason that matter, movement and force drive so restlessly through our bodies while we are in this world, that life stirs so indefatigably in us, and so long as life lasts we should try to endure these things in order that, in the other world, our bodies and our lives may become rich and great and mighty. Our little body here below is but a tiny loom through which pass all the threads of the broad fabric that is being spun to make the body and life of the world to come (pp. 104-5).
>
> Thus, we should not entertain the idea that, through our death, we are to be projected into quite another world. On the contrary, we shall continue to live in the same world in which we now live, only we shall have other, new means of

comprehending it, and greater liberty to traverse it. It will be the same old world in which later we shall fly and in which we now creep (p. 111).

[Death] is nothing other than a more rapid, more sudden transformation of the body that thus constitutes the rapid ascension to a new degree of life (p. 120).

Before birth, the child is enclosed inside the womb. With the bursting of all former bonds—it would appear to be his death—he steps outside into a quite new, free empire that is not detached from the former one, but rather encloses it, and he has free intercourse with all those who have stood on the same rung of life's ladder. If we amplify and expand further in this direction, there opens up to us the prospect that with the breaking of the present bonds of life—again, apparently, our death—we step into a still more free, quite new domain, which is yet not detached from the other, but rather encloses it in a wider circle, and we mingle still more freely with those who have stood on the same rung of life's ladder (pp. 123-24).

These quotations are made in order to emphasize the important point that essentially all his concepts for a future life are compatible with modern scientific doctrines, without recourse to a pan-psychism or a psychophysical parallelism. This attempt to interpret death as the negative aspect of a positive transformation to a new level of existence has its counterpart in more recent theories which seek to state that transition in terms of a strictly empirical naturalism. When the scientist speaks of our slipping into the sub-miscroscopic world, this does not mean that this realm of energies is on a lower level. On the contrary, it is presumably on a higher or at least a different level. It would be just as relevant to call it a supra-microscopic-macroscopic level. The mere fact that, so far, by our technologies we have only been able to utilize these energies to operate mechanical devices is a mark rather of the limitation of our science than of the character of those energies. For all we know, the organic and sociological technologies of the future may disclose some of those naturalistic equivalents of Fechner's third level. The important point to keep in mind is that transformations are not necessarily downward, from higher to lower levels—not in a dynamic universe which has produced organic evolution and man. The second law of thermodynamics still remains to be demonstrated as a universal principle. Certainly human evolution does not suggest the approach to a zero difference of energy potentials.

It is evident on every hand that we are in touch, at least indirectly, with this extra-sensory universe. Electricity, magnetism, radio, ultra-

violet, infra-red, X, gamma, cosmic rays are all known to us inferentially, although we have no sensory apparatus by which we may perceive them. In other words, the stratosphere and the sub-stratosphere are about and around us; not only do they encompass us, but they constitute the invisible elements and forces within us that, in our traditional terminology, we refer to as life, consciousness, intelligence, thought. Some day a naturalistic psychology will translate these abstract mystical words into terms of the dynamic processes—electro-magnetic or radionic—which make living and feeling and thinking possible. The important point to remember is that, while this extra-sensory world is beyond our perception, nevertheless we live and move and have our being in it. Ours is not a mere shadow world just because the gamut of our sense-perception is limited. The presumption is that ours is part and parcel of the vast plenum Einstein and others have postulated as the result of that intimate union of space and time known as the fourth dimension. We build up our science and philosophy from the facts we experience, however restricted they may be from an extra-sensory point of view. The limitation of our experience is no reason for disparaging such experience as we do have. On the contrary, our factual experience has been the positive basis for all those extrapolations of mathematical physics which have multiplied our scientific technologies.

Physics has advanced from a static substance doctrine to a dynamic conception of point-events in a world of ceaseless change. Events, qualities and relations are its operative concepts in place of matter, motion and energy. To the mechanics of a visible palpable metrically measurable world of matter in motion it has added the electronics and radionics of an invisible and impalpable, but inferentially demonstrable, submicroscopic world which is the real sub-structure of all the phenomena of our sense-perception. The underlying patterns—electro-magnetic and radionic—which constitute the unity and continuity of our experience of objects and events have the permanence and stability which are the product of long ages of progressive evolution. The patterns of that product of nature we call human nature, and of that product of human nature which we call intelligence, represent the culmination of a cosmic evolution—at least in our limited region of the island universes. The presumption is that operative patterns of this sort, which are not only a product of the past but the conditioning causes of further growth, will have the best prospects for an unlimited future development.

Ever since organic life began—probably a billion years ago—nature has been building and rebuilding a functional pattern which we call the culmination of nature in human nature. In that rearrangement of chromosomes in what we call conception, the species stamps its pattern upon the genes of each new unique individual. The species lives on in the individual and the individuals, which *are* the species, with their infinite variability, yet typical continuity, are the product of a cosmic process which has become aware of itself in those individuals. And this awareness, progressively interactive with the remotest details of that cosmic process, becomes an imperishable part of the evolving cosmic pattern. Creatures with awareness and intelligence are so interwoven in their structure with the environment about them that it and they can only survive together. Consciousness and personality are probably a phenomenon of high frequency whose pattern is so rooted in the universe itself that there is no problem of survival, but one only of progressive transformations from one dynamic context to another.

These underlying sub-microscopic patterns exist and persist independently of any particular complex of phenomena on the macroscopic or microscopic plane. We know that those patterns which underlie the functioning of an organism are continuous during the lifetime of the individual, perhaps longer. We are told by the physiologists that the corpuscles in the blood stream of a healthy organism are renewed every forty-eight days, while every structure and tissue in the entire organism undergoes a complete change several times during the average lifetime. Not only the fluid blood stream, with the constant renewal of the life-sustaining ingredients it absorbs from the alimentary tract, but also the firm muscular tissues and the living bony structure of the skeleton are constantly, but more slowly, renewed—day by day, year by year, while the functional patterns perdure recognizably continuous in what we call the behavior of the individual organism. These functional patterns are recognizable to a certain extent in the perceivable phenomena of the macroscopic and miscroscopic levels, although the changes which take place during the lifetime of an individual often obscure the recognition of what we call their identity. But the basic unity and continuity of these patterns reside in a sub-miscroscopic realm beyond our perception—in that dynamic interplay of electrons and protons and positrons and neutrons, and in those wave-packets of pulsation which the physicist tells us are the sustaining core of every object and event.

Inasmuch as our life and growth are a process of continual change and renewal of the macroscopic and microscopic material which is utilized by these functional patterns, it is obvious that those processes which we call living and growing, when applied to the cells of the body, are constantly accompanied by the corresponding processes of distintegration and dying. Living and dying, in other words, are concomitant obverse aspects of the same process. The discarded blood-corpuscles and endothelium cells are being constantly eliminated by the excretory organs; horny epidermal cells are continually worn away on the periphery; glands secrete and excrete; the kidneys, the colon, the skin are perpetually performing their part in removing the dying, that the living part of our organic processes may survive. As long as the organism is vital and healthy, usually until maturity, we look upon these processes as part of the process of life and growth, but as old age approaches and the various organs and structures begin to disintegrate and give way to disease, we recognize a culmination of this lifelong process of discarding the dead in the midst of the living. The process of the dying and discarding of the dead cells, during the period of vitality and growth, is viewed as a matter of course, but when old age and what we call death occur, this lifelong process of dying takes on an aspect of dramatic finality—so much so that the word "death" comes to be used exclusively for the final collapse of the macroscopic phase of the organic structure, with no consideration, as a rule, of what is happening in the microscopic and sub-microscopic realms.

The truth is that this dramatic climax is but the final stage of a lifelong process during which those sub-microscopic functional patterns have survived innumerable cycles of change on the visible and palpable level. The final failure of the oxygen-bellows (the lungs) and the blood-pump (the heart), from the point of view of a basic metabolism, is a relatively insignificant fact in the total process of the lifelong process of dying. This means, of course, that if the functional patterns have persisted in spite of the recurrent complete changes of structure of a lifelong process of dying, there is every reason to believe that this physiologically unimportant final event also has not affected the continuity of those patterns, however dramatic that event has been from the human experiential point of view.

As the inherited propulsions and the acquired drives, after maturity, gradually lose their dominating control, and a certain placidity and

moderation characterize our conduct, those achievements which have been built up during a lifetime of tension and struggle, emerge with clearer distinctness as our personality patterns. Immortality may be an achievement rather than an endowment. It may be that only those patterns survive which articulate with a progressively evolving universe. Those who live constructively perhaps achieve immortality by virtue of the cosmic forces with which they identify themselves in their moment-to-moment awareness. Putting the emphasis on the over-individual values, finding one's selfhood in the "generalized other" (cf. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society,* pp. 154-63), delving in friendly interchange into the depths of our common consciousness for those inspirations and insights which sensitize and implement our acts—it may be thus that we become identified with the imperishable patterns of an evolving universe.

Whether one survives into later stages of cosmic evolution depends on whether one has identified himself, in his feeling and thinking, with just such over-individual situations. Feeling and thinking, like all other modes of activity, root back in the sub-microscopic forces which operate our universe. If we feel and think in terms of "the generalized other," as Mead phrases it, we participate in a social solidarity. If we feel and think in terms of an envisioned cosmos, our feeling and thinking, by the very nature of their electronic and radionic rootage, become thereby identified with the cosmic process. We enter into the successive realms of an evolving world only as we strive to understand and appreciate it. Our philosophy, our art, our appreciation of beauty, and our sensitive response to every fresh insight a scientific technology affords us—these are the conditions of survival value. Survival depends on the relations one has with the surviving entities. If nature, in one of its aspects, cares naught for the individual, then, as Herrick says, identify yourself with that other phase, the species, for the survival of which nature is prodigal and extravagantly wasteful. Identifying one's self with the species—mankind—means living participatively, co-operatively, even symbiotically with other selves. Our electrons revolve in concentric fields; we enter into one another's inmost essence; together we vibrate with any high frequency the personality pattern demands. We survive because the electrons of our thinking and our feeling have put us in the generative center of an expanding universe. Those electrons, protons, photons, wave-packets, or whatever they are, that operate invisibly and impal-

pably within us in what we call our feeling and our thinking, are doubtless day by day building for us the structure of those functional patterns which will survive our temporary protoplasmic habiliment in this macroscopic world. Feel and think cosmically, and perhaps the cosmos will take care of you.

The organism means nothing apart from its context, and its context is nothing less than the environing universe. The photons that make vision possible travel a hundred and eighty-six thousand miles per second and arrive from at least ninety-two million miles away. The electromagnetic energies which underlie our synaptic correlations are part of the equilibrating mechanism that sustains the solar system. We are not specks of dust lost in the reconstruction of worlds; we are dynamic centers of awareness and intelligence which some day, by scientific technologies, will control that reconstruction. As Clarence Luther Herrick said, "My twin is the universe itself." We exist, subsist, cease to exist or survive together. Every breath I draw, every thought I think, every act I perform, back of the muscles involved, is implemented by this world of sub-atomic energies. The thought I think, the feeling I suffer or enjoy, is probably as important as a tidal wave or the explosion of a gas cone. The universe may be just a grand adventure to produce feelings and ideas as the crowning achievement of high frequency variables. And, since the pattern of a species survives the death of the individual and the pattern of the individual survives the repeated renewal of its cells during a liftime, so the feelings, ideas, and acts which constitute a personality are a functional pattern which likewise survives the transformation from a sensible to an extra-sensible world. There is every reason to suppose that our feeling and our thinking are as centrally tied up with the cosmic activities as our vision, our hearing, and our other sensorimotor activities.

There's a rainbow round my shoulder. That functional pattern which is I is always there, in this or in what we call the next world. No local showers, nor even a deluge, can do aught but enhance that glorious harmony of colors which emerges when the light of scientific truth shines through. And the functional patterns of those we have loved and lost are there too—beneath, above, around, within us, if we but let the reality of our over-individual selves keep that arch of beauty about us. It isn't only the ferocious monsters of our animal past that emerge from our subconscious. Beloved alter-egos and the revered companions and

friends of former days often hover over us, luring us into sensuous ecstasies or inciting us to clearer vision and deeper understanding of ourselves. *She* is there in all her loveliness and sympathy; *he* is there with all his friendliness and wisdom. They are as real as the actual; they are often more real, because of the ideality of their perfection, and we need not assume that they are but fabrications of our subconscious. They may be just that, but also they may be the effect upon our awareness, through the sub-microscopic underground channel, of other personalities welcoming the opportunity to be in touch with us when the threshold of our consciousness is lowered and the hazards and inhibitions of our waking hours are removed.

Back of our organic polarizations, our quests and satisfactions—or rather, within them—are the pulsating patterns of a sub-microscopic realm which not only operates a push-button civilization, but is ever present in that subliminal substructure of our selfhood which Freud called the Unconscious. These invisible dynamic patterns are the very matrix of our being. Not only are they the mysterious source of the stimuli that impinge on our sense organs, but they are the very substance our dreams and our wakeful awareness are made of. They are the quickening factor in our creative thinking. We do not live merely above the threshold of the subliminal world. The very roots of our being strike down into this realm which a science of electronics and radionics is disclosing to us. Pattern fragments occasionally become articulate in our dream-life, when the inhibitions of our wakeful awareness are weakened and our rootage in the subatomic realm juts out in that kaleidoscopic heterogeneity of the subconscious. They often have all the concreteness of detail and the warm sensuousness of our wakeful moments, but soon slip away into the obscurity of a phantasy world as we try to piece them together into some pictorial or historical context.

A personality in terms of such a liberated dynamic pattern, as Fechner says, would not be limited in its fellowship with other personalities by the impenetrable exteriors we present to each other in this macroscopic life. Our selfhood would interpenetrate, reciprocally participate, mutually co-operate in every intimate way with those we love. On a thousand vibrant strings the music of our social intercourse would be a perpetual orchestral delight. Our social selfhood, to use his charming metaphor, would be an endless interchange of concentric rings of intersecting waves where the ripples meet. It is an exhilarating thought

that the fellowship of personalities on this higher plane may take place in terms of a wider gamut of electro-magnetic pulsations of which we experience so narrow a band in our present vision. And the same would be true of a richer hearing, odor, taste and touch, wonderful as these are even in our present sensorium. Odors, tastes, sounds, like contacts and vision, in such a world will have a three-dimensional quality. All our senses will be synthetic: we will see the sounds, hear the music of the things we see, taste all the odors, and experience in touch a symphony of values embracing all the other senses.

Nature will be, not merely a panorama outside of us which we view from a distance, but a cyclorama in which we actively participate, blowing with the breezes through the trees, winging with the birds, ourselves glowing in the glory of seascape and sunset. It is difficult to picture this empirical naturalistic heaven, limited as we are by the analogies of the restricted sense experiences of this life, but just as, by the radio and television, we can hear and see what is happening around the world, so in the new realm of dynamic patterns, we may travel with the speed of light to the most distant island-universe or rest for a moment in the mirrored image of the world in a drop of dew.

Nature didn't spend a billion years of organic evolution producing you just to wipe you out over night. The hereditary genes, which condense into the chromosomes the patterns of those aeons of variation and interaction of our ancestors in diverse environments, leave their imprint upon a dynamic system. Every new pattern nature evolves becomes a permanent part of the cumulative totality of an expanding universe, just as every experience records a difference in our personalities. Endlessly changing, our adventurous world registers every variation into its structure, and what is structure but the potentiality of function? As long as the universe goes on, every wave and wavelet, every ray and radiation, every quantum and wave-packet, every center of awareness we call a self plays its perennial part in the cosmic drama. There are no discoverable limits to that arch of beauty that hovers over us; it is just the potentiality of our own future encompassing the present.

By means of the scientific technologies man even now is beginning to free himself from the limitations of his past existence. Speed, in an aeroplane, lessens the limitation of space and shortens the time required for transportation from one place to another. Radio and television enable us to hear and see what is happening around the earth-planet in a

matter of seconds, indeed almost instantaneously, instead of requiring days, weeks, perhaps months for the laborious transmission of audible and visible symbols. Unlike our ancestors, whose activities were limited to a terrestrial plane, we are able now to navigate the ocean like a fish or the air like a bird. Indeed, we can utilize these media in ways impossible to the fish or bird. By means of radar we can see in the fog and the dark. By means of the X-ray we can inspect the interiors of solid objects. In other words, we are beginning to live in a larger world or, to put it in another way, by means of our increasing knowledge in redirecting the forces of our environment, we are telescoping space and time till, some day, we may truly be living in that space-time continuum the mathematicians call the fourth dimension. And, with the biological technologies possible in a co-operative civilization, death will become for us what the chrysalis is to the emerging butterfly—a phenomenon of transition into a fuller, freer existence. Since at last we have diverted to other ends some of that terrific speed of the electrons that evelop and isolate the nucleus of the atom, perhaps we are on the way also to releasing from the nucleus of the living cell some of those vital radiations that will not only do away with cancer but instill into our tissues a death-defying factor which will transform our ad interim civilization into an unending pursuit of perfection.

BOOK REVIEWS

Philosophy—East and West. Edited by CHARLES A. MOORE. Princeton University Press, 1944. ix, 334 pp. $3.50.

This ably edited volume is unique in many respects. It grew out of the East-West Philosophers' Conference held at the University of Hawaii during the summer of 1939, and is fittingly inscribed to Dr. Gregg M. Sinclair, President of the University, who is a great believer in the values arising from the combination of Eastern and Western thinking.

The contributors who have written on the different thought structures encountered throughout the history of Asia, have all rightfully stressed that there is a wide variety of philosophical positions and a great divergence between them. As a matter of fact, Western thinking, for once, appears very much in the light of a homogenized view, particularly in Professor Northrop's article, which seeks to delineate the difference between Eastern and Western thinking in order to arrive at a proper evaluation of either. Nevertheless, every contributor seems to be profoundly convinced that mutual benefits of not inconsiderable consequences will result from an interchange of views, as well as a critical study of Oriental philosophy by Western scholars and Western systems by the Orientals. None of the authors has shut his eyes to grave shortcomings in the application of the respective world views to the practical issues of life.

In reading the book against the background of current events, one has the feeling that, in the present meeting of East and West, the former will be shocked into a realization of what man can *do,* while the latter is offered a chance, as never before, though under somewhat adverse conditions, to realize what man can *be.*

The problem of relating Eastern and Western philosophy for mutual benefit, resolves itself into this: Are we prepared to view ourselves as others do? Despite all self-criticism, it is still possible to call such attempts feeble. The failures and shortcomings of Western thinking are yet, to a large extent, suggested on the basis of presuppositions arising from within that thought matrix, while the spokesmen for the East, realizing that spiritual survival is at stake, fall largely into the error of subtly hinting at adoption of Western attitudes, at least in the government of practical affairs. By so doing, they will inevitably become involved in the same predicaments under which many minds in the West are chafing. Yet, it is a foregone conclusion that civilization, Western

style, will continue to prosper, extend its influence, and "progress." All these are first stages in the synthesis that those to whom these problems are realities, are longing for. From there we will, no doubt, press forward to a global feeling of solidarity and search for the solution of the problems of mankind, rather than those of special interests, leaving behind even the thought: This is Oriental, this is Occidental. However, this may be wishing too much when each is still a little boastful, saying: "Behold! how much I have accomplished!" "Behold the depth of my thought!"—"I am a success, am I not?" "I am contented, that is sufficient for me." Already there are Orientals in spirit in our midst, and Occidentals beyond the Pacific.

In the book under review, Professor Conger has outlined Indian philosophy briefly and pointed out the common ground of Eastern and Western metaphysics. Professor Chan Wing-tsit wrote the story of Chinese philosophy and depicted the spirit of Oriental philosophy in general. Buddhism, which links, as it were, all countries of the East spiritually, has been treated as a philosophy of "Thusness" in an illuminating article by Professor Emeritus Junjirō Takakusu. Professors Shunzō Sakamaki and Daisetz Teitarō Suzuki have interpreted Shintō and Zen. Appraisals, including comparisons with Western thinking, have been offered the reader by Professors William Ernest Hocking, George P. Conger, and Filmer S. C. Northrop. The editor, Professor Charles A. Moore, has written a most understanding synopsis of the comparative philosophies of life. In knitting together the somewhat heterogeneous contents of the book, he has attained for the volume a certain unity, bearing out the theme of the first chapter by Professor Hocking, who has long been known as most sympathetic toward the Eastern mind and here also has stressed the "extraordinary level of inner human dignity" as reached by the Orient.

It might be well to be a trifle wary of the clear-cut distinctions between Eastern and Western thinking that Professor Northrop has sought to establish in his most significant article, to which he has prefixed his elaboration of a technical terminology for comparative philosophy. That such a terminology is needed requires no demonstration, in view of the rather barren results thus far attained by this recent member of the "comparative sciences." Caution is advised, however, because the more the different systems of Oriental philosophy are studied, the more the student will find in them apparently disturbing and incongruous

conceptions, such as *śraddhā, bhakti,* and *vāc,* which, together with some others especially in the little understood Shivaite, Vishnuite and Tantric texts, seem to war against delineations that are uncompromising in character. The possibility must not be left unconsidered that there may not be one, but many hidden concepts by postulation in the apparently undifferentiated aesthetic continuum which Professor Northrop stipulates as the *summum bonum* of Oriental philosophy. The part that language plays in ancient and Oriental philosophy, still offers many solutions to a correct interpretation of strange modes of thought. By the same token, the positivistic implications in science or in Christianity, slight as they might be in Professor Northrop's view, would likewise seem to militate against the sharply drawn picture of Western thinking, which is supposed to be completely absorbed in the category of concepts by postulation.

In a sense, Professor Northrop's contentions bear out the well-known epitomization of the relation of East and West by Rudyard Kipling, no less than the conclusions which William Torrey Harris, the foremost American Hegelian, long since arrived at, to the effect that the Hindu is striving for a negative unity rather than a fulness in the Absolute which is the promise of Christianity as well as of Hegel's logic and interpretation of history. However, Professor Northrop must be thanked for having called attention to certain difficulties which too enthusiastic advocates of the comparative method in application to philosophy are prone to ignore. Beyond that, he has laid bare certain impossibilities in the comparative method which it is well to bear in mind. We also should not fail to recognize and acknowledge that, both in the title of his article, "The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy," and in his theory of "the symbolic character of the immediately apprehended," expounded briefly toward the end of his article, Professor Northrop shares, in general, the sentiment of his colleagues as to the desirability of an integration of hemispherical attitudes. In modern art, poetry, and some philosophies, he himself, indeed, acknowledges a trend toward "an all-inclusive world philosophy."

Understanding the Oriental thought is just as much a matter of penetrating the veil of language for us as sharing in the busy life of Western civilization is a matter of adjusting modes of action for the Oriental. It is debatable whether the going out of the spirit of compromise in the East and the ability of the Oriental at last "to enter into healthy bloody

wars to the death just like good Westerners" (p. 222) is, after all, desirable. It is true, as Professor Northrop continues, "Western religion and morality have their liabilities as well as their assets." The snares in which the minds of the East and our own have been separately caught up and held fast for many centuries, are not cut easily. But the volume is bound to do a great deal for the thoughtful and teachable reader who will appreciate the unusual content, the spirit of true tolerance which it breathes, and the sensitive integration achieved by the editor despite certain disagreements in details among the authors. May the book prove to be a potent factor in establishing a common universe of discourse for East and West.

KURT F. LEIDECKER

Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Troy, New York

Lu Hsiang-shan: A Twelfth Century Chinese Idealist Philosopher. By SIU-CHI HUANG. New Haven, Connecticut: American Oriental Society, 1944. 116 pp. $2.00.

Lu Jiu-yüan (1139-1193) was one of the minor philosophers who helped to develop the neo-Confucian philosophy that reinterpreted and widened Confucianism in the later medieval period. As a result, Confucianism succeeded in taking the intellectual leadership of intelligent China away from Buddhism and Daoism and in making itself the authoritative interpretation of Chinese thought. Lu Jiu-yüan was a contemporary and acquaintance of the great neo-Confucian synthesizer, Ju Hsi, and rebelled against the latter's emphasis upon a profound knowledge of the Chinese classics and the complicated sets of ritual performances he considered to be a necessary requisite for moral cultivation of one's personality. In place of these difficult practices, Lu Jiu-yüan returned to Mencius' ethical intuitionalism and depended upon the Pure Mind, which, he held, is inherent in all beings and is an all-sufficient guide for the whole of moral life. Although this Mind and its culture is fundamentally similar to the teachings of Chan (or Zen) Buddhism, Lu Jiu-yüan attacked that religion sharply for its otherworldliness and its lack of a social ethic. A metaphysical idealist, he held that Mind is the only existent and controls the universe. This objective idealism he derived from Mencius' intuitionalism, justifying it on the authority of that

classical philosopher. Thus he reduced Ju Hsi's complicated philosophy to a simple mentalism and a process of freeing Pure Mind from the appetites that mislead conduct.

Miss Huang's monograph is an excellent piece of work. It is clear and precise, asking almost all the needed pertinent questions concerning Lu Jiu-yüan's metaphysics, and reporting what replies he has made—a feature infrequently found in discussions of philosophic systems. Many brief passages from his writings are carefully translated. The meaning of each crucial term is indicated. This volume thus constitutes a reliable guide to his teaching. The bibliography and index are well done. The longest and most comprehensive study of this matter, however, is omitted, namely, L. V. Cady, "The Philosophy of Lu Hsiang-shan" (a D.Th. thesis at Union Theological Seminary, New York City, 1939, 441 typewritten pages). This manuscript is, however, available only in the Library of that institution. It is greatly to be wished that treatments similar to Miss Huang's were prepared for other outstanding Chinese philosophers.

There are some other minor defects. In Chinese, this man is usually called "Lu Hsiang-shan," and that phrase is used as the title of this book. But "Hsiang-shan" (lit., "Elephant Mountain") was never the name of this man. It was the name he gave to the place where he lived and lectured for a period of years (p. 12). His followers called him "the teacher of Hsiang-shan (Hsiang-shan Hsien-sheng)." "Lu Hsiang-shan" is merely a cursive expression for "Hsiang-shan Lu-shzh (Mr. Lu of Hsiang-shan)," the term used in the imperial citation bestowing his posthumous honors (*Complete Works* 33: 3b). We have, then, no more right to call him "Lu Hsiang-shan" in English, than to speak of "Thomas Aquino" (instead of "Aquinas") or "Joan Arc" (instead of "of Arc"). We should no more refer to Lu Liu-yüan as "Hsiang-shan" than to call Ralph Waldo Emerson by the name "Concord" (he is known as "the sage of Concord"). Pidgin-English uses English words in a Chinese word-order —"Lu Hsiang-shan" is, then, pidgin-English—something quite unworthy of anyone who has any pretensions to scholarship. The proper English equivalent for the Chinese phrase, "Lu Hsiang-shan" is "Lu *of* Hsiang-shan."

Miss Huang, moreover, does not seem to realize that, in Chinese, ages are stated in ordinal, not cardinal numbers. She should write, "in his tenth year," not "ten years of age"; "he was in his twenty-ninth year,"

not "he was twenty-nine"; "in his fourth year," not "at the age of four" (p. 12); "in his fifty-fourth year," not "fifty-four years of age" (p. 16). There is also a minor inaccuracy in the date of his death. Instead of "Jan. 10" (pp. 9, 16), it was Jan. 19, according to the date in his *Complete Works* (33: 12b, 36: 44b), P. Hoang's *Concordance des Chronologies Néoméniques,* (p. 256), and Chen-shzh *Jung-si-hui-shzh Jzh-li* (12:24). (Since the *Complete Works* record his death on the fourteenth day of the month, which bore the cyclical name *guei-chou,* the twelfth month of that year must have begun on Jan. 6, not on Jan. 5, as both Hoang and Chen's calendars put it.) He fell ill on Jan. 11, not "Jan. 3" (p. 15). On page 58, note 1 does not state that Miss Huang's reference is to Legge's *Li Ki,* vol. II, in *Sacred Books of the East* (vol. XXVIII) and not to the translation of this work in his *Chinese Classics.* In general, the proof-reading has been carefully done, but on page 78, line 16, the second parenthesis is an error for a comma. On page 81, note 3 refers only to the second quoted sentence on this page; the reference for the sentence with the superscript number "3" should be "*Ibid.,* p. 355."

One matter omitted by Miss Huang indicates perhaps better than any other the real philosophical stature of Lu Jiu-yüan. Confucius centered his ethics about the concept of *ren* (Miss Huang spells it *jen*), which term has been translated "benevolence," "human-heartedness," etc. To Confucius, this virtue meant love for others, and he defines it thus (*Analects* XII, xxii). But it was not for him an equal love towards all persons; it was a graded love, greater towards those nearer oneself, such as parents and elder brothers, and lesser towards more distant persons. The great ethical achievement of neo-Confucianism was that it substituted for this graded love the concept of a universal love for all and used the term *ren* in this latter sense. Thus Mo-dz's doctrine of equal love for all entered into the Confucian teaching. From the beginning of neo-Confucianism, the leaders of this school, such as Han Yü, Jou Dun-yi, Ju Hsi, Wang Shou-ren and others, all interpreted *ren* thus, and made it the center of their ethics. (For Jou Dun-yi, Jang Dzai, and Cheng Yi, sincerity [*cheng*] was not their central ethical principle, contrary to Miss Huang's statement [p. 26], but rather their central means of self-cultivation.) Lu Jiu-yüan, slavishly following Mencius, had no single central virtue. He emphasizes *yi* (righteousness), probably because it connotes an anti-Buddhistic social morality, and leaves the other virtues dangling, taking them on the authority of Mencius. Thus, unlike the

great neo-Confucians, he failed to attain a unified ethical system. In this respect, he indicates his philosophic inferiority. Wang Shou-ren (erroneously called "Wang Yang-ming" instead of "Wang *of* Yang-ming" on pp. 3, 9, 11, 85, 87, 88, etc.) corrected him in this matter, returning *ren* to its central ethical position.

These are, however, minor defects in a really excellent piece of work. The author, the Department of Oriental Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, where she did her work, and the American Oriental Society, which publishes this work, are to be congratulated on this monograph.

HOMER H. DUBS

Hartford Seminary Foundation

Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Vol. XIV. New York: 1944. xx, American Academy for Jewish Research, 276 pp. $2.50.

This volume of *Proceedings* contains a variety of studies. S. Atlas and M. Perlman publish Saadia's hitherto lost preface to the Arabic version of the *Scroll of the Hasmoneans.* An interesting collection of aphorisms excerpted from Joseph b. Judah ibn 'Aḳnīn's (d. 1226) largely inedited *Ṭibb al-Nufūs* is offered by A. S. Halkin, "Classical and Arabic Material in Ibn 'Aḳnīn's *Hygiene of the Soul,*" (pp. 25-147). The excerpts include a few passages from Galen's otherwise lost treatise, περὶ ἀλυπίας, *On Freedom from Grief.*

The sources of Ibn 'Aḳnīn's sayings point, of course, to Arabic literature. The edition is thus put in relation to this literature by adducing parallels to be found in similar writings and *florilegia.* But additional parallels are also to be found in Petrus Alfonsi, *Disciplina Clericalis,* and probably in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Politics* described by S. Horovitz, "Die pseudaristotelische Politik," *MGWJ.* 58 (1914), 257-80, a writing used by the Brethren of Purity, Alfarabi, and Ḥunain. The numerous aphorisms on "secrets" (no. 73 ff.) suggest Hermetic influence. It remains to be seen whether there does exist any direct or indirect connection between the contents of these sayings and the Arabic Hermetic writing edited by Bardenhewer, *Hermetis Trismegisti De Castigatione Animae Libellus* (1873). The source of Ibn 'Aḳnīn's topically arranged material must have been an unknown Arabic *florilegium,* based on Greek lore,

though the links of the transmission are incomplete. The archetype may have been the adaption or revision of a Greek or Syriac original, including Muslim and other Oriental accretions.

Ibn 'Aḳnīn's compilation belongs to Arabic gnomic literature, the origin of which is traceable to Greek, i.e., Hellenistic times. Muslim *adab* writers show, indeed, a marked similarity to a specific type of Hellenistic literature, περὶ βασιλείας, created by the Neo-Pythagoreans. One of these *Treatises on Kingship* served, for instance, as the main source of the *Letter of Aristeas* (cf. W. W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Baktria and India* [1938], 414 ff.). However, the question of interrelationship between the different chains of transmission is very involved. Here is an illustration. Aphorism no. 265 reads: "Plato said: It does not behoove a king to permit unrestricted lying, etc." In *b.Tamid* 32a, we read that the power is in the hand of the king but lying is not becoming to the king. This is an answer given by fictitious Jewish Elders to Alexander the Great, and a fragment from the same treatise on kingship used by Pseudo-Aristeas (about intricate details see L. Wallach, "Alexander's Conversation with Fictitious Jewish Elders and the Letter of Aristeas," *PAAJR.* XI [1941], 76 ff.).

Some of the aphorisms on "friends" render ideas of Aristotle's pathology of friendship as expounded in the eighth and ninth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Here is a striking example not identified by the editor. No. 298 reads: "Junaid, the Sheikh of the Fraternity, said: The brother, i.e., *the friend is in reality you*, etc." This is a quotation from *Eth. Nic.* IX, 4, 5 (1166a), ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός, "for a friend is another self"; cf. also IX, 9, 1 (1169b): "a friend, who is a second self"; IX, 9, 10 (1170b): "for his friend is a second self." Ibn 'Aḳnīn's teacher, Moses Maimonides, in his Arabic *Commentary on Aboth* i, 6, quotes the same passage in the name of Aristotle. To the aphorisms no. 276 and 284, and the relationship between friend and friend, cf. Wallach, "Amicus amicis inimicus inimicis," *Zeitschrift fuer Kirchengeschichte* 52 (1933), 614 f.

A special chapter deals with "Socrates in the Arabic Tradition" (pp. 38-60), since he figures as the largest single contributor of sayings. In this connection, the reviewer calls attention to Bergmann, "Sokrates in der juedischen Literatur," *MGWJ.* 80 (1936), 3-12. As to the transfer to Socrates of the motif of Diogenes in the barrel, cf. Petrus Alfonsi, *Disc. Cler.*, ed. Hilka-Soederhjelm, xxviii, *De Socrate (=Diogene) et rege.*

This writing, the oldest medieval Latin compilation of sayings, offers parallels to Ibn 'Aḳnīn's collection. Cf., e.g., *exemplum* xxix: *seculum est quasi pons,* etc., and no. 132: *This world is a bridge,* etc. The coincidence is not surprising, because both authors resorted to the same Arabic sources. What is said in the *Prologus* of the sources of the *Disciplina* could have been said by Ibn 'Aḳnīn of his own compilation ". . . ergo libellum compegi, partim ex prouerbiis philosophorum et suis castigacionibus, partim ex prouerbiis et castigacionibus arabicis et fabulis et uersibus."

Professor Halkin's study will be of help to Franz Rosenthal, the prospective editor of Ibn 'Aḳnīn's *Treatise on the Hygiene of Sick Souls and the Care of Sound Hearts.*

Adolph Kober's *Jewish Monuments of the Middle Ages,* may be called a funeral eulogy for the now defunct Jewry of Germany. He edits the epigraphic remnants of 110 tombstone inscriptions from Speyer, Cologne, Nuremberg, and Worms, dating from 1085 to ca. 1428.

Phonetic transcriptions of the present day Judeo-Arabic dialect of Ṣan'a in Yemen are Wolf Leslau's *Texts on Yemenite Folklore.*

Eisig Silberschlag, "Tschernichowsky and Homer," gives an estimate of the Greek influence on the modern Hebrew poet, the Hebrew translator of the Iliad and the Odyssey. But Professor Silberschlag's sweeping statement that Tschernichowsky was "fully conscious of the striking similarities between Jews and Greeks in the numerous domains of life and letters," (p. 261) is by no means substantiated by the scant remarks on page 260, which refer to rather vague instances. We still prefer Aḥad Ha-'Am's judgment of "the deep-seated and fundamental difference of spirit between Jews and Greeks."

In the careful literary analysis of the historical sources that characterizes his studies, Abraham Weiss (pp. 267-76) concludes that not only the seat of the Jewish court for the regulation of the leap year during the third century had been moved by R. Judah I from Judah to Galilee, but also the third century seat for the calendar regulation of the Jewish month.

Summarizing, we may state that this annual volume is a testimony to the wide horizon of research fathered by the American Academy for Jewish Research.

Luitpold Wallach

Knoxville, Tennessee

Germany's Stepchildren. By SOLOMON LIPTZIN. Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1944. xii, 298 pp. 18 illus. $3.00.

In our time the German Jew has become the "Wandering Jew" par excellence. Yet he whose destiny turned out to be that of the most brutally persecuted and most wantonly sacrificed of all the Jews in the world, had, for a long time, believed himself free from the old stigma of racial and religious discrimination. The German Jews dreamed the hundred and fifty year old dream of emancipation which started with Moses Mendelssohn's admission to German cultural life and the abolition of the ghetto restrictions at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and ended tragically with their physical destruction under Nazi rule.

Nowhere are these great hopes of a socially important minority and their cruel disappointment better illustrated than in the literary, artistic, and scientific creations of the Jewish elite of German tongue. Therefore, Dr. Solomon Liptzin's attempt to grasp the problem through the medium of the best German-Jewish literature has proven a complete success. It is, to this reviewer's knowledge, the first investigation of the tragic paradox of German-Jewish endeavors considered as a whole. Thus, this excellently written book can serve both as a warning to the Jews of other countries to avoid dangerous illusions and, at the same time, as a paradigm for every nation of the self-destructive effects of discriminatory policies. For, as the history of the past twelve years shows, in Germany the unleashing of anti-Semitic brutality goes hand in hand with the increasing decay of the country's cultural level.

Dr. Liptzin does a great deal for the understanding of the complicated problem of the German Jews by stressing the cultural importance of the Berlin Jewish salons which flourished at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The sudden rise to recognition and equality, however doubtful the latter might prove in practical life, could not have failed to confuse the minds and hearts of the German-Jewish intelligentsia. They reacted exactly like unexpectedly well treated stepchildren (the metaphor is amazingly adequate); out of an overwhelming sentiment of gratitude they tried to show themselves better citizens than the average German, assimilating and adapting their best qualities to the service of the newly-won fatherland. From the first, this attitude produced two unhealthy and dangerous developments: the undervaluation of their Jewish cultural and historical background by those who remained faithful to their religious traditions, and the adoption of Christianity by a large minority of

sophisticated Jews who wanted to demonstrate the completeness of their assimilation. What a doubtful phenomenon the celebrated emancipation of the German Jews must have been from the start, if the children and grandchildren of its eminent exponent, the philosopher Moses Mendelssohn, one after another abandoned the paternal faith to become ardent Catholics and Protestants! Those who honestly tried to be good Jews and good Germans at the same time were forced back to a purely defensive position. Uprooted from their Jewish background without having gained full and uncontested admission to the beloved Germanism, even in its finest manifestations, they were tragically doomed in their highest aspirations.

In analyzing the desperate efforts of the German-Jewish intellectuals to find a way out of this dilemma, the author holds that only those who uncompromisingly returned to their Jewish roots could withstand the barbarous assault of Hitlerism. He thus obtains an excellent yardstick from evaluating the lives and efforts of German-Jewish thinkers from the period of Rahel Varnhagen, Ludwig Börne, Heinrich Heine, to our time. He is correct in maintaining that Gustav Landauer, Richard Beer-Hofmann, Martin Buber, Arnold Zweig, and Max Brod, who (perhaps with the exception of Brod, who was blessed with other important literary qualifications) have excelled as masters of German language and German thought, could have maintained their high artistic and philosophic standards only through the medium of their fully emphasized Jewishness. Along with others, called by Liptzin "Pan-Humanists," these authors could give of their best because they not only gladly accepted their Jewish fate, but also helped to bring forth a "renaissance of the Jewish people."

The opposite phenomenon is found in another group of German authors of Jewish origin, who destroyed themselves in a hopeless struggle for an exalted Germanism, the promotion of which was denied them by the mere fact of their Jewish birth. The most typical case is that of the twenty-three year old philosopher, Otto Weininger, who killed himself because he considered the Jewish race morally and mentally foul and infectious, compared with the high qualities of the "Aryans."[1] But even Jakob Wassermann, who had made an international name for himself

1. He also rejected women as basically inferior and essentially evil, and could not bear the idea of being attracted by them. See this reviewer's essay, *Das Weib in Weiningers Geschlechtscharakterologie* (Berlin, 1924).

as a novelist, throughout his life was exasperated by the fact that his own belief that he was a full-fledged German, despite his Jewish origin, was not shared by other Germans. Dr. Liptzin shows analytical skill in his deduction that both Stephan Zweig and Ernest Toller, whom he describes as a "marginal Jew," were driven to suicide because they had repressed from their conscious minds any personal connection with their Jewish ancestry. When the big Hitler crush came and they found themselves homeless, expelled from what they considered their own soil, they were isolated and uprooted to such an extent that life became meaningless. Neither Toller's socialism nor Zweig's "world-citizenship" could provide their souls with a home real enough to provide a panacea for their helpless nostalgia. And they could not find their way back to the paternal Judaism.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is that devoted to four German Jews of far-reaching influence: Theodor Herzl, father of Zionism; Arthur Schnitzler, dramatist and novelist; Walther Rathenau, one of the few important politicians of the Reich; and Theodor Lessing, eminent philosopher and critic of culture. For three of them—Herzl, Rathenau, and Lessing—their own solution of the Jewish problem became the decisive event of their personal lives and deaths. The fourth, the Viennese Schnitzler, must be regarded as an example of the last possible synthesis of antithetical trends among the German Jews.

In 1895, when Theodor Herzl published his *Judenstaat,* the assimilated Jews of Central Europe considered his idea of restoring the ancient Jewish state in Palestine pure foolishness. At that moment they believed their position as fully recognized citizens to be completely assured, and even occasional outbursts of virulent anti-Semitic feeling failed to disturb their peaceful sleep. The personal sensitiveness, rare sense of honor, and foresight of a Theodor Herzl were needed to stir up the quiet waters of Jewish complacency. Not until Hitler came to power did the German, and finally the Austrian, Jews completely realize the truth of Herzl's predictions. Schnitzler, though recognizing Herzl's idealism, as well as the gulf between Jews and non-Jews in German lands, always considered himself a German poet who would never be betrayed by his "Aryan" literary colleagues. He was fortunate enough to die in 1931, two years before the unleashing of the Nazi fury in Germany, and seven years before the same event in Austria.

The case of Walther Rathenau is most tragic indeed. This great in-

dustrialist, thinker, and statesman, just at the time when Herzl's pamphlet appeared, published an urgent invitation to his fellow Jews in Germany to give up their specific racial Jewishness and merge with other Germans, retaining only a modernized Jewish religion which could be recognized along with other sects in a tolerant Germany. Later, he demonstrated logically the absurdity of all racial theories. After the revolution of 1918, he proved his patriotism by accepting, reluctantly, the office of Foreign Minister, in which, by his high culture, he won the admiration of the civilized world in Germany's darkest hour of defeat. Forerunners of the Nazi movement recompensed him for his achievements by assassinating him as a "dirty Jew," upon his return from the conference at Genoa.

Theodor Lessing was known outside of Germany through his interesting book, *Europa und Asien (Untergang der Erde am Geist).* He embodied in his own person the two contradictory aspects of German Jewry, starting as a violent "assimilationist," and collaborator with the imperialist Maximilian Harden, doubtless the most gifted German journalist of the Wihelmian era. Lessing's own *Jüdischer Selbsthass* (Jewish self-hatred), a typical German-Jewish phenomenon which he later described in a book by this title (Berlin, 1930), went so far at this period that he insulted the Jews of Galicia and ridiculed Jewish contributions to literature and art. But during the first World War, he changed his mind and became an ardent Zionist and violent fighter against German ultra-nationalism. He was courageous enough to confess his former "errors" publicly, and, while professor of philosophy at Hanover, to direct vitriolic attacks against that sterile symbol of German militarism, Fieldmarshal von Hindenburg, second President of the Weimar Republic. Consequently, he became one of the first victims of Nazi bestiality, being murdered by Gestapo agents in his exile in Czechoslovakia, thus expiating tragically the Jewish self-hatred of his youth.

In dealing with the ideas of Theodor Lessing, who was greatly influenced by Nietzsche, Dr. Liptzin devotes the greater part of his essay to an inquiry into Nietzsche's attitude towards the Jewish question. He thus gains an indirect insight into the main problem of his book through the eyes of a non-Jewish German philosopher and psychologist of enormous scope and influence. This is a great merit in Liptzin's work, that he never limits himself to the restricted topic of his investigation, but

co-ordinates it with the general context in which men and ideas can alone be properly explained. Consequently, his book is a "must" for the future student of both German mentality and Jewish history. But the reader can only wonder why he refrained from discussing men like Moses Mendelssohn, Karl Marx, Ferdinand Lasalle, and Sigmund Freud. The first three are mentioned frequently, but why did he not devote a special chapter to each of them?

HENRY WALTER BRANN

New York City

Jesus the Divine Teacher. By WILLIAM H. RUSSELL. New York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1944. viii, 468 pp. $3.00.

Roman Catholic writers may not always like what they read in Protestant books, but they keep a close watch on the latest pronouncements of Protestant scholars. Father Russell has a grand time quoting the scholars of the "divided world" in the opening chapters of this book, showing how much better agreed are the historians of the "united world." Later in the book, he is not afraid to quote Protestants in support of his thesis. Of course, this is nothing new in Catholic thought. De Grandmaison's encyclopaedic *Jesus Christ* (3 volumes, originally published in 1927, English translation 1935) includes references to most of the important contributions of Protestants. Recent articles in Catholic periodicals list some of the more dangerous Protestant and Jewish errors. Protestant scholars might learn a good deal if they paid as much attention to Catholic works.

The emphasis in this book is on Jesus as the "divine teacher," and the educator will look for some insight into methods. A chapter of 180 pages is entitled, "How He Taught," but most of the information adds to the previous chapter on "What He Taught." We learn a little about Jesus' example, his concreteness, his terseness, his parables, and his safe-guarding of free will, which are valuable suggestions of the principles of teaching, but there is little about specific methods. Except for occasional nasty references to John Dewey, American educators are not mentioned.

The book begins with theology. The "united world" knows who Jesus is. "The creed retains the whole Christ of history" (p. 25). Jesus is

what he claimed to be, the Son of God. Little is said about his life, except to reject the views of the eschatologists, social gospel exponents, evolutionists, the "historical" school, the "humanitarian" school, and the Jesus of "experience." Jesus, the Son of God, is the Redeemer, but he is also the Divine Teacher. From his supernatural point of view, he is able to give us the positive information and values we need.

The confusion concerning the nature of Christ is probably good Thomism, but it expresses a fundamental inconsistency when Jesus' human nature as a teacher is developed. We are told that

> Jesus is a divine Person with two natures—divine and human. . . . He is not dehumanized in any manner by saying that He does not have a human personality. Personality is not the soul nor the body of a human being. It is something that completes the combination of body and soul. . . . The divine personality took the place of a human personality in the Man Jesus" (pp. 136-37).

Even granting the peculiar meaning of "person" as used by Thomists, this distinction leads to a number of absurdities:

> Inasmuch as He is God, He demanded sovereign honor to His own divine nature and person, but as God's ideal of what man should be, He subordinated every action of His human nature to the one rule of always pleasing the Father (p. 118).
>
> Jesus is not a split-personality, as the term is employed today. The Incarnation is not God residing in *a* man. . . . The union in the Incarnation was not God and man, but God and a human nature" (pp. 134-35).
>
> Jesus, of course, possessed divine knowledge which was infinite. As God, He is omniscient. But we are here concerned with His intellectual abilities as man. He volunteered very little information as to the manner and extent of the knowledge given His human intellect by His divinity. His own statements leave the impression that His human intellect did not know all things, but we must distinguish between what He Himself knew and what the Father wished Him to reveal to us (p. 141).
>
> As God, He did not pray, but as the God-Man, demonstrating before men how God would have them live, He set the example. The prayers of Jesus were real, and at the same time educational (p. 279).
>
> Since this Person Jesus Christ is the very Son of God, it seems senseless to remark that He loved God with His divine will. We are thinking of Him, however, in His human nature, in His turning of His human will toward the Father (p. 286).

These quotations indicate the difficulties which Catholic theology faces when it deals with the human nature of Jesus. Because this book

examines the teaching methods of the historical Jesus from a theological perspective, it magnifies the usual problems. Even though, on Catholic terms, Jesus cannot be a split-personality because he is one divine Person, the admission is obvious in the above quotations that the two natures do not always seem to be perfectly fused; Jesus is at least subject to alternating natures! By trying to get the Holy Trinity into the Incarnation (p. 139), there can be no limitation of God's presence to human finitude. And finally, in spite of protestations which are not arguments, such reasoning leaves Catholics (along with Gore, Micklem, Quick, and other Protestants) with an impersonal human nature in Jesus.

Much of the book is typically Thomistic. There is the usual Aristotelian touch in the emphasis on the immortality of the soul and in the statement, "the will of man always seeks the good" (p. 146). Faith is defined as learning the truth by taking "someone else's word" (p. 190). The divisions of Christendom are regretted, and the usual arguments are advanced to prove the divine authority of the Roman Church. The author admits that "the 'kingdom' texts are numerous in the Gospels; the 'Church' texts are few. Yet it is Christ Himself who equated the two words, kingdom and Church" (p. 216).

The summary of Jesus' teachings, granting the usual Catholic approach to the primacy of Peter, the divine authority of the Church, and the centrality of the sacramental system, is well balanced. While little is said of the authority of Scripture, the author is as careful as the most conservative Protestant to cite well-chosen texts to buttress his arguments. But even when summarizing Jesus' teachings, there is an intrusion of Catholic propaganda. Concerning the beatitude of the peace-makers, he writes, "They who excluded the Pope from the Versailles 'peace' conference of 1919 have never earned the title of peace-makers. The world does not find peace because it shuns the Prince of Peace" (p. 251). The logic of this statement will not be clear to Protestants until it is possible to distinguish between an Italian state with its Vatican politics and the Catholic Church with its universal concern for nations. Except for a few remarks in passing, there is very little of political significance in this book; and the references to democracy are more favorable than in many Catholic writings.

What is most appealing about this book is the well-rounded portrait of Jesus as a leader of men. There is little description of teaching methods, but there is a picture of Jesus as a teacher. The reader is never al-

lowed to forget that Jesus is God, but as the book develops there is more use of the Gospel material. Of course, the Fourth Gospel is given equal status with the Synoptic Gospels, and in spots the portrait does not ring true. In spite of some shortcomings, the total effect is helpful and sound.

While this book is good Catholic apologetics, the Church and Sacraments do not intrude too much on the argument and miracles are kept in the background. The author is asking for faith in Jesus Christ, the Divine Teacher, and, therefore, the appeal centers in the nature and work of Christ and only by implication in the Church. Beginning with the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation in comparison with the voices crying in the wilderness of the "divided world," the author develops a strong doctrinal background for the teaching ministry of Jesus, recounts the major teachings of the four Gospels, and then provides a good deal of insight into the human nature of Jesus the rabbi.

> Jesus desired attachment to Him and to His Church to be based on inner conviction. Yet as a wise teacher He would not impose Himself, would not pour out information, for He wanted his students to do something for themselves. . . . He touches the whole man, and insists that a man develop from within and rid himself of selfishness by giving himself unreservedly to the truth (pp. 443-44).

The careful student of Catholic and Protestant works will find nothing new here. The value of the book lies in its emphasis upon the teaching elements in Jesus' ministry, which, while not discarding other essential Catholic doctrines, indicates something of the intellectual content of the teaching ministry for today. There is a bibliography of both Catholic and Protestant works, and the index is practical.

RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER
Church Divinity School of the Pacific

The Dissidence of Dissent: The Monthly Repository, 1806-1838, Under the Editorship of Robert Aspland, W. J. Fox, R. H. Horne, and Leigh Hunt, with a Chapter on Religious Periodicals, 1700-1825. By FRANCIS E. MINEKA. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944. xiv, 458 pp. $4.00.

There is such a thing as a central tradition in the intellectual and cultural history of a country. In England, from the sixteenth century to the

nineteenth, that central tradition is to be found mainly in the writings of men of thought and action who were trained in the two great universities, and who assumed positions of influence in the Established Church and in the political life of the nation. But if we are to have an understanding of the totality of the intellectual history of England, we cannot ignore those who, because of disabilities both legal and social, put upon them for religious noncomformity, were shut out from a place at the center of national life and were thus able to exert an influence only by protest and dissent directed from outside. It is well that we should have evidence to counteract the smug condescension of such writers as Matthew Arnold, whose devastating picture of the unloveliness of the intellectual life to be found among "hole-and-corner" chapel-goers is among the most brilliantly unfair things he ever wrote. Dr. Mineka's book is valuable, because it gives us an idea of the attitudes of mind, social, literary, and religious, which characterized Unitarians, that "sect every where spoken against," one of the smaller religious minorities, but also one of the most homogeneous and one of the most intellectually serious. The writers for the *Monthly Repository,* many of them now only forgotten names, emerge from this study worthy of our respect for their honesty, and for liberal and humane views often in advance of their time.

The book is addressed not primarily to specialists in the study of religion, but rather to general students of literary and intellectual history. Its plan is simple and logical. Two introductory chapters give the historical background. The first is a model of compression, sketching briefly the history of the Unitarian movement from the time of the expulsion of the "two thousand" ministers in 1662 to the end of the eighteenth century, when "virtually all the traditional Presbyterian churches had gone over to Unitarianism." One might suggest a qualification here. Although it is true that nearly all the chapels which, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, were continuing to call themselves Presbyterian adopted a Unitarian theology and eventually took the new name, on the other hand, probably as many as half of the chapels which had been Presbyterian in 1700 retained a Trinitarian theology and went over to the Congregational connection.

The second chapter is a contribution to knowledge which should prove helpful to other scholars. It surveys the history of religious periodicals in England from 1700 to 1825. Dr. Mineka analyzes without argu-

ing, but two conclusions may fairly be drawn: that little serious theological and biblical scholarship is to be found in eighteenth-century religious periodicals, given as they were to sectarian or factional battles and to the moral edification of the laity; and that the Nonconformist journals, particularly Congregational and Unitarian, judged by standards of intellectuality and fairness in controversy, were the best of the lot. Joseph Priestley's twice attempted and financially unsuccessful *Theological Repository* stands almost alone in its time as a learned journal of biblical research and liberal theological opinion.

The *Monthly Repository* itself is studied in three stages: the first twenty-five years, when it was the more or less official organ of Unitarianism; six years when it was owned and edited by W. J. Fox as a liberal magazine of literature, politics, and social criticism; and a final two-year period in which, without the cohesive force of the sectarian bond or the forceful personality of Fox, it fought a losing battle against extinction.

In the first phase it is interesting chiefly as the champion of civil and religious liberty. It was consistent and thoroughgoing in its advocacy of religious toleration. In contrast with many "orthodox" dissenters, the Unitarians spoke out for Catholic emancipation and opposed prosecutions for blasphemy. The principles of biblical criticism enunciated in 1819, though they are as old as those laid down by Erasmus in the Introduction to his New Testament, are rightly pointed out as being years in advance of the prevailing nineteenth-century English attitude:

> The meaning of the sacred writings is to be made out precisely in the same way as that of any other writers of equal antiquity. First by a correct text; then by the grammatical construction of the words, and by philological criticism. If this be not sufficient, . . . recourse must be had to the context, to the object and design of the writer, to the habits of thinking, and the peculiar phraseology of his age and country. And finally, it is impossible to avoid taking into consideration the general principles of the writer and the doctrine he proposes to establish.

The second phase is dominated by the personality of W. J. Fox, who, although he remained a popular Unitarian preacher, attempted to eliminate sectarian controversy from the magazine and turn it into a medium of more general liberal criticism. Dr. Mineka integrates the story of Fox's life with his writings, so that we see him clearly for what he was, not a profound thinker or inspired prophet, but a humane, generous, high-minded, and fearlessly honest man who is worth remembering, not only

for his early recognition of the poetry of Tennyson and Browning, but also for his brave fight in unpopular causes. In this section, also, the analysis of the contributions of John Stuart Mill is a real addition to our knowledge of the development of Mill's ideas. The same may be said for the study of a lesser but still interesting figure, Harriet Martineau.

A valuable part of the book is the Appendix, in which Dr. Mineka, partly from scattered secondary works, many of them now out of print and often difficult to find, and partly from a hitherto unpublished manuscript key, has identified the authorship of a great number of articles.

The book shows learning, understanding, and sympathy for the subject. It is obvious that Dr. Mineka admires the men and women who wrote for the *Repository*, but he is careful not to claim too much for their direct influence upon their contemporaries. He does succeed in showing that a periodical which never had a circulation of more than one thousand copies and was written for over thirty years by voluntary, unpaid, and often anonymous contributors has a right to a "high and honorable place among the works of a small but enlightened group whose ideas were gradually to become a part of the English heritage." Moreover he writes clearly and gracefully, with the result that his book is as readable as it is informative.

MERLE M. BEVINGTON

Duke University

The Quest for Moral Law. By LOUISE SAXE EBY. New York: Columbia University Press, 1944, viii, 289 pp. $3.25.

I regret that I am unable to see what purpose this book is supposed to serve. I gladly believe that Professor Eby's remark on "Herr Hitler's . . . racial teachings . . . warmly embraced by the youth of the Third Reich" is not meant to express approval of this racial creed (p. 6, cf. p. 188). Her many trite comments on principles of moral progress are obviously manifestos of a sincerely liberal mind. But what can the scientifically minded reader, and what can the reading public gain philosophically by studying these 289 pages?

On page 143 we are told that, according to the Epicureans, "one should follow virtue in order to be happy." On page 149 we are informed that practically the opposite is true, namely, that according to

the Epicureans, "the quest of happiness would . . . lead to virtue." Both these statements are said to be quoted from Kant. Yet Kant said clearly something quite different from both these statements. One need not be a philosopher in order to know by hearsay that Jeremy Bentham's famous principle of ethics is the principle of the greatest happiness of the *greatest number*. Professor Eby does not mention this principle at all on the several pages she dedicated to Bentham. But she counts him and J. S. Mill, without hesitation, among the representatives of "the egoistic interpretation of hedonism" (p. 162), although Bentham had explicitly protested against such a complete misjudgment of his theory. The categorical imperative is, according to Professor Eby, "a law of moral action, in the same sense that gravitation is a law of physics, for it is . . . a priori valid" (p. 145). In fact, there can not be the slightest doubt that for many reasons Kant could never accept any comparison of the law of gravity with the categorical imperative. It is certainly doubtful whether the law of gravity can be called a law a priori, even in a restricted sense of the term; and, above all, the whole comparison is incompatible with Professor Eby's own, though entirely misleading, assumption that Kant's practical reasoning a priori is a type of reason "over against and aside from the . . . theoretical reason" (p. 140). Perhaps these few examples may be sufficient to illustrate the considerable number of flat misstatements in the book.

Professor Eby's appraisal of the work of the world's greatest "ethicians" equals the carelessness and capriciousness with which she reports on her heroes. Her method of distributing praise and blame throughout the history of ethics is as simple as it is simple-minded and almost self-contradictory. She reproaches Confucius because his "readiness to compromise kept the Chinese sage from reaching the lofty heights of moral grandeur attained . . . by other ethical teachers who were not too afraid to be absolute in their demands on human nature" (p. 28). But Socrates is blamed exactly because he made no compromise: "There is some excuse to be made for his enemies; and to state their case against him in the mildest terms, it may be observed that the gadfly process was not the best pedagogical method by which to instill in his fellow citizens a love of truth similar to the philosopher's own" (p. 59). Spinoza is reprimanded because his "intellectual love of God is a rather cool and moderate goal" and does not allow a real "fellowship with Him" (p. 129); and Kant's extreme rationalism is also censured. But, finally, both these

great moralists are granted extenuating circumstances because they lived in an age of reason; and Kant in particular is "pardoned" because he "was confined to the academic life of the small university town of Königsberg" (p. 156). The fact that precisely during Kant's life time there lived in the very same small town one of the most passionate anti-rationalistic thinkers of modern times has evidently given no headache to Professor Eby. Nor does she betray any awareness of the truly fascinating arguments and emotions on which the great rationalists and non-rationalists of past ages have built up their faiths.

But after having said all this, I wish to apologize to Professor Eby. After all, I believe that her book is no worse than similar half-popular works published recently. Yet it must be said: if what these books present is all that past and contemporary ethics have to offer us, then this result is so meager, nay, shabby, that we all should forget about it. Or better still, I should ask university presses why they do not print a few books which really come to grips with moral problems, even if these books do not promise to make their readers acquainted with such a lot of (undigested) terminology from Buddha and Zoroaster up to Freud and to Hoskins' endocrinology as does this *Quest for Moral Laws*.

DAVID BAUMGARDT

Library of Congress

A Realistic Philosophy. By KURT F. REINHARDT. Milwaukee; Bruce Publishing Company, 1944. xii, 268 pp. $2.75.

This book is an exceptionally sober and clear exposition of the Neo-Scholastic philosophy. Unfortunately, the subjects discussed are so many that an adequate criticism would involve the training of a philosopher, an economist, a theologian, and an international lawyer. The following review carries with it no claims other than that it was written with the intention of discussing critically such parts of the book as the author appeared to regard as fundamental. The thesis of the book is: *Back to absolute standards*—as these are delineated in the "Eternal Philosophy." Its position with respect to those holding other philosophies, including the theologies of Protestantism, orthodox or otherwise, can be expressed in the words of St. Paul: "O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, that ye should not obey the truth?"

Besides the Introduction (25 pages) the book has four chapters of widely varying lengths. Chapter I (90 pages), called "Being and Reality," deals with such traditional subjects as the concept of being, the analogy of being, the transcendental attributes of being, substance and accident, matter and form, the demonstrations of the existence of God, and so on. Chapter II concerns the subject of ethics, and deals with subjects such as the relation between metaphysics and ethics, the supreme criterion of the good, the freedom of the will, and so on. Chapter III is an able and provocative discussion on the subject of political philosophy. Chapter IV, "Economic Philosophy," is perhaps the weakest chapter of the book, containing as it does too many of the usual platitudes found in the average college text book on the subject of ethics.

According to Dr. Reinhardt, the present crisis in world events is unique in that it represents a radical break with the past, in consequence of which we witness today an almost universal search for new absolutes. This, of course, has its roots in the past, and more immediately in the "liberalism" of the nineteenth century, which had little faith in the objectivity of values and no faith at all in the possibility of organizing society in accordance with "the order of nature and the dignity of man." To this has been added that most recent form of scepticism which confines human reason to the facts and methods of the natural sciences. Today, as a result of the spirit of scepticism and relativism prevalent in our institutions of higher learning and reflected in our literature, both the educated and the masses are being increasingly conditioned to a naturalistic outlook upon life.

It is not strange, therefore, that philosophy itself is, more and more, being looked upon as an idle pursuit, having little relevance to real knowledge and actual living. But inasmuch as relativism and naturalism cannot really be lived, men will eventually acquire some philosophy or other in spite of a prevalent scepticism. There are things, institutions, and values which men will place first, and once they do this, they have by implication asserted the primacy of some standard, and thereby committed themselves to a metaphysics of some sort, however crude it may be. It is this fact that has raised to popularity the pseudo-philosophies of positivism. For positivism, despite its insistence on scientific impartiality and scientific method, is a metaphysics, and as such necessarily posits standards.

Inasmuch as today we feel the need of new absolutes, how shall we go

about finding them? The author begins by warning against the one-sidedness of earlier philosophies, some of which overemphasized the theoretical, others, the practical, and still others, the radically empirical. Thus extreme idealism and rationalism are incapable of explaining the phenomena of change, whereas extreme empiricism ignores, and must ignore, the things that endure, the principles underlying change. Since both underrate an essential part of reality they are one-sided. Being one-sided, they not only fail to solve real problems, but they also precipitate problems which are purely artificial, i.e., problems which are not truly *realistic*. Again, we must not suppose that thought is self-sufficient, for to do so would lead to abstract and empty dialectics; nor, on the other hand, should we despise rational demonstrations, for that would lead to scientism and, in the end, scepticism.

How, then, may philosophy contribute toward producing order in the present chaos, equilibrium in an unstable world in which men are looking for new absolutes? The author proposes to introduce us to a philosophy that will "show itself a trustworthy guide." This philosophy will "be as broad, comprehensive, and enduring as the eternal laws of being, and yet sufficiently flexible and dynamic to apprehend, appraise, and understand the phenomena of flux and change" (p. 13). This philosophy is, of course, the *Philosophia Perennis*. It recognizes immutable truth, but truth with ever changing aspects, independent of time and place, and not at all affected by how much we know about it. This philosophy is both static and dynamic, that is to say, it visualizes an eternal order, a metaphysical and moral reality, which, although unchanging in essence, shows varying aspects of itself to the searching mind. The proper procedure in philosophy would seem, therefore, to be that of "grafting the new into the old" and thereby providing "organic growth for the new and rejuvenation for the old." In a word, this philosophy is already in possession of lasting principles, and all that needs to be done is to demonstrate that these principles can absorb whatever is new in contemporary knowledge of fact.

Furthermore, this philosophy is truly autonomous. It may become the "handmaid of theology," but it will be a handmaid and not a theologian. Since to reason is man's distinctive activity, the handmaid will confine herself to the "examination of natural truths by reason." Philosophy is a "rational investigation which in itself is truly autonomous" (p. 22). Of course, philosophy may be autonomous without being self-sufficient. Al-

though the only proper method of philosophy is that of rational demonstration, we should remember that human reason is not infallible and that it cannot demonstrate everything. Eventually, therefore, it may appear that we require a "superior source of light" in order to obtain more perfect knowledge of things pertaining to man and the cosmos. But if human reason does its work well, it will find itself in accord with this superior source of light. Of course, in the end philosophy is subordinate to theology because the latter, after all, is based upon revelation. In short, philosophy is not concerned with faith but with the "rational preambles" to faith. It must demonstrate the rational necessity of the existence of God, the possibility and necessity of a supernatural revelation, and the actuality of freedom and immortality.

In his discussion of the subject of metaphysics, Dr. Reinhardt uses the terminology generally associated with the subtleties of medieval philosophy. He does his job well enough, but one does not quite escape the impression of having been lead through the strange corridors of an imaginary castle. It is frequently difficult to argue with him, just as it is difficult to argue about the logic of a dichotomous division. One has to admit that the logic is good enough, but what about the relevance of the terms? "Essence and existence," "potency and act," "substance and qualities," "matter and form," "prime matter," "substantial form"—these and a few other like terms seem to be all that are necessary in order to speak intelligibly about God, man, and the cosmos. We are told that matter is "an indeterminate substrate of becoming," as a result of which it has "receptivity" or "privation," so that it always "strives for a form," i.e., for a certain "end" or "perfection" (p. 60). Again, there is the argument that nature testifies to purpose in the universe because "implanted in the heart of all things" is "action for an end," that is to say, all things *strive* toward an end and this end *moves* them to their operation. The concept of time or change is still somewhat of a mystery to most philosophers. Not so to Dr. Reinhardt, who explains that time can be understood in terms of change, and that change can be understood in terms of such concepts as the "constant activity and receptivity of beings," "act and potency," and "prime matter and substantial form." (p. 60) In discussing the mind-body problem, he tells us that the soul is to the body as "act is to potency," or as "form is to matter." In his exposition of the theory of knowledge, he asserts that in the event of knowing, the subject "in some way . . . becomes the object" and that there is a "mysterious

synthesis of knower and known" (p. 93). In fact, not only does the subject "become" the object, but the object in turn "becomes" the subject. Earlier he has assured us that beings *desire* one another because they desire "the fullest actualizations of their natures" (p. 38).

It all seems like a game: given the concepts essence, substance, rational appetite, striving, prime matter, and so on, how describe the facts and problems of life? This game can doubtless be artfully played, but do we not, in the end, get something quite abstract? Or are these concepts deliberately retained in order to pave the way for a rational demonstration of God, freedom, and immortality? From the assertion that cosmic evolution realizes an "immanent original preformation," and that this implies purpose and will, the idea of God, of course, easily follows. From the distinction of essence and existence we easily pass to something "the essence of which is its existence." Again, to assert that "implanted in the heart of things" there is "action for an end" is to assert the fact of teleology and, by implication, the fact of purpose and mind. Dr. Reinhardt, in fact, employs the term God long before he has offered a rational demonstration of the existence of God. When, for example, he states, as he repeatedly does, that his discussion is on the ontological level, he too often seems to mean that he is confining himself to the terms inherited from Aristotle, Stoicism, and St. Thomas Aquinas. Of course, if this practice actually clarifies things for him, it is clearly his privilege to continue it, since he is merely introducing us to a way of thinking. Consequently, when, for example, in the course of his discussion on the subject of essences, he finally arrives at the conception of a perfect being who includes in his essence all possible perfections, and from whom every potency is excluded, we can only reply, How does he know this? (p. 55 ff.).

In reading the chapter on metaphysics, one is sooner or later beset by an uneasy feeling that Dr. Reinhardt is not quite doing what he said he was going to do. In the Introduction he proposed to introduce us to an autonomous philosophy, one which without any theolgical preconceptions would, by means of rational demonstration, show the inevitability of the preambles to faith. But before we are at all aware of anything like a rational demonstration we find him freely using a terminology which involves rather definite theological concepts. Thus he tells us that prime matter is pure potentiality, whereas *God* is pure actuality (p. 61); that all things *strive* toward a perfection; that it is impossible to understand

God as he is in himself, and so on. He says of Aristotle's four causes that they represent rationally necessary questions to be answered, "if we want to understand the true nature of real beings": What is the material out of which things are *made,* by *whom* are these things *made,* and for what *purpose* did he make them? (p. 66). He tells us that the ontological possibility of the contingent following upon a state of not-being is logically conceivable, and that it may occur by *"virtue of the absolute power of the Divine Being."*[1] A finite effect, so he argues, need not have a finite cause; consequently a *higher degree of reality* may be attributed to the cause than to the effect; and we can, therefore, discover an analogy between *relative and Absolute being.* Again, in his defense of the argument from motion to a first mover, he undertakes to refute an objection based upon the concept of the initiative of nature, by asserting that *nature, after all, is in the hand of God* (p. 82). We know, he asserts, that the *created universe* is not self-explanatory, and that it needs a "necessary and *infinitely potent* support." Without God the world is an "accidentally accrued, meaningless texture of nonentities." Genera and species, he says, reveal in their natures varying degrees of the absolute perfection of their creator (p. 90). In Chapter III we find this: The ultimate end of the state is the life of virtue, that is, the *possession of God* and, therefore, the *eternal happiness* of men—something which clearly "transcends the power and authority of the state." Now *"to Christ is attributed a Universal Kingship"* extending over all creation, and from this is derived a royal priesthood to which "is entrusted the earthly government of Christ's kingdom." The higher the end of this kingdom the nobler the authority, and therefore a ruler who represents the ultimate end is above rulers concerned with secondary ends (p. 175 f.). In his theory of knowledge, he states that although no individual thing is a proper object of knowledge, what happens whenever it is said to be known is really this: It is "disembodied," it *"reverses its descent* into matter," and it *"ascends* to the ideal universality and transcendence" (p. 97).

Naturally, if Aristotle's four causes represent rationally necessary questions, little intellectual ingenuity will be required to show that the first proposition of the Apostle's Creed is, if not a rationally demonstrated truth, at least a most reasonable assertion. And of course, if the appeal is to the absolute power of the Divine Being, one can hardly

1. In this and in following quotations the italics are mine.

deny the possibility of "the contingent following upon a state of non-being." Whether that is conceivable from the point of view of human reason is, however, another question. But where is the demonstration of the idea that a finite effect need not have a finite cause, or that the cause-effect relation applies to God at all—unless one already has a definite preconception of what God is? Again, if men are finite and relative, how is it demonstrated that they can understand the infinite and the absolute by analogy? How can we know that the universe has been created and that it needs an "*infinitely* potent support"? Obviously almost any fideist would agree with most of Dr. Reinhardt's assertions. But what has become of the autonomy of philosophy?

In answer to Kant's theory of the postulates of practical reason, Dr. Reinhardt holds that the existence of God is acceptable as a postulate only after His existence has been demonstrated. From the point of view of philosophy, God's existence cannot be an article of faith, because philosophy is not concerned with faith but with the "rational preambles to faith." Other preambles to faith are the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, and the possibility, knowability, and necessity of revealed truth. Let us see how Dr. Reinhardt demonstrates some of these preambles, and let us begin with his demonstration of the existence of God. Following St. Thomas Aquinas he holds that a conclusive demonstration must be a posteriori, i.e., it must begin with effects and by way of a causal regress show the necessity of the idea of God's existence.

If, according to Dr. Reinhardt, we can show that causes are essentially subordinate, then the idea of an infinite series of causes is at once ruled out, and we must posit a first cause. Wherever we find a series of essentially subordinate causes, there the series depends upon "the causal initiative of its first member." The idea of an infinite series of causes is permissible only when it can be shown that the causes in question are co-ordinate or "merely accidentally subordinated" (p. 80). Expounding the Thomist view he argues that the conditioned can have its ultimate explanation only in the unconditioned. If everything were a continuous process of generation and corruption, then there must have been a time when nothing at all existed; in that case nothing could exist today. Therefore, something necessary must always have existed. For nothing that can cease to exist, such as plants, animals, and even the stars in their courses, can contain the cause or reason for its own existence. Here the idea of an infinite series of contingent beings is useless. We

may conclude, therefore, that a contingent being depends for its existence upon a necessary being, that is, a being whose essence is its existence.

This, one must admit, is a strong argument, especially from the point of view of common sense. Of course, its validity depends upon whether there are metaphysically real subordinate causes. It is possible to maintain, as do the Neo-Idealists, that the final cause of everything is the universe itself and that, strictly speaking, all causes are co-ordinate, since any particular cause or series of causes are abstractions, and one cannot argue from abstractions to the existence of God. Furthermore, all depends upon how the word cause is interpreted. Certainly within the bounds of common human experience with respect to the social and natural environments, there are no uncaused causes. Consequently, whenever we assert that God is the cause or creator of the universe, the term cause seems to include much more than cause in the sense of a set of events or conditions which form the context for, or which "explain," another set of events or conditions. It is, therefore, questionable whether we can reason from cause in the ordinary or even scientific sense of the word to cause in the sense of including absolute origination or creatorship. Dr. Reinhardt might, of course, answer that we can reason analogically from the one to the other, but the trouble is that in this case the argument goes far beyond the analogy. Again, it is conceivable that what we call subordinate causes appear so because of our limited point of view. Taking his cue from the *Summa Theologica,* Dr. Reinhardt asserts that natural bodies act in view of some definite end, and that inasmuch as they lack intelligence of themselves, they must be directed by an intelligent being. The only other alternative is pure chance which, after all, is no alternative at all. Furthermore, it is a fact that in human experience we find much of our world ordered in accordance with the principle of means and ends. This, he says, evidentally points to design. But, once again, it is conceivable that his argument is a case of putting the cart before the horse, as, e.g., in the statement that "rivers have a way of flowing past large cities." Just what the ends are, and what the means, often depends upon a point of view. And Dr. Reinhardt does not finally demonstrate that there is no choice on rational grounds between his view and that of, say, Mr. F. H. Bradley.

The causal argument does not prove much more than that contingent beings are not self-explanatory, and St. Thomas Aquinas' argument

that if everything were a continuous process of generation and corruption, we should have to conclude that once upon a time nothing at all existed, carries no cogency. All we can conclude from his hypothetical premise is that we can make no conclusion. A being "whose essence is its existence" is, after all, a presupposition involved in the peculiar concepts and terms which Dr. Reinhardt seems to regard as the inevitable language of ontology. There is nothing in his presentation of the causal argument that would prevent one from accepting some kind of pantheistic Absolute. His treatment of the argument may have value in so far as it demonstrates our ignorance, but beyond that it leaves us pretty much in the air. We are told that disorder is not the rule in nature, that certain phenomena may seem disorderly because of our limited point of view, and that given a wider context, meaningless things may finally be seen to have a meaning. But this sounds more like Spinoza or like certain deistic explainings away of evil. It is hardly up to the dignity of a rational demonstration of a perfect being possessing to an infinite degree all that man has of goodness, reason, will, and creativeness. Incidentally, Dr. Reinhardt's treatment of the problem of evil is so sketchy and superficial that one is justified in saying that he really avoids it.

Dr. Reinhardt's rational demonstration of the immortality of the soul seems to consist in the main of a number of assertions. There are three arguments. Following St. Thomas Aquinas, he says that animals are not immortal, because "the soul of the brute is entirely wrapped up in the composite soul-body." Inasmuch as the life principle of the animal cannot act independently, the dissolution of the animal involves both body and soul. It is otherwise in the case of man. A human soul exercises an intellectual activity of its own, for which it requires an autonomous mode of being. Since this does not depend for its subsistence upon the body, and since it is not composed of material parts, it survives the corruption of the organism. Nor can the soul be annihilated, because man's intellectual nature is "endowed with perpetuity" (p. 99). The second argument states that inasmuch as all being has an innate tendency to endure, which in the case of man takes the form of desire for "being as such" (animals desire merely the particular and the individual), this desire "cannot be in vain." The third argument is a variant of the second. Man desires lasting happiness because he can attain, or has attained, or desires to attain the true and the good. His desire, so to speak, is "elevated to the realm of the permanent." Hence,

if this desire is innate, its ultimate fulfillment logically follows (p. 100). In this connection Dr. Reinhardt considers the subject of the proper activities of the disembodied soul. His exposition involves much sound Christian theology. But, once more, what has become of the autonomy of philosophy?

Another rational preamble to faith, which it is the function of philosophy to demonstrate, is human freedom or freedom of the will. Dr. Reinhardt discusses this preamble in connection with the material found in the chapter on ethics. He makes a number of sound assertions about human freedom, but one could hardly say that he offers a rational demonstration. His description of a free act is clear enough, and not even a determinist will quarrel with him there. And when he says that morality is not a foreign law imposed upon man from without, but that it is rather the soul's own intrinsic law; that man, because created in the image of God, is guided by God and to some extent by himself; that man reaches true perfection by submitting to the divine guidance, and that by refusing to do so he can create temporary disorder both within himself and the social environment: it is evident that almost any fideist will agree with him. To them his conclusions will seem altogether right and intelligible quite apart from his metaphysical terms and demonstrations. And when, finally, he asserts that man cannot choose evil qua evil since that would amount to "self-annihilation of the will" (p. 130 f.); that "if the will were to find itself face to face with the Absolute Good or the good as such, it would . . . embrace of necessity this ultimate end and object of the rational appetite" (p. 126); and that a free act must express a deliberate judgment on the part of the intellect, but that this is possible only for those beings who know the true and the good, not even a Calvinist would find fault. For all this sounds startlingly like the Shorter Catechism, in which we are told that God's common grace has made rare, if not impossible, man's deliberate choice of evil as such; and that by God's special or saving grace men are first enlightened, i.e., chosen, before they are free to know God and to enjoy Him forever. Incidentally, no Calvinist has ever denied that, with respect to the contingent and the relative, men are psychologically free and morally responsible.

Once again, how much of Dr. Reinhardt's discussion of the rational preambles to faith is theology, and how much of it is really autonomous philosophy? Perhaps the fideist is not altogether wrong when he main-

tains that unless in our thinking we begin with God we can hardly expect to arrive at a philosophy which is God-centered. If by a rational demonstration we mean that the evidence is so obvious, or that the argument from accepted premises is so conclusive, that anyone in his right mind must accept it as a matter of intellectual honesty, then we must conclude that Dr. Reinhardt's arguments do not demonstrate that we have our choice between Neo-Scholasticism and nothing. The most he may have done is to show that Neo-Scholasticism involves difficulties no greater than those of any other contemporary school of philosophy. He has not demonstrated that, beginning with commonly observed facts and human reason, we inevitably reach the preambles to faith, and that the content of Christian theology is the only one that will fit the preambles. What he has shown is that the Christian thinker must sooner or later become involved in matters of revelation and faith and that, in the words of Duns Scotus, philosophy proves nothing worth proving in theology. However, should Dr. Reinhardt be willing to concede that in writing this book his interest was primarily apologetical, we on our part would have to admit that he has done an admirable piece of work.

Only extremists would disagree with Dr. Reinhardt's political and economic philosophy. In the course of his exposition he offers a number of fundamental criticisms of Communism, Fascism, National Socialism, and our own recent laissez faire economics. His own position with regard to the class struggle is known as Solidarism—a position which seems to have the official blessing of the Catholic Church. The sovereignty of the state should be determined within the limits of natural and moral law. Within these limits the interests of individuals and corporate groups should be adjusted by way of a higher synthesis. The ultimate appeal in society would then be to the norms of physical and moral law, since these "are deeply ingrained in the universe and in human nature." The final purpose of the state would be humanize and personalize the individual and society.

There is no question as to where the author stands in his evaluation of the individual. Here he is anti-pragmatist, anti-evolutionist, anti-fascist, and anti-communist. Human rights he regards as unconditionally prior to the claims of the group, for the welfare of the group must have as its frame of reference the welfare of persons. As a person a man has rights "prior to his being constituted a member of family, state,

and society" (p. 155). Institutions should be considered as means to the perfectibility of the individual. With respect to natural rights all men are equal; that is to say, all have an equal claim to the means necessary for the attainment of personality. Under conditions existing in this world the group is not an organism, but rather a mechanism; for the group has no reality apart from its members, whereas the members do have a reality apart from the group. The most we can claim for the rights of society, as over against those of the individual, is that *usually* the latter achieves a higher degree of personality within society. But wherever that does not appear to be true (as e.g., in the case of Christians in communist Russia or fascist Germany), there is no reason why the individual should surrender himself to the "welfare of the group," since that welfare may be purely temporary and quite mistaken. In the end the basis of all law and rights is the will of God.

Dr. Reinhardt's discussion on the subject of war and its justification is brief, balanced, and to the point. He grants that war is an evil. Nevertheless, although peace is a great good, justice is a higher good, so that peace without justice may be a greater evil than war. In this connection he treats with great clarity such questions as the moral defense of an aggressive war, the conditions under which injuries should be pardoned, or at least tolerated, and the moral requisites of a just war. Following St. Thomas Aquinas he observes that a declaration of war is tantamount to passing a sentence of death. So-called "preventive wars" usually involve a rationalization either of international brigandage or of the maintenance of an unjust status quo. In fact, even a just cause is not always a justifiable reason for waging war. Nevertheless, right and justice are more important than peace, and spiritual and moral values should be defended even at the risk of possible defeat. The average pacifist is a superficial optimist who underestimates the perversions and weaknesses of the human will and the strength of human passions.

Beginning with a number of theological assertions, Dr. Reinhardt has this to say in his economic philosophy: any system of economics which regards the economic aspect of life as autonomous is fundamentally irrational and immoral. Labor not only has rights but also a dignity derived from the nature of man and, ultimately, from the dignity and nature of God. To work is to perform a moral act, an act which remotely reflects the work of God. In this connection he handles expertly, although somewhat utopianly, the problem of the depersonaliza-

tion of industry, the right of labor to organize, the rights and obligations of ownership, and the limitations of the right to strike. At the conclusion he sagely remarks that what we fundamentally need today is a "changed state of mind."

The book contains many acute criticisms. Dr. Reinhardt has a keen eye for the shortcomings of other philosophies.

CECIL DE BOER

University of Arkansas

Approaches to World Peace: A Symposium. Edited by L. BRYSON, L. FINKELSTEIN, and R. M. MACIVER. Published by the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, Inc. New York, 1944. xviii, 973 pp. $5.00.

The papers included in this volume were prepared for and discussed at the fourth meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, held at Columbia University in September 1943. Although written, in most cases, more than two and a half years ago, the papers have not lost their interest, or their relevance to the problem with which they are concerned. Neither the individual articles nor the comments and criticisms of them by various members of the Conference contain any single doctrinal point of view or methodological approach to the problems of world peace. Nor are they united by any one theme or principle. Yet they share in common, as the editors point out in the preface, a sense of the need, felt by philosophers and social scientists alike, for a breaking down of departmental barriers, and for overcoming the narrow compartamentalized thinking that has been the product of increased specialization in the social sciences and the humanities as well as in the natural sciences.

As Professor W. F. Albright says in the opening article, "Historical Adjustments in the Concept of Sovereignty in the Near East," "Two divergent tendencies stand out today among thinkers who investigate human group phenomena" (p. 1). One of these tendencies is pluralistic, instrumentalist, and non-functional in its approach; the other is organismic and functional. Most of the writers in the present volume, perhaps, lean rather more heavily toward the latter tendency.

Indeed, the besetting sin of many of the articles in the volume is an

all too prevalent tendency to assume or argue that integration and diversity are incompatible. Mankind is now faced with an overwhelming need for some principle of political and cultural integration if it is to survive at all; ergo, cultural, political, economic, and religious diversity and relativism of all sorts must be rejected. This sort of dichotomous thinking is as dangerous to lasting peace as it is false to the true character of men's needs and the conditions which permit their mutual satisfaction. It is one thing to argue that without world organization based upon universal principles of justice, tolerance, and brotherhood, enduring peace is impossible. It is quite another to maintain that within a broad framework of international institutions and universal practices there is no room for a variety of cultural and social patterns which differ widely from one another in temper and outlook.

There are a number of papers, notably those of F. S. C. Northrop, C. W. Morris, Bingham Dai, Krishnalal Shridharani, and A. L. Locke, which point out the importance for future peace of a frank recognition of a plurality of cultural ideals. These writers stress the constructive possibilities which would result from a broad social assimilation of the "fact," as Professor Morris puts it, (p. 624) of cultural relativity. Without in the least wishing to deny the need for a recognition of our "common humanity," and the common elements and needs which bind all peoples and cultures together, these writers plead for an admission of differences where they exist. They point out the fruitfulness, in terms of goodwill, tolerance, mutual understanding, and richness of human living, which may result from such an admission on a wide scale. To Professor Morris, for example, there is much more to fear from the emergence of cultural and ethical absolutism and uniformitarianism, with their ugly implications of intolerance, fanaticism, and authoritarianism, than from a wise and temperate continuation of cultural differences where they exist on a basis of mutual co-operation and assimilation.

The deepest cleavage between the members of the Conference concerns just this question of absolutism versus relativism. But it is not merely a matter of difference of practical ethics or even of underlying ethical principles. The cleavage extends back to basic underlying methodological and metaphysical assumptions. On the one hand, there is the frank pragmatism and neo-positivism of writers like Morris and C. G. Hempel, who wish to subject all judgments to the empirical and opera-

tional tests of meaning and truth. On the other hand, there is the equally candid intuitionism and rationalism of writers like Brand Blanchard, who hold that "the only way to tell whether a specific satisfaction is good is to look at it attentively in the hope that one will *see* (sic) its goodness as clearly as one sees the goodness of love or understanding or the badness of intense pain" (p. 632, italics not in the text).

The papers are classified broadly under seven general headings: (1) The Social Sciences and Enduring Peace, (2) Psychological Research and Enduring Peace, (3) Education for Enduring Peace, (4) Arts and Letters and Enduring Peace, (5) Philosophical Ideas and Enduring Peace, (6) Religious Foundations for Enduring Peace, and (7) Administrative Problems and World Peace. Within each rubric is a considerable diversity of topic and theme. This saves the volume from the uniform monotony which often attends such undertakings. As a result, however, the volume will seem to some not a symposium but a collection of essays and comments whose relations to one another are more nominal than real.

The papers vary considerably, moreover, both in scope and in pretentions. Some of them, such as Professor Moses Hadas' paper on "Federalism in Antiquity," are modest, scholarly attempts to apply the methods or results of the social sciences and history to relevant problems of peace. Thus, Professor Hadas, by way of an examination of the problems of unification which beset the ancient Greeks, is able to sound a warning as well as to point toward a means of escape for a world which has yet to discover an adequate and acceptable principle for the integration of all men and all nations. Similarly, Dr. Ordway Tead's article, "A Science of Administration in the International World," is, as one of its commentators points out, "a well-balanced contribution of an authority whose training, intellectual interests, and livelihood activities have given him a sound understanding not only of the psychological foundations of good administration but also its technique" (p. 937). Dr. Tead's thesis, which he develops admirably, is that "wise administrative practice is good democratic practice" (p. 931). This is a heartening reassurance to those committed to a faith in the efficacy of democratic procedures. It is also, and what is perhaps more important, an empirical principle behind which Dr. Tead is able to marshal both evidence and expert analysis.

On the other hand, there are some papers, such as Professor Sorokin's

"The Cause of War and the Conditions of a Lasting Peace," which seem, to the present writer at least, as pretentious and inflated as they are badly reasoned or documented. By now most readers of this review are probably acquainted with Sorokin's critique of "sensate values" and the catastrophes which, according to him, attend those civilizations which forego their allegiance to those "supersensate, spiritual values" which, Sorokin insists, can alone be universal. Professor Sorokin is perfectly correct in asserting: "Without the organization of a moral universe no lasting peace is possible, no matter what economic or political reforms are made" (p. 103). But from this it by no means follows that this organization, or the universal values which hold it together and give it a *raison d'être,* must be those of "categoric imperative," "unconditional social duty," and the like. The need for food, shelter, and security is universal, though probably "sensate"; yet an acknowledgment of such needs, and the establishment of institutions capable of ministering successfully to them, do not depend upon the acknowledgment of "transcendental" imperatives or obligations. Quite the contrary. Although men are still at odds with respect to their ultimate "spiritual" allegiances, they are bound together irrevocably by the common requirements of their sensate natures, and by the conditions of mutual respect, reciprocity, and fair dealing which are binding upon all, because they are *needed* by all. Without justice and goodwill, the satisfaction of any needs, spiritual or animal, is impossible. But it is this possibility of satisfaction or well-being which provides them with their sanction and which alone makes them obligatory. Is it not the belief that there must be "unconditional social duties" which, in Germany and Japan, has been partially responsible for the disastrous conflict in which we now find ourselves? Social duties to whom, one wishes to ask Professor Sorokin. And by what sanction? Professor Sorokin desires that such norms "be universally inculcated," that the institutions and forces of society "earnestly engage in implanting those norms into the actual behavior of their members, beginning with the preschool children and ending with the grown-ups, through family, school, church, press, radio, and all the available means of education and formation of character and behavior" (p. 104). One wonders when and if the people are also to be taught to think for themselves; when and if they are to find time to decide rationally what ideals and obligations are worth giving their allegiance to. Sorokin's "conditions of lasting peace" in many ways seem to be perilously similar in

spirit to the programs of ideological conditioning, euphemistically called "moral training" by some writers, from which the world is gradually ridding itself at great cost of life and suffering. One wishes that Professor Sorokin, and some other members of the Conference who voiced similar sentiments, might take to heart Professor Morris's wise plea for an acceptance of cultural and human differences, and the lesson in tolerance and goodwill which comes from a recognition that values, "sensate" and otherwise, are functions of human interest and need, rather than the transcendental demands of—one wonders what.

There are other papers, such as that of Professor F. S. C. Northrop on "Philosophy and World Peace," which are suggestive in their attempt to evaluate the tasks of their particular disciplines with respect to the peace. According to Professor Northrop, philosophy itself has three tasks; (a) the analysis of cultures, and the basic theoretical assumptions upon which their institutions and practices are based; (b) the specification of a common, single set of assumptions possessed of greater generality than the former, which, moreover, permits the largest possible number of the resultant diverse traditional assumptions logically compatible to be retained; and (c) the reconstruction of traditional assumptions in order to bring them into closer accord "with the nature of things" (p. 653). Yet one must assent to Professor Blanchard's criticism that when Northrop says (a) that good is "a set of philosophical presuppositions," or (b) that one can derive what a people regards as good from their "conception of the nature of things," it is difficult to know just what he *means*. Without wishing to deny the importance of the relation of ethics to metaphysics, still, to attempt to deduce the concept of value from that of reality or its categories is to imply that reality itself is good. But the idealization of the actual which attends all varieties of purely metaphysical ethics seems inevitably to destroy the significance of moral struggle. To derive one's theory of value from one's metaphysics, to the present writer, seems as dangerous as to hold, as Morris and Hempel do, that value judgments are merely expressions of approval and disapproval.

Despite the difference of outlook, temper, and training, most of the writers in this volume are at least convinced that moral, cultural, and social isolationism is incompatible with lasting peace. The common recognition of the existence of "one world," and the pressing need for social mechanisms capable of enforcing its conditions is a heartening sign,

when one remembers the diversity of viewpoint represented in the Symposium. It is also evidence of the fact that diversity is compatible with unity, and that differences in background and philosophical approach are compatible with peace and order.

HENRY DAVID AIKEN

The University of Washington

Baudelaire: A Criticism. By JOSEPH D. BENNETT. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944. 165 pp. $2.00.

The Devil's Share. By DENIS DE ROUGEMONT. Translated from the French by HAAKON CHEVALIER. New York: Pantheon Books, 1944. 221 pp. $2.50.

Once more Baudelaire is offered to the modern reader as a major moralist and prophet of the nineteenth century, and his sense of evil is urged upon us as a cure for the moral infirmities of our age. Mr. Bennett confines his *Criticism* to a number of poems which bear upon the issues of good and evil—a part, though an important part, of Baudelaire's work. M. de Rougemont's attempt to give the Devil his due begins with an arresting quotation from Baudelaire, "The Devil's cleverest wile is to convince us that he does not exist," and betrays throughout, in conception and style, the influence of Baudelaire's analysis of the experience of evil. Both books are hortatory in tone; both offer the sense of the reality of evil and the Devil as the satisfaction of a basic need in our day; and, latent in Bennett, overt in Rougemont, there is a linking of this question with current political and moral crises.

The orthodox Baudelaire—*poeta Christianissimus*—has become a familiar figure in modern criticism. St. Paul, St. Augustine, Dante, Pascal, and, nearer Baudelaire's own time, Joseph de Maistre (whom Baudelaire called "le grand génie de notre temps, un *voyant*") are commonly mentioned as sources and analogues of the vision of good and evil, of original sin and damnation, which is to be found in *Les Fleurs du Mal* and in the *Journaux Intimes*. Yet, since Baudelaire was no theologian in a formal sense, one must question why the orthodox doctrines of sin and redemption should be presented to us in his terms rather than in those of the great traditional Christian moralists. One reason, surely, is the shock of surprise—the surprise of discovering in a

poet whose reputation in England was first nurtured by a school of "immoralists" and "diabolists" in the nineteenth century a strong and dominant current of Christian experience. Then there is, of course, the greatness of Baudelaire as a poet, as an innovator whose force is still strongly felt in modern French and English poetry. Related to this is the fact that he was among the first to set the drama of sin and despair against the background of the great cities of an industrial age: the seven deadly sins appear in the desolate *faubourg*, and the sense of damnation is experienced as *spleen* or *ennui* in airless apartments. Mr. Bennett is fond of the expression, "sin and modern metropolitan civilization," in which we appear to be faced with two equally ponderable evils; for Baudelaire they were one, and the metropolis was merely one of the many settings of the unchanging moral dilemma of man—everywhere, in every age, "le spectacle ennuyeux de l'immortel péché." But perhaps the greatest attractions in Baudelaire's work are strong traces of an unresolved Manichaeism—the most irrepressible of heresies—with its impressive and dramatic vision of triumphing evil, which, while it may be resolved in Augustinian terms (Rougemont makes the attempt) yet retains, as one sometimes suspects it did in St. Augustine, much of its latent force.

For the "orthodoxy" of Baudelaire is dubious and ambiguous: it consists in little more than in seeing the spiritual life as a tension between two magnetic attractions, Good and Evil, God and Satan. Baudelaire's impassioned advice to his time was that it should live in this tension, and feel these forces, at the risk of damnation. Typically, in the last lines of the *Hymne à la Beauté*, when the question of the source of beauty comes up, Baudelaire gives no answer: "De Satan ou de Dieu, qu'importe?" And a similar phrase at the end of the important poem, *Le Voyage*, reaffirms this attitude:

> Nous voulons, tant ce feu nous brûle le cerveau,
> Plonger au fond du gouffre, Enfer ou Ciel, qu'importe?

The Augustinian reply would be that it matters quite a little. While the sense of two strong external forces drawing man, arousing in him the angel or the brute, may relate Baudelaire to Pascal and to the Augustinian tradition, there is an all-important difference. The paths of salvation were uncertain to Baudelaire, and he is content to rest, in most

of the poems, with a sense of guilt that is irredeemable, of loss that is irreparable. Hope is dead; we feed upon our remorse, and it feeds on us; there is no issue. It is not until his last years of crisis, and only at moments then, that the experience of redemption in humility and submission to a God, "réservoir de toute force et de toute justice," comes to him. Yet even in the notes on his crisis, gathered in *Mon Coeur mis à nu,* his dominant vision is of a Manichaean world, delivered to the Prince of Evil. It is not a mere romantic whim, or an affectation of décor, that forces him, in *Les Litanies de Satan,* to turn to the Devil as the only comforter. There is no other comforter; God is withdrawn and unavailable to the sinner. And, as Rougemont is aware, to doubt the possibility of forgiveness is one of the greatest surrenders to the Devil. If Baudelaire's vision of evil was strong, his vision of good was generally defective. He had a sense, seldom equalled in its subtlety and anguish, of the misery of man, but little sense of his greatness.

Yet it is this Baudelaire who is recommended to us as a healer today, and it is the cultivation of this sense of irredeemable guilt which is expected to help in what is conceived as a moral and spiritual impasse. Mr. Bennett imagines Baudelaire as a lonely voice raised against the "falsity of the ideas of the nineteenth century"—all of them—and presumably against ours. To Mr. Bennett the nineteenth century is an age of "debasing and brutish" ideas of positivism, materialism, rationalism, and metropolitanism: its gods are Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer. With this reading of history one can have little patience; what must be strongly affirmed is that seldom was there a truer "enfant du siècle" than Baudelaire. His criticism of the moral sterility of his age places him in one of the traditions most characteristic of the nineteenth century—the great questioning spiritual movements which weighed and criticized the results of industrialism and progress. Blake, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky, Nietzsche—the list of men of letters could be prolonged —are with Baudelaire in this.

The great heresy of the time, Baudelaire wrote in 1856, was the suppression of the idea of original sin. To this single, central perception he returned again and again. Against the hopes of the reformers, he uttered terrible cries: "Nous périrons par où nous avons cru vivre!" The greatest danger of having lost the sense of man's imperfection he saw as "l'avilissement des coeurs"—the hardening and degradation of the heart. In a famous sentence in *Mon Coeur mis à nu* (which Rougemont

quotes at an important point in his book) Baudelaire defines civilization as "the diminution of the traces of original sin"; the only true progress, he holds, is moral progress, within the individual, and accomplished by the individual.

It is in this insistence upon the individual's experience of evil, in the subtlety with which he explores especially that province of evil known as *ennui, acedia,* or atrophy of the will, that Baudelaire speaks to us. His experience is rich and meaningful; his theological ideas remain primitive. In an essay written in 1930, T. S. Eliot speaks of the "theological innocence" of Baudelaire:

> He is discovering Christianity for himself; he is not assuming it as a fashion or weighing social or political reasons, or any other accidents. He is beginning, in a way, at the beginning; and, being a discoverer, is not altogether certain what he is exploring and to what it leads; he might almost be said to be making again, as one man, the efforts of scores of generations. . . . His business was not to practise Christianity, but—what was much more important for his time—to assert its necessity.

In Baudelaire we have one of the early examples of that species of half-belief which becomes more and more characteristic of modern times—a belief based on the need to believe, a belief without faith. His experience underlines one of the dangers run by those who attempt to return to orthodoxy by first cultivating the sense of evil: it is easy to go no further than this, and Manichaeism is always intoxicating.

Mr. Bennett has added little to what previous critics have discerned in Baudelaire's moral struggles and attitudes. Du Bos, Fumet, Eliot, have investigated Baudelaire's paradoxes far more subtly, and we must turn to them, or to Enid Starkie's splendidly documented biography, if, after reading the works, we require a further analysis of Baudeleire's religious experience. This is to speak only of the thesis of Mr. Bennett's book, in which Baudelaire is used as a text in a tract for the times. The greater part of the book is concerned with the elaborate analysis of some twenty poems. Mr. Bennett's critical theories derive from T. S. Eliot, through the agency of Allen Tate; like his moral and religious ideas, they are bleakly and repetitiously affirmed. Yet his analysis has the value of holding the poems up to our attention, and focussing this upon particular lines and images, when Mr. Bennett's moralizing tendency does not obtrude. For the examination of Baudelaire's experi-

ence of evil, Mr. Bennett lacks the necessary complexity that some of his predecessors have shown. Baudelaire's important insight, we are told, was his discovery that "he himself was in present danger of damnation and that his century likewise was damned, although for sins far worse than his." This was "an insight unusual for a man of the nineteenth century."

And what were the sins of the nineteenth century? Baudelaire emerges as a fantastic doctrinaire engaged in a battle against "the press gang of progress, reformers, nationalists, Darwinists, positivists, Transcendental Unitarians, industrial planners, communists, universal religionists, and prophets of science." It is true that Baudelaire, in the midst of the conflict of his time, was given to violent simplicities in his attacks, for the sake of stressing urgent spiritual needs. But Mr. Bennett, a hundred years later, is not so easily forgiven for overlooking the spiritual movements of the nineteenth century. And even those searchers for human comfort who, in his phrase, sought for "Hygiene in low, flat, easily accessible buildings" might be forgiven; for original sin, if it has any meaning, remains with us yet, even in the comfortable hygienic house, and after the ministration of the psychiatrist. The historian, as well as a sense of original sin, must have charity. And Mr. Bennett is as sounding brass.

M. de Rougemont, on the other hand, has the gift of tongues. All his resources of wit, paradox, irony, and surprise are placed at the service of that widespread attempt to restore and revitalize myth which is one of the clearest signs of the unrest of our times. It is to curb "the state of pre-dementia to which rationalism has led the world"—the main symptom of this being irresponsible irrationalism—that Rougemont offers the idea of the Devil as an idea necessary to man's happiness. The Devil is consciously accepted as an ordering myth. "A myth," says Rougemont, "is a story which describes and illustrates, in dramatized form, certain deep structures of reality." But its reality reduces itself to its necessity. Again, as in Baudelaire, this appears to be half-belief, in which "structures of reality" are erected to correspond to needs. Reviewing this book in the *Kenyon Review* (Summer, 1945) Lionel Trilling refers us to two modern versions of the Devil, in Shaw's *Man and Superman,* and in Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov.* To judge Rougemont's paradoxical acceptance of the Devil, it is enlightening to hear what the Devil has to say to Ivan Karamazov:

"I lead you to belief and disbelief by turns, and I have my motive for it. It's the new method. As soon as you disbelieve in me completely, you'll begin by assuring me that I am not a dream but a reality. I know you."

Rougemont's Devil is related to Baudelaire's and Dostoyevsky's, though his traditional and orthodox aspects are insisted upon. Yet in his ironic and elusive fashion, Rougemont has much to say to us. His central perception—not a new one—is that the reality of the Devil is related to the reality of man's identity and of his sense of moral responsibility. The refusal to accept this responsibility is the disease of our times, leading to "depersonalization," escape from freedom, and flight into the mass. "We have seen things in terms too large for our capacities, we have lost on the way the golden rule, the man-standard." The way out, Rougemont holds, is to restore an anthropomorphic view of reality, intelligible and relevant to man:

The Devil has not sprung from a series of more or less authentic or ancient texts. For he is a permanent agent of human reality as we live it when we really live, in our state of *free* creatures, that is to say, constantly placed before choices, in contradiction and perplexity, paradox, tragedy. All this assumes and poses the existence of a good and of a something *other* than the good. Otherwise where would choice, tragedy, liberty lie?

This relation of the Devil to man's freedom reminds us of Milton as well as of Dostoyevsky. The limiting views, political or moral, are wittily, if sometimes irreponsibly, analyzed by Rougemont,—the idea of man's essential goodness, optimism, the reduction of evil to social forces, psychoanalysis, and all the familiar positions of determinism are there—and are shown to be inadequate backgrounds for the idea of man's freedom and for the possibility of happiness and salvation.

Rougemont avoids the dilemma of Baudelaire by adding a Michael to counterpoise Satan, thus escaping the horn of Manichaeism. His book concludes with a section called "The Blue of Heaven," offering a road out of the inferno:

What does it mean, to sanctify ourselves? The activity of the Devil being to overshadow in us the feeling of guilt, and to make us believe that it is always the *other*, the force of things or fatality that have brought about all the evil, the contrary activity alone will be sanctifying. . . .

We have to rediscover the fundamental catholicity, determined and revealed by God as being the order of his *Creation*. And we have to rediscover the ab-

solute of a good and an evil non-relative to our moral ideas, to the blinding suggestions of instinct or to the pressures of momentary interest; the absolute of a good and evil determined and revealed by God as being the order of his *Will.*

There Rougemont leaves us. He has been aware of the necessity of the vision of good as well as the vision of evil; but "The Blue of Heaven" has an almost negative reality. It is slightly reminiscent of the blue skies which beckon, in Aldous Huxley's latest popular morality, to the disembodied spirit of Eustace Barnack, and which that spirit, as far as we are allowed to follow him, so sensibly rejects for fragments of real, if evil, experience. For the limitations of half-belief are that, while it will be richly aware of the drama of evil in our experience, it will be defective in a sense of the drama of beatitude which Dante visualized in the *Paradiso.* This defect is increasingly characteristic of the neo-religion of our day, which moves often on the brink of neo-Manichaeism. Yet, since, as Rougemont is aware, "Everything leads us to believe that we are about to enter into an era of aberrant religions—or, as a great Indian legend says, into the Era of the Increase of Monsters," it is well that as much wit and light should be cast upon the traditional beliefs by secular investigators endowed with a sense of the history of ideas and the immediate problems of the time.

ANDREW CHIAPPE

Columbia University

BOOK NOTES

The Bhagavad Gita. Translated from the Sanskrit, with Notes, Comments, and Introduction by SWAMI NIKHILANANDA. New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1944. xvii, 386 pp. $3.00.

There has been a rich crop of *Bhagavadgīta* translations in recent years, almost as vast as the Indian commentaries to the *Gīta* that have flourished through the ages. In his brief foreword to the present publication, William Ernest Hocking rightly stresses that every new translation "adds a facet to the total sense." In fact there is a limit to the novelty still possible in a field as thoroughly explored as that of the *Gīta* translation. This present publication is particularly recommendable, not only because it is done by a Hindu, but also because of the comprehensive, careful commentary explanations which accompany every verse. A further virtue is to be seen in the adding of an elaborate outline of the *Mahābhārata,* without which the peace-hero Krishna is too often misinterpreted as a ruthless militarist.

Nikhilananda's present publication has proved to be an excellent text in university courses, and probably the best guide in lay groups circling around the *Gīta* which have formed recently in surprisingly many places throughout America.

It is further to be welcomed because the translator has included Śaṅkara's introduction, as well as an eight page glossary of Sanskrit terms. The spirit of Nikhilananda's understanding of the *Gīta* can best be seen in his summary on page 11: "Men suffer because they regard themselves as doers. When once they realize that the Lord alone is the Doer, then their duty, whatever its nature may be, will bring them joy and satisfaction. It will bring them spiritual success."

Without detracting at all from the value of this book, a critical word may be permitted: No attempt at textual criticism has been made, nor are the critical comments of present scholarship anywhere mentioned. This silence, however, is a general tendency among Hindu scholars which may be explained as a reaction against regrettable excesses of Western criticism. Yet the value of this criticism should not be completely disregarded. After all, Nikhilananada admits (p. 6), that "One does not find in the book consistency even in the use of certain important words." Another criticism may be based on the fact that the translator, though admitting that his explanations follow, in the main, Śaṅkara's commentary, never indicates where he might have used direct quotations. Such quotations, if they could be included in a future edition, would enhance the value of the book considerably. The same holds true as to the indebtedness of the translator to Sri Aurobindo, whose works are unfortunately still unavailable in most American libraries.

In conclusion, it may be questioned whether there might not have been, perhaps, a slight overemphasis on the *Gīta* in American studies of Hindu thought. The *Gīta* is, after all, not the only philosophical text of its kind, an opinion which has become fairly general by now. It is certainly regrettable that other

Mahābhārata texts, such as the *Anugīta* or the *Sanatsugatiya*, remain almost unknown. For beginners particularly, the *Gīta* is too rich and composite a work to be easily digested. Some plainer, one-line systems of Indian philosophy like Kapila's would perhaps better serve as introductory reading.

FREDERIC SPIEGELBERG

Encyclopedia of Bible Life. By MADELEINE S. and J. LANE MILLER. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944. xvi, 493 pp., illustrations, maps, and indexes. $4.95.

It should be stated at the outset that the energetic and skilful authors of this book, Rev. J. Lane and Mrs. (Madeleine S.) Miller use the term "Bible Life" in its fullest and broadest sense, and hence include in their *Encyclopedia* the cultures and religions of Mesopotamia, Syria, Egypt, Greece, and Rome. This is how an encyclopedia of Bible life should be composed, for the Old and New Testaments are, their uniqueness notwithstanding, an integral part of the ancient Mediterranean cultures, and an understanding of the former necessitates a knowledge of the latter. This handsome and beautifully illustrated encyclopedia (it contains one hundred full page photographs of ancient and modern themes) treats its subject matter under 1,694 headings, divided into 22 sections, and presents a veritable treasure of information of the life in "Bible Lands" from the most ancient to the most modern time, even including the Zionist colonies of present day Palestine. It is particularly gratifying to find the good use the compilers have made of the publications of the American Schools of Oriental Research, and many a scholar will find the excellent up-to-date bibliography at the end of each chapter and the five indices extremely useful.

Since this encyclopedia, the reviewer feels sure, will become a standard reference book with ministers, teachers, and students of the Ancient Near East, it is very regrettable that some parts of the book were written in a rather hasty manner, and that, as a result, inaccuracies and mistakes crept into the text. Authors of books for non-specialists ought to be particularly wary in this respect, for the layman has no means of checking the sources. The authors use almost consistently the term Sumer-Accad (pp. 1, 8, 443, etc.) instead of Sumero-Accadian; on pages 43 and 287 they speak of "Ugarit tablets found at Ras Shamra" and "Tablets recovered from Ugaritic Ras Shamra" without enlightening the reader that Ras esh-Shamra is the modern name of the ancient site of Ugarit. "Zezith" (p. 61) should be spelled *ṣiṣît* (or zizith). The authors wonder why the place name Tell el-Amarna is not mentioned in the Old Testament; well, it hardly could have been, since it is the modern Arabic name of ancient Akhetaten. As an illustration of hasty writing, the following example will suffice: "Many of the choice little (cuneiform) tablets . . . are only now (?) in progress of translation. Scholars need a grammar of the Accad language and of the various dialects in which cuneiform documents have been written" (p. 131). These

faults, however, do not detract from the great usefulness of the book under review. They have been stressed for the sake of corrections to be made in a future second edition which the *Encyclopedia* richly deserves. I. M.

According to Paul. By HARRIS FRANKLIN RALL. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1944. xv, 272 pp. $2.75.

Dr. Rall has long been a student of the New Testament, and is the author of several significant and valuable books in that field. He is best known, however, as a constructive theologian and, as such, has done his more important writing. In the present book, the Ayer Lectures of 1942, both of these interests are expressed, and the writer's great competence in both fields is demonstrated. The book is an interpretation of the theology of Paul, moving logically from an examination of the Apostle's conceptions of man and sin, through his doctrine of salvation, to a consideration of the nature and work of Christ, the idea of the Spirit, and the meaning of the Church. The concluding chapters are devoted largely to Paul's thinking about history and ethics.

It is impossible in a brief review to deal with Dr. Rall's discussion in detail. He is a liberal evangelical and is, perhaps, too much inclined to interpret Paul as such. But, on the whole, the portrait is trustworthy as well as sympathetic. The author is keenly aware of the fact that early Christianity was a living movement, not a system of ideas—"a religion in search of a theology," not a theology trying to produce a religion. Paul was primarily a religious man, a devout Jew, seized by a new faith, laid hold of by a new experience, caught up into the life of a new community; and his theology is his attempt to think through the meaning of what has happened to him. Dr. Rall regards—I think, rightly—Paul's Jewish heritage as the most influential element in his background as a Christian, and is disposed to emphasize—again, I think, rightly—the essential continuity between Jesus and Paul.

This book does not make, or pretend to make, any radically new contribution to our understanding of Paul at any particular point. It is an attempt to make Paul intelligible to contemporary readers. Such an attempt always involves the danger that one will stress elements in an ancient author which are congenial to the modern mood, and play down somewhat those elements which are alien. That danger, I would say, has not been altogether escaped in the present book. But can it ever be escaped entirely? Dr. Rall has been unusually successful in presenting a clear and sympathetic picture of Paul without excessive modernizing.

JOHN KNOX

The Dream of Descartes. By JACQUES MARITAIN. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1944. 220 pp. $3.00.

Those who have some doubt about the benefit to modern thinking of Descartes and of the Cartesians will find this book worth reading, as it brands Cartesianism, "the greatest sin of French philosophy."

The first of the five essays gives interesting details about Descartes' experience the night of November 10, 1619. This material has been generally neglected, because Descartes' biographer, Baillet, is inaccessible.

The "dangers" of Descartes' science are seen when it is contrasted with the scholastic science. Descartes himself was aware of them, and had presented his philosophy in "masqued" form to avoid the criticism of the Church. His extreme emphasis upon science deposed Wisdom. It made Wisdom a derivative of science rather than of religion. Nevertheless, one has to smile at the thought that the error of Protestantism is thus worked out in the thought of Descartes.

Essay IV, which is the only essay written specifically for this volume, compares three Cartesian proofs for God with scholastic thinking on the subject, and finds that God depends upon mathematics instead of mathematics upon God.

For a Frenchman who is highly respected in the Church, to choose between Descartes, with his clarity of style and love of proof, and a more orthodox system of thought must have caused anguish of heart. To an American of different convictions the negative criticism of Descartes is more convincing than the alternative to which M. Maritain feels he must turn.

ROBERT G. REMSBERG

War, Peace, and Nonresistance. By GUY F. HERSHBERGER. Scottdale, Pa.: The Herald Press, 1944. xv, 415 pp. $2.50.

Dr. Hershberger's thorough treatment of the Mennonite peace testimony is a useful help toward understanding the biblical people who have afforded forty per cent of all American conscientious objectors in World War II.[1] On the faculty at Goshen College (Indiana), Professor Hershberger is a member of a notable circle of church historians which has brought attention in this country to the little known treasures of the Left Wing of the Reformation, and distinction to their journal, *The Mennonite Quarterly Review*. His scope includes the vigorous statement of Felix Manz in the radical circle at Zurich, 1525: "No Christian smites with the sword nor resists evil," and the latest problem in Civilian Public Service: "They believed . . . that the C.P.S. plan as adopted was the best solution under conscription which they could find." He is at home in the field, whether dealing with the views of Menno Simons concerning the Law under the Old and New Covenants, or analyzing the contributions of A. J. Muste and Reinhold Niebuhr to the discussion. He manages to criticize a good deal of loose thinking within the ranks of the "pacifist movement," to distinguish sharply biblical nonresistance from such social positivism, and at the same time to maintain the good temper and tolerance toward persons which has been one of the glories of "Anabaptism" throughout four centuries of congregational life.

1. It complements, in dealing with the historic peace churches, the recent work by Rufus D. Bowman, *The Church of the Brethren and War, 1708-1941* (Elgin, Ill., 1944), and the classic by Margaret Hirst, *The Quakers in Peace and War* (London, 1923).

The Anabaptist vision was the restitution of the Golden Age of the faith, New Testament Christianity as it was before "the Fall of the Church" in the reign of Constantine the Great. The True Church was the simple and nonresistant community of missionaries and martyrs, not the proud state-church. They proposed to follow through on the radical restitution from which the "half-way men" (Luther and Zwingli) hung back. Savagely persecuted for their practice of religious voluntarism in Reformed, Lutheran, and Roman Catholic lands, they were the forerunners of the free congregations in England and America. The Mennonites of the U. S. A. have retained that high optimism toward those called to be Christians, balanced by a deeply biblical pessimism toward the world, which characterized the maturity of the continental movement. When evil breaks forth in its most virulent forms they are not surprised nor unprepared. The direction and end of history are in the hands of God; theirs is to follow faithfully in the footsteps of the Master.

American "Mennonites" are largely descended from the Swiss and South German Brethren. We have, therefore, the curious fact that the real "Mennonites" (those directly descended of Menno's congregations) do not maintain the nonresistant witness. Certain continental Mennonite writers have attempted to prove that refusal to take oath and bear arms was not an integral part of earlier Anabaptist life.[2] According to this line of interpretation, the nonresistance of the fathers of the movement was tied to their martyrdom, and with their determination to dissociate themselves from the revolutionary episode at Münster. In countries where they have come to enjoy religious liberty, they may participate wholeheartedly in official and military affairs. In Holland they number some of the most prosperous and powerful leaders in government and business.

Although American Mennonites teach the New Testament discipline of the Sermon on the Mount in full, and still largely forego political life and influence, it is clear that they are opposed to revolutionary activity as much as are the continental groups. Modern pacifism—"a mixture of religious liberalism, the social gospel, and Satyagraha"—is distinguished from Scriptural obedience to God (pp. 219 f.). Since 1935 the Mennonite Church has signed numerous agreements with labor organizations to remove members from participation in coercive measures; other members have left jobs when the closed shop was introduced (pp. 285 f.). We may conclude, then, that in the political and economic sphere they are content with a vocational witness, whose Scriptural foundations, history, and problems are here carefully presented for the use of alert students of Christianity and the Gospel of the Prince of Peace.

FRANKLIN H. LITTELL

2. Notably, W. Mannhardt, *Die Wehrfreiheit der Altpreussischen Mennoniten* (Marienburg & Danzig, 1863); K. Vos, *De Weerloosheid der Doopsgezinden* (Amsterdam, 1924). John Horsch maintains the point of view of the American groups in "An Historical Survey of the Position of the Mennonite Church on Nonresistance," *The Mennonite Quarterly Review,* I (1927), 3, 5-22, 4, 3-20.

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

Oriental Religions

Far Eastern Bibliography 1945. Prepared by Earl H. Pritchard. *Far Eastern Quarterly,* IV (1945), 204-12; 303-7.

The Spirit of Asia. By Dhirendra Nath Roy. *Prabuddha Bharata,* L (1945), 35-42.

The Impact of Confucianism on Seventeenth Century Europe. By Arnold H. Rowbotham. *Far Eastern Quarterly,* IV (1945), 224-42.

Twelve Principles of Buddhism. *The Middle Way,* XIX (1945) 125-26.

Buddhism and the Ethical Movement. By R. J. Jackson. *The Middle Way,* XX (1945), 8-10.

Some Contemporary Buddhist Interpretations of the Bible. By Charles S. Braden. *Shane Quarterly,* VI (1945), 127-37.

The Cultural and Social Status of Indian Women in Vedic and Mediaeval Times. By Pandita Kahamabai Row. *Aryan Path,* XVI (1945), 162-68.

The Shrauta Diksha. By Jagadishchandra Mitra. *Prabuddha Bharata,* L (1945), 99-104.

Gita through a Modern Eye. By C. T. Srinivasan. *Vedanta Kesari,* XXXI (1945), 215-19; 238-42.

The Puranas. By Kshetralal Saha. *Kalyana Kalpataru,* XI (1945), 114-17; 162-65.

Monism, Qualified Monism, and Dualism: A Re-Synthesis. By Dewan Bahadur K. S. Ramaswami Sastri. *Prabuddha Bharata,* L (1945), 66-70.

Cow Number. *Kalyana Kalpataru.* XI (1945), No. 1; No. 2 is also devoted to the veneration of the cow.

Image-Worship in Hinduism. By Satischandra Chatterjee. *Vedanta Kesari,* XXXII (1945), 5-8.

Swami Vivekananda in the West. By Swami Atulananda. *Prabuddha Bharata,* L (1945) 89-92; 119-28.

Scientific Confirmations of Theosophy in 1944. By Charles J. Ryan. *Theosophical Forum,* XXIII (1945), 148-57.

When Islam Came to Iran. By Irach J. S. Taraporewala. *Aryan Path,* XVI (1945), 124-30.

The Cultural Influence of Islam on the History of India. By Sir Azizul Huque. *Moslem Sunrise,* XVII (1945), 18-23.

Comparative Religion in the Azhar University. By Charles C. Adams. *Moslem World,* XXXV (1945), 111-25.

Mohammedanism in Nigeria. By George W. Sadler. *Moslem World,* XXXV (1945), 133-37.

Islam in Malaya. By R. A. Blasdell. *International Review of Missions,* XXXIV (1945), 165-72.

The New Order. By Hazrat Mirza Bashir-ud-din Mahmud Ahmad. *Moslem Sunrise,* XVII (1945), No. 1, 9-17. No. 2, 8-25.

Christianity and Islam. By Frithjof Schuon. *Arab World,* I (1945), No. 3, 44-45, 72-80.

What Should We Think of "The New History Society" in the Light of the San Francisco Conference? By Lee G. Kassardji. *New History,* XIV (1945), No. 8, 4-6.

Judaism

The Horse and the Ass in the Bible. An Essay on Zechariah 9:9, 10. By Charles W. F. Smith. *Anglican Theological Review,* XXVII (1945), 86-97.

The Jewish Doctrine of Human Immortality. By Louis Finkelstein. *Harvard Divinity School Bulletin,* XLII (1945), No. 7, 5-34.

Important Passover Texts in Josephus and Philo. By Grace Amadon. *Anglican Theological Review,* XXVII (1945), 109-15.

A Faith's Mystic Quest. By Bernard Heller. *Christendom,* X (1945) 188-99.

The Testimonial Oath. By Boaz Cohen. *Historia Judaica,* VII (1945), 51-74.

The Jews in Medieval Carinthia. By Joseph Babad. *Historia Judaica,* VII (1945), 13-28.

The Jews of Central Asia (Khorasan) in Medieval Literature. By Walter J. Fischel. *Historia Judaica,* VII (1945), 29-50.

Moses Hess. By Martin Buber. *Jewish Social Studies,* VII (1945), 137-48.

Ritual in the Jewish Home. By Jack J. Cohen. *The Reconstructionist,* XI (1945), No. 7, 14-19.

The Jew as Public Servant. By Albert I. Gordon. *The Reconstructionist,* XI (1945), No. 6, 17-23.

A Symposium: Christian-Jewish Relationships. *Journal of Bible and Religion,* XIII (1945), 72-105.

Anti-Semitism. By Solomon Zeitlin. *Crozer Quarterly,* XXII (1945), 134-49.

Anti-Semitism and the National Conference of Jews and Christians. By Willard Johnson. *The Humanist,* V (1945), 30-35.

This Is God's Country. By O. Walter Wagner. *The Protestant,* VI (1945), No. 4, 12-13.

Fascist Test Philadelphia. By Ben Richardson. *The Protestant,* VI (1945), No. 4, 16-18.

Antisemitism in the Post-War World. By Koppel S. Pinson. *Jewish Social Studies,* VII (1945), 99-118.

Hitler and Israel, or On Prayer. By Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. *Journal of Religion,* XXV (1945), 129-39.

Reconciliation in Palestine: A Comment. By Sir Wyndham Deedes. *Hibbert Journal,* XLIII (1945), 265-69.

Who Bars Palestine's Door? By Kenneth Leslie. *The Protestant,* VI (1945), No. 4, 1-5.

The Conversion of the Chief Rabbi of Rome to Catholicism. *Religions,* No. 51 (April, 1945), 22-23.

The Joseph Books. By GRACE GOLDIN. *Reconstructionist,* XI (1945), No. 5, 9-12.

Thomas Mann and the Midrash. By BERTHA BADT-STRAUSS. *Reconstructionist,* XI (1945), No. 5, 12-16.

CHRISTIANITY: HISTORICAL

A Bibliography of Dispensationalism. By ARNOLD D. EHLERT. *Bibliotheca Sacra,* CI (1944), 95-101; 199-209; 319-28; 447-60; CII (1945), 84-92; 207-19; 322-34.

What Jesus Thought about Himself. By HILLYER H. STRATON. *Christendom,* X (1945), 222-29.

Soteriology. By LEWIS SPERRY CHAFER. *Bibliotheca Sacra,* CII (1945), 8-26; 135-52.

Christ's Role in the Universe According to St. Irenaeus. By DOMINIC UNGER, O.F.M. *Franciscan Studies,* XXVI (1945), 3-20; 114-37.

The New Testament Conception of Worship. By JAMES G. VAN BUREN. *Shane Quarterly,* VI (1945), 36-87.

A Much Neglected Spiritual Asset. In Other Words a Brief Plea for a More Intimate Knowledge of the Apochrypha. *The Chronicle* (1945), XLV (1945), 176-79.

Paul and the Primitive Church. By S. MACLEAN GILMOUR. *Journal of Religion,* XXV (1945), 119-28.

The Churches and War: Historic Attitudes Toward Christian Participation. By ROLAND H. BAINTON. *Social Action,* XI (1945), No. 1, 3-71.

The Lady and the Emperor—A Study in the Domitian Persecution. By JOHANNES KNUDSEN. *Church History,* XIV (1945), 17-32.

Saints and Women in the Fourth Century. By AMBROSE W. VERNON. *Christendom,* X (1945), 163-75.

Christendom's Cultural Debt to Islam. By T. CUYLER YOUNG. *Moslem World,* XXXV (1945), 89-110.

The Platonic Academy of Florence. By HERBERT L. STEWART. *Hibbert Journal,* XLIII (1945), 226-36.

The Life and Works of Thomas of Celano. By GILBERT WDZIECZNY, O.F.M. CONV. *Franciscan Studies,* XXVI (1945), 55-68.

The Pointed Arch in Franciscan Theology. By THOMAS PLASSMANN, O.F.M. *Franciscan Studies,* XXVI (1945), 97-13.

The Gifts of the Holy Ghost. By JOHN OF ST. THOMAS. (English trans.). *The Thomist,* VIII (1945), 244-84; 369-403.

Marignolli and the Decline of Medieval Missions in China. By MARION A. HABIG, *O.F.M. Franciscan Studies,* XXVI (1945), 21-36.

Fray Manuel des Santisimo Sacramento, the Last Franciscan in Kiangsi, China. By BERNWARD WILEKE, *O.F.M. Franciscan Studies,* XXVI (1945), 175-96.

Magie et Poesie. *Hemispheres* (Special Number), II (1945) No. 5.

The Layman's Complaint and the Friar's Answer. By FRANCIS LEE UTLEY. *Harvard Theological Review,* XXXVIII (1945), 141-47.

The Shape of the Liturgy. By E. C. RATCLIFF. *Theology,* XLVIII (1945), 127-31.

On Life and Books. By ALBERT PEEL. *Congregational Quarterly,* XXIII (1945), 158-68.

A Neglected Page in Anglican Theology. By H. A. HODGES. *Theology,* XLVIII (1945), 104-110.

A Victorian Prelate. By PERCY V. NORWOOD. *Church History,* XIV (1945), 8-16.

A Layman's View of the Irish Church. By H. R. CHILLINGWORTH. *Modern Churchman,* XXXV (1945), 33-40.

Religious Enthusiasm and Separatism in Colonial New England. By MAURICE W. ARMSTRONG. *Harvard Theological Review,* XXXVIII (1945), 111-40.

Churches under Enemy Occupation, Philadelphia, 1777-8. By NELSON WAITE RIGHTMYER. *Church History,* XIV (1945), 33-60.

Natural Religion and Religious Liberty. By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET. *Harvard Divinity School Bulletin,* XLII (1945), No. 7, 35-50.

The Social Influence of the Baptists. By SHAILER MATHEWS. *The Chronicle* (Baptist), VIII (1945), 55-63.

Symposium on the Doctrine of the Church. *Christian Horizons,* VII (1945), No. 3, 3-8.

A Romantic Story, By W. T. T. MILHAM. *World Dominion,* XXIII (1945), 148-52.

Among Australian Aborigines. By W. H. RAINEY. *World Dominion,* XXIII (1945), 167-73.

Dom Paul Bellot, O.S.B. By PETER ANSON. *Liturgical Arts,* XIII (1945), 50-52.

CHRISTIANITY: CONTEMPORARY

Pius XII and World War II. By HEINZ POL. *The Protestant,* VI (1945), No. 5, 14-19.

Clerical Fascism and Totalitarianism. By EDWIN H. WILSON. *The Humanist,* V (1945), 49-52.

United Nations Hoax? By THE EDITOR. *The Protestant,* VI (1945), No. 5, 3-6.

The Sacrament of Confession. By MILITZA ZERNOV. *Sobornost,* No. 31 (New Series), June, 1945.

Rogationtide. By ADRIAN BELL. *Current Religious Thought,* V (1945), No. 5, 12-14.

"The 1949 Prayer Book." By F. R. BOLTON and K. W. MEIKLEJOHN. *Theology,* XLVIII (1945), 80-86.

At the Home Base of the Swedish Missions. By NORMAN GOODALL. *International Review of Missions,* XXXIV (1945), 187-92.

Christian Higher Education in China. By PAUL C. T. KWEI. *International Review of Missions,* XXXIV (1945), 173-78.

The Christian Church, What of Its Future? By JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JR. *The Chronicle* (Baptist), VIII (1945), 49-54.

Recent Evidences of Theological Vitality. By EDWIN LEWIS. *Drew Gateway,* XVI (1945), 23-26.

The Place of Systematic Theology. By E. J. PRICE. *Congregational Quarterly,* XXIII (1945), 122-32.

Our Culture and Our Religious Life. By SAMUEL L. HAMILTON. *Christendom*, X (1945), 177-87.

Chaos in the Study of Religion: A Plea for a New Approach. By D. W. GUNDRY. *Hibbert Journal*, XLIII (1945), 198-203.

A Religious Apologetic and Program. By GEORGE YEISLEY RUSK. *The Personlist*, 176-89.

Toward an International Declaration of Interdependence. By CHRISTIAN RICHARD. *Freedom*, IV (1945), 49-63.

The Challenge of Present-Day Fundamentalism. By GEORGE M. GIBSON. *Journal of Bible and Religion*, XIII (1945), 67-71.

America's New Folk Movement. By CLARENCE Q. BERGER and KURT SINGER. *Religious Digest*, Vol. XVIII (1945), No. 115, 88-96.

God and the War. By JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN. *Christianity and Society*, XI (1945), No. 2, 11-15.

The God of the Foxholes. By HAROLD H. WATTS. *Christendom*, X (1945), 200-9.

GENERAL THEORY OF RELIGION

The Non-Christian Religions and the Religion of the Future. By F. H. HILLIARD. *Modern Churchman*, XXXIV (1945), 345-50.

Eastern Wisdom and Western Psychology. By E. GRAHAM HOWE. *The Middle Way*, XX (1945), 4-6.

Emanation and Creation. By THEODORE P. ROESER. *New Scholasticism*, XIX (1945), 85-116.

The Value of Creation. By JAMES F. KELEHER. *The Thomist*, VIII (1945), 233-43.

The Lure of Beauty. By JOHN FEARON, O.P. *The Thomist*, VIII (1945), 149-84.

Synesius on the Imagination. By SIDNEY H. SPODE. *Modern Churchman*, XXXIV (1945), 365-67.

Agape and Eros. By JOHN A. T. ROBINSON. *Theology*, XLVIII (1945), 98-104.

God and Man. By LEO TREPP. *The Reconstructionist*, XI (1945), No. 7, 10-13.

The Law of Nature: Some General Considerations. By JAMES LUTHER ADAMS. *Journal of Religion*, XXV (1945), 88-96.

The Church and the World (Church Congress Syllabus 38), *Anglican Theological Review*, XXVII (1945), 105-8.

Religion and Its Place in Our Life. By THE EDITOR. *Prabuddha Bharata*, L (1945), 30-35.

I Believe. By RICHARD MACKENZIE. *Religion in Life*, XIV (1945), 237-45.

What Is Religious Liberalism? By WORCESTER PERKINS. *The Chronicle*, XLV (1945), 153-56.

The Relevance of Christian Ethics. By RANDOLPH CRUMP MILLER. *Religion in Life*, XIV (1945), 205-15.

Roosevelt's Ethical Will. By IRA EISENSTEIN. *The Reconstructionist*, XI (1945), No. 6, 10-12.

Dogma, Drift or Humanism? By WARREN TAYLOR. *The Humanist*, V (1945), 21-23.

The Ascetic Temper of Modern Humanism. By Bernard Eugene Meland. *The Personalist,* xxvi (1945), 153-65.

A Personalistic View of Human Nature. By Edgar Sheffield Brightman. *Religion in Life,* xiv (1945), 216-27.

Do We Need a Philosophy of Religion? By W. R. Matthews. *Hibbert Journal,* xliii (1945), 194-97.

Truth: The Stages in Its Pursuit. By V. Subrahmanya Iyer. *The Aryan Path,* xvi (1945), 59-65.

From the Commission's Mailbag. Edited by Brand Blanshard. *Philosophical Review,* liv (1945), 197-259.

Facts, Faith and Philosophy. By A. R. Poduval. *Vedanta Kesari,* xxxi (1945), 197-99.

Shakespeare Answers the Query, "What is Man?" By J. V. Moldenhawer. *Anglican Theological Review,* xxvii (1945), 79-85.

The Liturgy, Art, and Common Sense. By Maurice Lavanoux. *Liturgical Arts,* xiii (1945), 52-55.

Nietzsche Re-studied: Has He a Message for Our Time? By F. McEachran. *Hibbert Journal,* xliii (1945), 237-43.

A Poet Speaks to Our Need. By Walter Russell Bowie. *Religion in Life,* xiv (1945), 278-89.

The Theology of C. S. Lewis. By E. L. Allen. *Modern Churchman,* xxxiv (1945), 317-24.

Religion's Part in Modern Life. A Psychological Approach. By T. Wigley. *Religions,* No. 51 (April, 1945), 12-16.

Psychotherapy and the Christian Ministry. By David E. Roberts. *Religion in Life,* xiv (1945), 184-94.

The Conscious, the Sub-Conscious, the Unconscious, and the Super-Conscious in Psychology. By P. S. Naidu. *Prabuddha Bharata,* l (1945), 70-74.

The Religious Significance of Eddington. By Reginald A. Smith. *Modern Churchman,* xxxiv (1945), 332-39.

Is There a Force Unknown to Physics? By B. Abdy Collins. *Hibbert Journal,* xliii (1945), 252-57.